On Point blog, page 7 of 17
Circuit court’s failure to specify ch. 51 dangerousness standard was harmless error
Barron County v. K.L., 2021AP133, District 3, 8/9/22 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity
Langlade County v. D.J.W., 2020 WI 41, ¶3, 391 Wis. 2d 231, 942 N.W.2d 277, held that “going forward circuit courts in recommitment proceedings are to make specific factual findings with reference to the subdivision paragraph of Wis. Stat. § 51.20(1)(a)2. on which the recommitment is based.” Deciding an issue addressed in the dissenting opinion in Sheboygan County v. M.W., 2022 WI 40, the court of appeals holds the failure to comply with D.J.W.‘s findings requirement can be a harmless error and was harmless in this case.
COA affirms recommitment, finds sufficient evidence and compliance with D.J.W.
Manitowoc County v. J.M.K., 2022AP122, 7/27/22, District 2, (1-judge opinion; ineligible for publication); case activity
J.M.K. is currently diagnosed with schizoaffective disorder. He has been committed several times since 2015. Right now he is doing well. He lives in a supervised apartment but holds a job, participates in community activities, and works out at the YMCA. The county monitors his medication compliance because in the past when he has stopped taking them he deteriorated rapidly.
COA asks SCOW to clarify circuit court competency to conduct remand hearings in ch. 51 cases
Walworth County v. M.R.M., 2022AP140-FT, certification filed 7/14/22, certification granted, 9/14/22, reversed, 2023 WI 59; District 2; case activity
1. Does the Wisconsin Supreme Court’s decision in Waukesha County v. E.J.W., 2021 WI 85, ¶38, 399 Wis. 2d 471, 966 N.W.2d 590, have retroactive application or only prospective application?
2. In a ch. 51 case involving a petition to extend a commitment order, is circuit court competency determined from the expiration of the earlier commitment order or from the expiration of the extension order, even where the extension order is determined on appeal to be invalid?
SCOW: Appeals from expired ch. 51 commitment orders are not moot
Sauk County v. S.A.M., 2022 WI 46, reversing an unpublished court of appeals opinion, 2019AP1033; case activity
Unlike other states, Wisconsin appellate courts have for decades dismissed most appeals from expired ch. 51 orders as moot. As a result, there was been little appellate review of circuit court decisions declaring people mentally ill, committing them to government custody, and medicating them against their will. Not any more. In a 4-3 decision, SCOW holds that appeals from expired recommitment orders are not moot due to their collateral consequences. While S.A.M. won the war on mootness, he lost his due process and sufficiency of evidence claims. His recommitment was affirmed.
Defense win! Circuit courts lack competency to conduct remand proceedings after ch. 51 commitment expires
Sheboygan County v. M.W., 2022 WI 40, reversing an unpublished court of appeals opinion; case activity
The crisp majority opinion of this 50-page split decision confirms a narrow but important point of law for ch. 51 cases. When an appellate court reverses a commitment order that has expired, the circuit court lacks competency to conduct remand proceedings in the case. The majority opinion does not address whether, in all cases, an appellate court must reverse a “D.J.W. error” outright or whether it may instead conduct a harmless error analysis. The dissent does not fully grasp this point and thus presents a long, confusing attack on an imaginary majority opinion.
Reissued defense win on special verdicts for ch. 51 recommitment trials!
Outagamie County v. C.J.A., 2022 WI App 36; case activity
On April 12th the court of appeals issued an opinion holding that due process does not require a county to give particularized notice of the standard of dangerousness that a person will satisfy if treatment is withdrawn. It also found that special verdict given to the jury defective. The court of appeals reversed and remanded the case for a new trial on a recommitment that had expired. Happy news! The court of appeals withdrew that opinion. The reissued opinion omits the due process decision, retains the special verdict win, and now reverses outright.
COA rejects hearsay challenge in ch. 51 commitment; says no need for personal colloquy to stipulate to extension
Rock County v. J.B., 2021AP1157 & 2021AP1883, 4/14/22, District 4 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case history
This is a consolidated appeal of J.B.’s original, six-month commitment and a subsequent nine-month extension of that commitment.
In a “close case,” COA affirms recommitment under 4th standard of dangerousness
Waupaca County v. H.I.B., 2021AP2026, 4/7/22, District 4 (1-judge opinion ineligible for publication); case activity
It is uncontested that “Hazel” has done well for three commitments in a row. Yet the court of appeals has affirmed her 4th Chapter 51 recommitment because the jury could have inferred a “substantial probability” of death or serious injury from evidence that was “only suggestive” and that “lacked details such as dates and clear descriptions of conduct.”
CoA says people with mental illness may not choose death over medication
Taylor County Human Services v. L.E., 2021AP1292, 2/15/22, District 3, (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity
A circuit court extended “Luca’s” commitment, directed that he be placed in a locked ward, and ordered involuntary medication. On appeal, Luca challenges his placement in a locked ward and the involuntary medication order. At a minimum, the court of appeals analysis of Luca’s right to refuse involuntary medication merits review by SCOW.
CoA affirms recommitment despite patient’s lengthy stability and medication compliance
Outagamie County v. D.D.G., 2021AP511, District 3, 1/20/22, (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity
“Dana” has been under commitment since 2017. It is undisputed that she has taken her medication and has done nothing dangerous in the interim. Yet the court of appeals affirmed her 2021 recommitment because she questions her diagnosis and her need for medication and has concerns about its health effects. The court said that if she were released, she would decline medication and decompensate. Her case highlights a tension between §51.20(1)(am) and a person’s 14th Amendment right to refuse medication. It also shows that courts continue to misapply §51.61(1)(g)4., the involuntary medication statute.