On Point: 6. Procedures/hearings/evidence

Eau Claire County v. J.M.P., 2020AP2014-FT, 6/22/21, District 3; (1-judge opinion, ineligble for publication); case activity

A month ago District 3 reversed the recommitment order in this case because the circuit court had violated Langlade County v. D.J.W. That is, the circuit court ordered a recommitment without making specific factual findings tied to one or more the standards of dangerousness in §51.20(1)(a)2. Thus, the court of appeals remanded the case and ordered the required factfinding. Upon reconsideration, the court of appeals has issued a new decision holding that the correct remedy is outright reversal.

Milwaukee County v. T.L.T, 2020AP426, District 1, 5/18/21 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity

Two court-appointed examiners failed to file their reports on whether T.L.T. should be recommitted 48 hours before her final hearing. Trial counsel moved to dismiss arguing that the violation of §51.20(10)(b)’s 48-hour rule deprived the circuit court of competency to adjudicate the case.  The circuit court denied the motion, and without the defense’s agreement, adjourned the case so that counsel could review the reports before the hearing. T.L.T. appealed but the court of appeals dismissed her appeal as moot.

Sheboygan County v. M.W., 2021AP6, 5/12/21, District 2 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication), petition for review granted, 9/14/21, reversed, 2022 WI 40; case activity

For more than a year now, Langlade County v. D.J.W., 2020 WI 41, 391 Wis. 2d 231, 942 N.W.2d 277, has required circuit courts imposing ch. 51 commitments to identify which statutory form of dangerousness has been proved. A little over a month ago, the court of appeals decided Rock Co. DHS v. J.E.B., holding the circuit court failed to satisfy this requirement. But the appellate court didn’t undo the commitment: it just remanded for the circuit court to decide whether the facts satisfied any of the five standards. It did this even as it declined to address J.E.B.’s other challenge: that there was insufficient evidence of any form of dangerousness. This latter claim would have required dismissal of the petition. Is the court of appeals free to refuse to consider a litigant’s claim–a claim that would that would dispose of the entire case–for no other reason than that it is granting some lesser relief?

Rock County v. J.J.K., 2020AP1085, 4/29/21, District 4, (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication), case activity

This is an appeal from the initial commitment and involuntary medication order entered against J.J.K. The court of appeals affirmed both contrary to published precedent on the rule against hearsay, the plain error doctrine, and procedural and substantive due process.

Rock County v. J.J.K., 2020AP2105, District IV, 5/6/21 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity

This is the sequel to the Rock County v. J.J.K.. 2020AP1085 above. The decision is alarming because the circuit court found J.J.K. dangerous enough for a recommitment based on the 5th standard, but the court of appeals affirmed based on the 4th standard. The opinion also further highlights the need for SCOW to elaborate its decision in Winnebago County v. C.S., 2020 WI 33, 391 Wis. 2d 35, 940 N.W.2d 875. Specifically, can a court order involuntary medication for a person undergoing recommitment without evidence that he is dangerous as defined by §51.61(1)(g)3?

Sauk County v. S.A.M., 2019AP1033, petition for review granted 2/24/21; case activity

Issues for review:

1. Whether S.A.M.’s appeal from his recommitment is moot because it expired before S.A.M. filed his notice of appeal.

2. Whether the county failed to meet its burden of proving dangerousness by clear and convincing evidence.

3. Whether S.A.M. was denied procedural due process because the county failed to provide particularized notice of the basis for his recommitment. including which standard of dangerousness was being alleged.

4.  Whether this court has the authority, through its “superintending and administrative authority over all courts” (Wis. Const. art. VII, § 3(1)) and/or its authority to “regulate pleading, practice, and procedure in judicial proceedings in all courts” (Wis. Stat. § 751.12(1)), to require the court of appeals to expedite the disposition of appeals under Wis. Stat. ch. 51, or in some other manner to ensure that appellants under Wis. Stat. ch. 51 receive an appeal that addresses the merits of the appellants’ contentions?*

Waukesha County v. E.J.W., 2020AP370, petition for review granted 2/26/21, reversed, 2021 WI 85; case activity

Issue for review:

Section 51.20(11) provides that the subject of a commitment proceeding must demand a jury trial 48 hours in advance of the time set for the final hearing. When the court adjourns the hearing for good cause to appoint new counsel, does that reset the 48 hours for demanding a jury trial?

Outagamie Countyv. G.S., 2019AP1950, 1/20/21, District 3 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity

“George” called law enforcement claiming to be a federal authority who wanted to make a citizen’s arrest of some duck hunters. When a deputy arrived at the lake he saw George in a boat with 2 encased firearms about 100 yards from shore where a group of duck hunters were upset about George’s verbal encounter with them. George never pointed a gun at anyone.  Based on this evidence, a doctor’s report, and substantial hearsay evidence, the circuit court committed Geoge under the 3rd standard of dangerousness, which requires a pattern of recent acts demonstrating a substantial probability that he would injure himself or others.

Waukesha County v. E.J.W., 2020AP370, 11/4/20, District 2 (1-judge opinion; ineligible for publication), petition for review granted 2/26/21; case activity

Section 51.20(11)(a) provides that an individual or his counsel must demand a jury trial at least 48 hours before the time set for his final commitment hearing. At the start of his hearing, E.J.W requested a substitution of trial counsel and a jury trial. The court granted the substitution of counsel and postponed the trial 7 days, but it would not reset the clock for demanding a jury. The court of appeal affirmed.

Portage County v. E.R.R., 2020AP870-FT, District 4, 10/1/20 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

As the supreme court recently emphasized, at a proceeding to extend a ch. 51 commitment, proving dangerousness under § 51.20(1)(am) requires evidence establishing that the person is likely to be dangerous under one of the specific standards in § 51.20(1)(a)2. if treatment is withdrawn. Langlade County v. D.J.W., 2020 WI 41, ¶40, 391 Wis. 2d 231, 942 N.W.2d 277. There was not enough evidence in this case to prove E.R.R. was dangerous under one of those standards.