On Point: 1. Original commitment

State v. Davonta J. Dillard, 2020AP999, 4/13/21, District 1, (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Officers patrolling in Milwaukee noticed a vehicle idling and apparently unoccupied. One approached the vehicle and shined his flashlight through a window; he saw a person (Dillard) in the back seat who immediately ducked out of view (most of the windows were highly tinted, impeding the officer’s view). The officer opened the rear driver’s side door, and the person then opened and ran out the door on the other side. Other officers tasered and detained him. The officer who’d opened the door saw a handgun on the floor of the car, which ultimately led to Dillard’s conviction for carrying a concealed weapon.

Fond du Lac County v. J.L.H., 2020AP2049, 3/24/21, District 2 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

Wisconsin Stat. § 51.20(1)(a)e. lays out the “fifth standard” for dangerousness; a person can be committed under it if his or her mental illness prevents him or her from understanding the advantages and disadvantages of treatment, and a lack of treatment will cause a substantial probability that the person will be harmed and become unable to function. But there’s a limitation on this standard that the other standards lack: a person can’t be dangerous under it if care is available, either in the community at large or through ch. 55, that diminishes the threat of harm so that it is not substantial.

Jefferson County v. S.M.S., 2020AP814, 3/11/21, District 4 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity

It is blackletter law that the probable cause hearing for a Chapter 51 commitment must be held within a statutorily-prescribed time from the subject individual’s detention or the circuit court must dismiss the proceeding for lack of competency to adjudicate it. See §51.20(7)(a) and Dodge Cnty. v. Ryan E.M., 2002 WI App 71, ¶5, 252 Wis. 2d 490, 642 N.W.2d 592. In this case, the court of appeals held that the Ryan E.M. rule did not apply because the individual’s conduct (he was pro se) made it necessary for the circuit court to adjourn the probable cause hearing beyond the 72-hour period expired.

Waukesha County v. E.J.W., 2020AP370, petition for review granted 2/26/21, reversed, 2021 WI 85; case activity

Issue for review:

Section 51.20(11) provides that the subject of a commitment proceeding must demand a jury trial 48 hours in advance of the time set for the final hearing. When the court adjourns the hearing for good cause to appoint new counsel, does that reset the 48 hours for demanding a jury trial?

Adams County v. D.R.D., 2020AP1426, 1/28/21, District 4; case activity

This appeal posed a simple question about due process in a Chapter 51 commitment proceeding. Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078 (E.D. Wis. 1972) held that the 14th Amendment requires the county to give a person sufficient notice of the legal standard under which she is being detained so that she has a reasonable opportunity to prepare a defense. D.R.D. raised this issue on appeal but since trial counsel had not preserved the objection, the court of appeals held the issue forfeited.

Outagamie Countyv. G.S., 2019AP1950, 1/20/21, District 3 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity

“George” called law enforcement claiming to be a federal authority who wanted to make a citizen’s arrest of some duck hunters. When a deputy arrived at the lake he saw George in a boat with 2 encased firearms about 100 yards from shore where a group of duck hunters were upset about George’s verbal encounter with them. George never pointed a gun at anyone.  Based on this evidence, a doctor’s report, and substantial hearsay evidence, the circuit court committed Geoge under the 3rd standard of dangerousness, which requires a pattern of recent acts demonstrating a substantial probability that he would injure himself or others.

Fond du Lac County v. S.N.W., 2019AP2073, petition for review granted 11/19/20; case activity

Issues presented:

1. Did the circuit court lack competency to adjudicate this Chapter 51 commitment proceeding due to the county’s violation of the rule requiring it to file psychiatric reports 48 hours before the final hearing?

2. If the circuit court retained competency, did it err in admitting a tardy report and the testimony of the report’s author?

Vilas County DHS v. N.J.P., 2019AP1567, 12/15/20, District 3 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity

In this appeal from an initial commitment, the county conceded that it had not offered clear and convincing evidence to mee the 4th standard of dangerousness. It asked the court of appeals to affirm the commitment based on the 5th standard of dangerousness.  The court of appeals rejected the county’s concession and affirmed on the 4th standard because N.J.P., who is mentally ill, had been expelled from a homeless shelter and was found dressed in tattered clothes on a bitterly cold day. 

Waukesha County v. L.J.M., 2020AP820, 11/4/20, District 2 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

L.J.M. (“Lisa”) appeals the extension of her commitment under ch. 51. In a thorough opinion, the court of appeals affirms, though not without pointing out deficiencies in the county’s case and the circuit court’s decision.

Waukesha County v. I.R.T., 2020AP996, 11/4/20, District 2 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication) case activity

The county sought to extend I.R.T.’s commitment but could not be located for a time. Eventually the court issued a capias and I.R.T. was arrested. At the extension hearing, there was testimony that after his parole in a criminal matter ended I.R.T. had become homeless and had not taken medications or communicated with the county or his “outpatient prescribers.” (¶14). A psychologist opined that I.R.T. would be dangerous if treatment were withdrawn due to his history of noncompliance with treatment and his “history of psychotic symptoms, and threatening behaviors toward others” and referred to information received from “staff” at an unnamed facility and I.R.T.’s parents. (¶16).