On Point blog, page 26 of 33
Evidence deemed sufficient for Chapter 51 commitment and involuntary medication order
Ozaukee County v. M.L.G., 2015AP1469-FT, 9/23/15, District 2 (1-judge opinion; ineligible for publication); case activity
More specifically, the court of appeals held that the County had offered evidence sufficient to establish that MLG was dangerous under §51.20(1)(a)2.c and that he was substantially incapable of understanding his treatment options under § 51.61(1)(g)4b:
Finding of incompetence to refuse medication or treatment supported by evidence
Ozaukee County v. C.Y.K., 2015AP1080-FT, District 2, 9/9/15 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity
Even though the examining psychiatrist opined that C.Y.K. was not substantially incapable of making an informed choice about accepting or refusing medication or treatment, the record as a whole supported the circuit court’s order for involuntary medication and treatment.
Evidence showed ch. 51 respondent was a proper subject for treatment
Milwaukee County v. Kent F., 2015AP388, District 1, 8/18/15 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity
The court of appeals rejects Kent’s argument that, under Fond du Lac County v. Helen E.F., 2012 WI 50, 340 Wis. 2d 500, 814 N.W.2d 179, he is not a proper subject for ch. 51 commitment because he is not capable of rehabilitative treatment.
Circuit court’s Ch. 51 decision appropriately relied upon expert report that was based upon hearsay
Walworth County DHS v. M.M.L., 2014AP2845, 7/15/15, District 2 (one-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
The court of appeals affirms the involuntary commitment for M.M.L. under § 51.20(1)(a)2.c., which requires evidence of impaired judgment based on recent acts or omissions showing a substantial probability that she would physically impair or injure herself or others. It rejects her challenges to the sufficiency of evidence and the testifying examiner’s references to hearsay he relied on when forming his opinion.
Expiration of ch. 51 commitment made appeal moot, despite continuing restriction on gun possession
Dunn County v. Dennis M., 2014AP2579, District 3, 6/16/15 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity
Despite the fact Dennis M. can’t possess a firearm as a result of a prior involuntary commitment order, his appeal from that order is moot because he entered into a voluntary stipulation to recommitment that has expired and not been renewed.
Recent overt act of violence not required for extension of Ch. 51 commitment
Kenosha County v. James H., 2014AP2945, 6/3/15, District 2 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); click here for case activity
James was diagnosed with chronic paranoid schizophrenia and hospitalized many times. He appeal an order extending his involuntary commitment and argued, unsuccessfully, that the county failed to present evidence of recent acts of violence against others and insufficient evidence that he would become dangerous if treatment were withdrawn.
Winnebago County v. Christopher S., 2014AP1048, certification granted 5/12/15
Click here for certification order; circuit court order affirmed, 2016 WI 1; click here for case activity
Issue (composed by the court of appeals):
This appeal raises an important issue of first impression regarding the constitutionality of a mental health treatment statute related to inmates within the Wisconsin state prison system. The question presented is whether Wis. Stat. § 51.20(1)(ar) (2013-14) is facially unconstitutional on substantive due process grounds because it does not require that a court find an inmate dangerous prior to ordering the inmate civilly committed for treatment and authorizing the involuntary medication of the inmate. A definitive answer to this question from the Wisconsin Supreme Court, along with a clear statement as to the appropriate level of constitutional scrutiny to apply in such a case, would be of great value to the bench, the bar, the legislature, and the citizenry. Thus, we certify this appeal to the Wisconsin Supreme Court pursuant to Wis. Stat. Rule 809.61.
County presented sufficient evidence to prove subject of ch. 51 commitment can be rehabilitated
Dane County v. Thomas F.W., 2014AP2469, District 4, 4/23/15 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity
To extend a ch. 51 commitment, the County must prove the subject individual is a proper subject for treatment, which means showing he or she is “capable of rehabilitation,” §§ 51.01(17) and 51.20(1)(a)1. The court of appeals rejects Thomas’s argument that the evidence in this case shows treatment will only blunt the symptoms of his mental illness, not rehabilitate him.
Cout of Appeals certifies constitutional challenge to Chapter 51 provision
Winnebago County v. Christopher S., 2014AP1048, 4/1/15, District 2, click here for certification; certification granted 5/12/15, circuit court orders affirmed, 2016 WI 1
Issue
This appeal raises an important issue of first impression regarding the constitutionality of a mental health treatment statute related to inmates within the Wisconsin state prison system. The question presented is whether Wis. Stat. § 51.20(1)(ar) (2013-14) is facially unconstitutional on substantive due process grounds because it does not require that a court find an inmate dangerous prior to ordering the inmate civilly committed for treatment and authorizing the involuntary medication of the inmate. A definitive answer to this question from the Wisconsin Supreme Court, along with a clear statement as to the appropriate level of constitutional scrutiny to apply in such a case, would be of great value to the bench, the bar, the legislature, and the citizenry. Thus, we certify this appeal to the Wisconsin Supreme Court pursuant to Wis. Stat. Rule 809.61.
It doesn’t take much to find someone is dangerous for purposes of a ch. 51 commitment
Rock County v. J.N.B., 2014AP774, District 4, 3/26/16 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity
Having rejected the no merit report filed by J.N.B.’s appellate counsel and ordered counsel to brief the issue of the sufficiency of the evidence, the court of appeals declares “the County presented ample evidence demonstrating that J.N.B. is dangerous because he evidences such ‘impaired judgment, manifested by evidence of a pattern of recent acts or omissions, that there is a substantial probability of physical impairment or injury to himself,’” § 51.20(1)(a)2.c.