On Point: A. Ch. 51, Mental health

Jefferson County v. M.P., 2019AP2229, 3/5/20, District 4 (One-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

M.P. has schizophrenia. In 2018, she was committed for six months after she made statements about shooting some relatives and burning down a house. In 2019, the county sought and received an extension of the commitment. M.P. argues that recommitment was invalid because the evidence went only to her conduct before her initial commitment, and thus didn’t show her to be currently dangerous. The court of appeals disagrees.

Marathon County v. D.K., 2020 WI 8, 2/4/2020, affirming an unpublished court of appeals decision; 2017AP2217; (case activity)

The caption is the most confusing part of this opinion:

ZIEGLER, J., delivered the majority opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I., II., III., IV.A., IV.B., and IV.C.1, in which ROGGENSACK, C.J., REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, KELLY, and HAGEDORN, JJ., joined, the majority opinion of the Court with respect to Part V., in which ROGGENSACK, C.J., KELLY and HAGEDORN, JJ., joined, and an opinion with respect to Parts IV.C.2., and IV.D., in which ROGGENSACK, C.J., and HAGEDORN, JJ., joined. REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which KELLY, J., joined. DALLET, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J., joined.

But it’s not as bad as it looks! And this decision makes (some) law: specifically, that an appeal of an original commitment is not moot where the commitment has the continuing effect of forbidding its subject to possess firearms.

Milwaukee County v. E.C.H., 2019AP772, District 1, 1/14/20, (1-judge opinion; ineligible for publication); case activity

This appeal asks: Is evidence of homelessness, by itself, sufficient to prove that a person is dangerous to himself or will become dangerous if treatment is withdrawn? And the answer is . . . we don’t know. Hiding behind the mootness doctrine, the court of appeals declined offer guidance to the circuit courts on this important issue of law.

Portage County v. L.E., 2019AP1841-FT, District 4, 1/9/19 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity

Welcome to another chapter in the Wisconsin saga “once committed, always committed.” L.E. has been under commitment for 25 years. At her most recent recommitment hearing, the County offered a doctor’s testimony that “if treatment were withdrawn she’d become a proper subject for commitment.” What facts supported that legal conclusion?  Well, not what Portage Cty v. J.W.K., 2019 WI 54, seems to require.

Monroe County v. D.J., 2019AP1133, 1/2/19, District 4, (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity

Oh, this issue again. Monroe County pursued a Chapter 51 original commitment against D.J. but didn’t say which of the 5 standards of dangerousness it was proceeding under. One doctor opined that commitment was warranted under the 1st or 2nd standards. The other doctor specified 2nd or 5th standards. The trial court instructed the jury on all 3 standards. D.J.’s trial counsel didn’t object. And the jury found commitment warranted.

La Crosse County v. J.M.A., 2018AP1258, 11/21/19, District 4 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

J.M.A. appeals his recommitment under ch. 51. He argues the psychiatrist who was the sole witness at his trial provided only conclusory testimony on dangerousness; the court of appeals disagrees.

Sauk County v. R.A.S., 2018AP2253, 10/31/2019, District 4 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

R.A.S. was committed after a ch. 51 jury trial. The county alleged and the court instructed on two forms of dangerousness–those in Wis. Stat. § 51.20(1)(a)2.c. and 2.d.. R.A.S. asked that the verdict form require the jury to agree on one, the other, or both to commit him, but the circuit court refused, instead submitting a form that just asked the jury if R.A.S. was “dangerous.” The court of appeals now affirms this decision, rejecting R.A.S.’s due-process claim and saying that In re Michael H., 2014 WI 127, 359 Wis. 2d 272, 856 N.W.2d 603, controls the question–though it in fact has only glancing relevance to the issue.

Waupaca v. K.E.K., 2018Ap1887, District 4, 9/26/19 (not recommended for publication), petition for review granted 7/24/20, affirmed, 2021 WI 9; case activity

This opinion infuses uncertainty, if not confusion, into the law governing circuit court competency to decide a Chapter 51 recommitment case and the substantive legal standard that courts are to apply at the recommitment stage.

Waukesha County v. J.K., 2018AP616-NM, 9/3/19 (unpublished order); case activity

The court of appeals can be pretty aggressive about dismissing Chapter 51 appeals for mootness. This time SCOW slapped its hand.  J.K.’s lawyer filed a no-merit notice of appeal. Before appointed counsel could file a no-merit report, and before J.K. could respond to any such report, the court of appeals (D2) dismissed the appeal as moot because the commitment order at issue had expired and J.K. was under a new commitment order.

State v. Eric L. Vanremortel, 2018AP417, 9/4/19, District 3 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Vanremortel was charged with disorderly conduct for an incident in which he followed the wife of a retired police officer in her car, then repeatedly got out of his own car and shouted at her. The state sought to admit evidence of three prior incidents involving Vanremortel following and/or shouting at police officers, including one that happened a few weeks before the charged conduct and involved the wife’s retired-officer husband. The circuit court admitted the evidence, finding it satisfied the test of State v. Sullivan, 216 Wis. 2d 768, 576 N.W.2d 30 (1998), and Vanremortel appeals.