On Point: e. Dangerousness

Winnebago County v. D.E.S., 2023AP460, 9/20/23, District 2 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

This is a nice case to know, both for its careful, thorough analysis of a common ch. 51 problem–commitments based entirely or extensively on hearsay–and its collection of other cases analyzing the same issue. The sole witness at D.E.S. (“Dennis”)’s extension hearing was a Dr. Anderson, who had witnessed none of the behaviors she relied on to conclude that Dennis was dangerous, instead reading them from his institutional records. Over objection, the trial court relied on them anyway. The court of appeals now reverses the commitment because absent the hearsay, there was no evidence tending to show that Dennis would be dangerous if treatment were withdrawn.

Washington County H.S.D. v. Z.A.Y., 2023AP447, 9/13/23, District II (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

In a big defense win, COA reverses a commitment and accompanying medication order due to the circuit court’s failure to make specific findings.

Brown County v. Z.W.L., 2022AP2201, District 3, 9/12/23 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (briefs not available)

In yet another hearsay-based sufficiency challenge to a Chapter 51 commitment, Z.W.L. (“Zeb”) succeeds because the circuit court relied on inadmissible hearsay and no other evidence established that Zeb was dangerous. Specifically, while Zeb made admissible “party-opponent” statements to a crisis worker and a police officer, the county failed to call either direct witness to Zeb’s statements and instead relied on two witnesses who read about Zeb’s history. While the circuit court relied on a case manager’s testimony because “this is what case managers are supposed to do” and “to me, that’s an exception to any of the hearsay rules,” the court of appeals disagrees.

Waupaca County v. G.T.H., 2022AP2146, District IV, 8/24/23, 1-judge decision ineligible for publication; case activity (briefs not available)

Contrary to what has seemed like a steady stream of unsuccessful hearsay-based Chapter 51 appeals, see e.g., here, here, here, here, and here, G.T.H. succussfully convinces the court of appeals to reverse his recommitment, which was based on extensive hearsay testimony.

Waukesha County v. M.A.C., 2023AP533, District II, 7/28/23, petition for review granted 12/12/23; reversed 7/5/24; 1-judge decision ineligible for publication; case activity (briefs not available)

In a Chapter 51 case with troubling due process implications, COA is compelled to affirm by virtue of what it believes to be binding precedent.

Marathon County v. T.R.H., 2022AP1394, 3/14/23, District 3 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity

Counties often seek recommitment under §51.20(1)(a)2.c, the third standard of dangerousness. It is the easiest standard to satisfy–especially at the recommitment stage. But not this time. The court of appeals held that the county can’t just offer testimony that, at some point in the past, the person failed to care for himself, experienced delusions, and struggled with social interactions when not on medication.  The county’s evidence must be more specific.

Outagamie County v. C.J.A., 2022AP230, 2/17/23, District 3 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

“Catherine” appeals the extension of her ch. 51 commitment. The recommitment hearing was originally set for a few days before her previous extension would expire. But three days before that scheduled hearing, Catherine requested an independent examination. She, the court, and the county agreed to a “stipulation for temporary extension to commitment” for 60 days. The final hearing was held near the end of this 60 days, 57 days after her commitment had been set to expire before the stipulation.

Barron County v. K.L., 2022AP502, District 3, 02/07/2023 (one-judge decision, ineligible for publication), case activity

K.L. (Katie) challenged the 2021 extension of her original 2013 Chapter 51  commitment on two grounds: (1) insufficient evidence of dangerousness and (2) the circuit court’s failure to “make specific factual findings with reference to the subdivision paragraph of Wis. Stat. § 51.20(1)(a)2. on which the recommitment is based.” See Langlade County v. D.J.W., 2020 WI App 41, ¶3, 391 Wis. 2d 231, 942 N.W.2d 277. The court affirms Katie’s recommitment after concluding the county presented “clear and convincing evidence” that Katie was dangerous under the fourth standard (see Wis. Stat. § 51.20(1)(a)2.d.), and  that the circuit court complied with D.J.W. when it “checked two boxes on its written order,” which indicated that Katie was dangerous under the third and fourth standards. (Opinion, ¶¶2, 12).

Winnebago County v. D.J.S., 2022AP1281, District 2 (one-judge decision ineligible for publication), case activity

Accompanied by a familiar sounding caveat that “it certainly would have been better if the County had presented more evidence and the circuit court had been more detailed and specific in its oral determination,” the court of appeals rejects D.J.S.’s sufficiency of the evidence challenge to the extension of his Chapter 51 involuntary civil commitment. (Opinion, ¶8).

Rock Count v. H.V., 2022AP1585-FT, 1/20/23, District 4; (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity

This is an appeal from a ch. 51 recommitment under the 2nd standard– dangerousness to others. H.V.’s main argument was that the circuit court erroneously relied on hearsay to find that he is dangerous when not committed. The court of appeals disagreed and further found the county’s evidence sufficient to support the commitment.