On Point: f. 51.20(1)(a)2. Dangerousness

Milwaukee County v. I.K., 2017AP1425, District 1, 5/8/18 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

The County proved I.K. was dangerous under both § 51.20(1)(a)2.d., by showing there was a substantial probability I.K. would suffer physical harm resulting from his inability to satisfy basic needs due to mental illness, and § 51.20(1)(a)2.e., by showing that, after being advised of the advantages and disadvantages of accepting treatment, I.K. was unable to understand and make an informed choice regarding treatment and that a lack of treatment will result in further disability or deterioration.

Chippewa County v. M.M., 2017AP1325, 5/1/18, District 3, (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity

You don’t see this very often. A jury found M.M. mentally ill, a proper subject for treatment, and dangerous under §51.20(1)(a)2.c based on testimony by not 1, not 2, but 3 doctors–all of whom said that M.M.’s paranoia and conduct would cause others to feel fearful and threatened and possibly assault him in an effort to protect themselves. This idea that M.M. was “indirectly” dangerous to himself did not wash with the court of appeals. It reversed and also rejected the County’s claim that M.M.’s appeal from this 6-month commitment was moot.

Outagamie County v. C.A., 2017AP450, District 3, 1/23/18 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity

The records for Chapter 51 cases are confidential, so we have not seen the briefs for this case. But, judging from this court of appeals opinion, it doesn’t take much beyond a mental illness diagnosis to get yourself committed under §51.20(1)(a)2e, Wisconsin’s 5th standard of dangerousness. A little unsubstantiated hearsay about your frustration with the justice system just might do the trick.

Langlade County v. D.J.W., 2017AP1313-FT, District 3, 11/7/17 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

There was sufficient evidence at D.J.W.’s commitment trial to establish he met the standard for dangerousness under § 51.20(1)(a)2.d.

Marathon County v. R.O., 2016AP1898-FT, 2/27/17, District 3 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

In 2016 R.O. was detained under § 51.15 after she was evicted and went to a local shelter but wasn’t able to do the paperwork to stay at the shelter. According to the two doctors who examined her while she was under emergency detention, R.O. was angry, defiant, irritable, displayed some paranoia, refused to cooperate with certain parts of the exams, and ‘lacked insight” into her illness. (¶¶2-6). These observations, in conjunction with information in her records describing past episodes that ended in hospitalization, were sufficient to justify the circuit court’s finding she was dangerous to herself.

Dodge County v. J.T., 2016AP613, District 4, 2/9/17 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

The threats J.T. made in a letter provided sufficient evidence to find him dangerous to others under § 51.30(1)(a)2.b.

Iowa County v. J.L.R., 2016AP1459, 1/12/17 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

J.L.R. challenges her ch. 51 commitment on the ground that there was insufficient evidence that she was dangerous to herself or others. The court of appeals finds sufficient evidence as to danger to others, and so affirms.

Rock County v. S.J.M., 2016AP255-FT, 5/19/16, District 4 (one-judge opinion; ineligible for publication); case activity

A circuit court involuntarily committed S.J.M. under §51.20(1)(a)1 -2 after finding him mentally ill, a proper subject for treatment, and dangerous.  S.J.M. challenged the “dangerous” determination and, specifically, the finding that he threatened his mother with serious physical harm, which made her reasonably fear violent behavior and serious harm from him.

Outagamie County v. Adam B., 2015AP718, 4/12/16, District 3 (1-judge opinion; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

The circuit court neglected to specify which of the 5 statutory “dangerousness” standards in §51.20(1)(a)2.a-e supported the Ch. 51 commitment of Adam B. But that did not trouble the court of appeals. Given the “de novo” standard of review, it could (and did) decide for itself which statutory “dangerousness” test the facts satisfied.

Kenosha County v. CMM, 2015AP504, 9/23/15, District 2 (1-judge opinion; ineligible for publication); case activity

Like many Chapter 51 appeals, this one didn’t challenge any legal standards. It argued that the evidence in this particular case did not meet the test for “dangerousness” in §51.20(1)(a)2.d. The court of appeals found the evidence more than sufficient.