On Point: f. 51.20(1)(a)2. Dangerousness

Langlade County v. D.J.W., 2017AP1313-FT, District 3, 11/7/17 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

There was sufficient evidence at D.J.W.’s commitment trial to establish he met the standard for dangerousness under § 51.20(1)(a)2.d.

Marathon County v. R.O., 2016AP1898-FT, 2/27/17, District 3 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

In 2016 R.O. was detained under § 51.15 after she was evicted and went to a local shelter but wasn’t able to do the paperwork to stay at the shelter. According to the two doctors who examined her while she was under emergency detention, R.O. was angry, defiant, irritable, displayed some paranoia, refused to cooperate with certain parts of the exams, and ‘lacked insight” into her illness. (¶¶2-6). These observations, in conjunction with information in her records describing past episodes that ended in hospitalization, were sufficient to justify the circuit court’s finding she was dangerous to herself.

Dodge County v. J.T., 2016AP613, District 4, 2/9/17 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

The threats J.T. made in a letter provided sufficient evidence to find him dangerous to others under § 51.30(1)(a)2.b.

Iowa County v. J.L.R., 2016AP1459, 1/12/17 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

J.L.R. challenges her ch. 51 commitment on the ground that there was insufficient evidence that she was dangerous to herself or others. The court of appeals finds sufficient evidence as to danger to others, and so affirms.

Rock County v. S.J.M., 2016AP255-FT, 5/19/16, District 4 (one-judge opinion; ineligible for publication); case activity

A circuit court involuntarily committed S.J.M. under §51.20(1)(a)1 -2 after finding him mentally ill, a proper subject for treatment, and dangerous.  S.J.M. challenged the “dangerous” determination and, specifically, the finding that he threatened his mother with serious physical harm, which made her reasonably fear violent behavior and serious harm from him.

Outagamie County v. Adam B., 2015AP718, 4/12/16, District 3 (1-judge opinion; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

The circuit court neglected to specify which of the 5 statutory “dangerousness” standards in §51.20(1)(a)2.a-e supported the Ch. 51 commitment of Adam B. But that did not trouble the court of appeals. Given the “de novo” standard of review, it could (and did) decide for itself which statutory “dangerousness” test the facts satisfied.

Kenosha County v. CMM, 2015AP504, 9/23/15, District 2 (1-judge opinion; ineligible for publication); case activity

Like many Chapter 51 appeals, this one didn’t challenge any legal standards. It argued that the evidence in this particular case did not meet the test for “dangerousness” in §51.20(1)(a)2.d. The court of appeals found the evidence more than sufficient.

Ozaukee County v. M.L.G., 2015AP1469-FT, 9/23/15, District 2 (1-judge opinion; ineligible for publication); case activity

More specifically, the court of appeals held that the County had offered evidence sufficient to establish that MLG was dangerous under §51.20(1)(a)2.c and that he was substantially incapable of understanding his treatment options under § 51.61(1)(g)4b:

Walworth County DHS v. M.M.L., 2014AP2845, 7/15/15, District 2 (one-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

The court of appeals affirms the involuntary commitment for M.M.L. under § 51.20(1)(a)2.c., which requires evidence of impaired judgment based on recent acts or omissions showing a substantial probability that she would physically impair or injure herself or others. It rejects her challenges to the sufficiency of evidence and the testifying examiner’s references to  hearsay he relied on when forming his opinion.

Rock County v. J.N.B., 2014AP774, District 4, 3/26/16 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

Having rejected the no merit report filed by J.N.B.’s appellate counsel and ordered counsel to brief the issue of the sufficiency of the evidence, the court of appeals declares “the County presented ample evidence demonstrating that J.N.B. is dangerous because he evidences such ‘impaired judgment, manifested by evidence of a pattern of recent acts or omissions, that there is a substantial probability of physical impairment or injury to himself,’” § 51.20(1)(a)2.c.