On Point blog, page 2 of 2

An unconstitutional application of the 5th standard of dangerousness?

Outagamie County v. C.A., 2017AP450, District 3, 1/23/18 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity

The records for Chapter 51 cases are confidential, so we have not seen the briefs for this case. But, judging from this court of appeals opinion, it doesn’t take much beyond a mental illness diagnosis to get yourself committed under §51.20(1)(a)2e, Wisconsin’s 5th standard of dangerousness. A little unsubstantiated hearsay about your frustration with the justice system just might do the trick.

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Defense win! Insufficient evidence of dangerousness under any of the 5 standards of dangerousness

Milwaukee County v. Cheri V., 2012AP1737, District 1, 12/18/12

 court of appeals decision (1-judge, ineligible for publication); case activity

 

Mental health commitment, § 51.20, requires proof of mental illness and dangerousness. Cheri V. limits this challenge to the latter; the court agrees:

¶7        As seen from our recitation of the facts adduced at the trial, however, there is absolutely no evidence that any of the statutory prerequisites were met—yelling at and pointing a finger at another person,

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Mental Commitment – Finding of Dangerousness

Trempealeau County v. Charles O., 2011AP2794, District 3, 5/1/12

court of appeals decision (1-judge, not for publication); for Charles O.: William E. Schmaal, SPD, Madison Appellate; case activity

The court rejects Charles O.’s argument that the evidence fell short of the “fifth-standard” showing of dangerousness, § 51.20(1)(a)2.e., State v. Dennis H., 2002 WI 104, ¶14, 255 Wis. 2d 359, 647 N.W.2d 851:

¶11      When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence,

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Mental Health Commitment – “Fifth Standard” – Constitutionality

State v. Dennis H., 2002 WI 104, on certification
For Dennis H.: Ellen Henak, SPD Milwaukee Appellate

Issue: Whether the “fifth standard” for mental commitment, § 51.20(1)(a)2.e. (roughly: refusing treatment due to incapacity for making rational treatment decision), is constitutional.

Holding: The statute isn’t vague — the state must prove the various “elements” of this standard (which the court spells out and won’t be repeated here).

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