On Point blog, page 8 of 14
SCOW to address 48-hour deadline for filing Chapter 51 examiners’ report
Fond du Lac County v. S.N.W., 2019AP2073, petition for review granted 11/19/20; case activity
Issues presented:
1. Did the circuit court lack competency to adjudicate this Chapter 51 commitment proceeding due to the county’s violation of the rule requiring it to file psychiatric reports 48 hours before the final hearing?
2. If the circuit court retained competency, did it err in admitting a tardy report and the testimony of the report’s author?
Evidence sufficient to satisfy Chapter 51’s 4th standard of dangerousness
Vilas County DHS v. N.J.P., 2019AP1567, 12/15/20, District 3 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity
In this appeal from an initial commitment, the county conceded that it had not offered clear and convincing evidence to mee the 4th standard of dangerousness. It asked the court of appeals to affirm the commitment based on the 5th standard of dangerousness. The court of appeals rejected the county’s concession and affirmed on the 4th standard because N.J.P., who is mentally ill, had been expelled from a homeless shelter and was found dressed in tattered clothes on a bitterly cold day.
COA takes close look at 51 extension, sees problems, affirms
Waukesha County v. L.J.M., 2020AP820, 11/4/20, District 2 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity
L.J.M. (“Lisa”) appeals the extension of her commitment under ch. 51. In a thorough opinion, the court of appeals affirms, though not without pointing out deficiencies in the county’s case and the circuit court’s decision.
Court rejects hearsay, sufficiency claims in ch. 51 appeal
Waukesha County v. I.R.T., 2020AP996, 11/4/20, District 2 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication) case activity
The county sought to extend I.R.T.’s commitment but could not be located for a time. Eventually the court issued a capias and I.R.T. was arrested. At the extension hearing, there was testimony that after his parole in a criminal matter ended I.R.T. had become homeless and had not taken medications or communicated with the county or his “outpatient prescribers.” (¶14). A psychologist opined that I.R.T. would be dangerous if treatment were withdrawn due to his history of noncompliance with treatment and his “history of psychotic symptoms, and threatening behaviors toward others” and referred to information received from “staff” at an unnamed facility and I.R.T.’s parents. (¶16).
COA clarifies when Chapter 51’s 72-hour clock begins for persons detained on criminal charges
Columbia County v. J.M.C., Jr., 2020AP1001, District 4, 10/22/20 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity
J.M.C. was taken to jail on possible criminal charges. Two days later, the County filed a Chapter 51 petition for his commitment. Section 51.20(7) provides that the circuit court must hold a probable cause hearing within 72 hours of taking a person into custody under §51.20. The circuit court dismissed the petition for violation of the 72-hour rule, and the County appealed arguing that the circuit court erred in determining what triggered 72-hour clock triggered.
Expert testimony provided sufficient evidence of dangerousness at ch. 51 extension hearing
Fond du Lac County v. S.N.W., 2020AP274-FT, District 2, 7/15/20 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication), petition for review granted 11/19/20; case activity
The testimony of the county’s expert provided sufficient evidence of dangerousness under § 51.20(1)(a)2.b. and (1)(am).
Who needs examiner reports 48 hours before a Chapter 51 hearing?
Fond du Lac v. S.N.W., 2019AP2073, 6/17/20, District 2 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity
We detect the unmistakable odor of SCOW bait. One of two court appointed medical experts failed to submit his examiner’s report within 48 hours before the final hearing for an original commitment of a prisoner. S.N.W. argued that this violation deprived the circuit court of competence to adjudicate the case. Alternatively, if the court retained competency, the report had to be excluded. The court of appeals disagreed. Who needs expert reports 48 before trial? Not defense lawyers striving to defend their clients’s rights. They can just wing it. This decision is at odds with several unpublished opinions and thus sets up a good petition for review.
Wisconsin Supreme Court issues a BIG defense win on Chapter 51!
Langlade County v. D.J.W., 2020 WI 41, reversing an unpublished court of appeals opinion, 4/24/20; case activity
Wisconsin’s involuntary commitment rate is higher than that of any other state–by a long shot. According to a report for the Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services, the annual commitment rate among states ranges from 0.23 to 43.8 per 1,000 adults with serious mental illness. The average is 9.4 per 1,000, with Wisconsin at 43.8. SCOW’s decision in this case can reduce the number of fait accompli commitment hearings–but only if defense lawyers invoke it and trial courts take it seriously.
Defense win! SCOW declares part of Ch. 51’s involuntary medication statute unconstitutional
Winnebago County v. C.S., 2020 WI 33, reversing a published court of appeals opinion; 4/10/20; case activity
This is a BIG case for Chapter 51 lawyers! In a 4-3 opinion, SCOW held that when a court commits a prison inmate under Chapter 51, it cannot order involuntary medication without finding the inmate dangerous first. The decision changes trial procedure for inmates commitments, but also has implications for the involuntary medication of non-inmates under Chapter 51.
SCOW holds ch. 51 commitment not moot but affirms on the merits
Marathon County v. D.K., 2020 WI 8, 2/4/2020, affirming an unpublished court of appeals decision; 2017AP2217; (case activity)
The caption is the most confusing part of this opinion:
ZIEGLER, J., delivered the majority opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I., II., III., IV.A., IV.B., and IV.C.1, in which ROGGENSACK, C.J., REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, KELLY, and HAGEDORN, JJ., joined, the majority opinion of the Court with respect to Part V., in which ROGGENSACK, C.J., KELLY and HAGEDORN, JJ., joined, and an opinion with respect to Parts IV.C.2., and IV.D., in which ROGGENSACK, C.J., and HAGEDORN, JJ., joined. REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which KELLY, J., joined. DALLET, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J., joined.
But it’s not as bad as it looks! And this decision makes (some) law: specifically, that an appeal of an original commitment is not moot where the commitment has the continuing effect of forbidding its subject to possess firearms.