On Point blog, page 28 of 34
Evidence sufficient to establish “pattern” and prove dangerousness under § 51.20(1)(a)2.c.
Outagamie County v. Lori D., 2014AP1911, District 3, 1/27/15 (1-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity
There was sufficient evidence to commit Lori under § 51.20(1)(a)2.c. because her behavior over one night showed a “pattern of recent acts or omissions” that evidenced impaired judgment and because the lack of services available in the community established a “substantial probability of physical impairment or injury” to Lori if she wasn’t committed.
Evidence was sufficient to establish substantial probability that ch. 51 respondent would harm himself
Milwaukee County v. Andy S., 2014AP1885, District 1, 1/13/15 (1-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity
The evidence was sufficient to prove dangerousness under § 51.20(1)(a)2.a., as it showed Andy “[e]vidence[d] a substantial probability of physical harm to himself … as manifested by evidence of recent threats of or attempts at suicide or serious bodily harm.”
SCOW: “threat of suicide” ground for involuntary commitment does not require articulation of plan
Outagamie v. Michael H., 2014 WI 127, 12/16/14, affirming an unpublished court of appeals decision, majority opinion by Justice Crooks; case activity
Section 51.20(1)(a)2.a authorizes the involuntary commitment of a person who is “dangerous,” a test that may be met by showing recent threats of, or attempts at, suicide. This unanimous decision holds that in the right circumstances just thinking about suicide–without articulating a plan for committing it–constitutes a sufficient “threat” to satisfy the involuntary commitment statute.
Jury instruction defining “drug” using dictionary was proper in ch. 51 commitment based on drug dependency
Marathon County v. Zachary W., 2014AP955, District 3, 12/2/14 (1-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity
Even if the circuit court erred it provided multiple definitions of the term “drug” when instructing the jury hearing a ch. 51 commitment case.
Threats to harm others, when made to third parties, show dangerousness under Sec. 51.20(1)(a)2.b.
Kenosha County v. Steven H., 2014AP1435-FT, District 2, 10/15/14 (1-judge opinion ineligible for publication); case activity
The court of appeals here affirmed an order finding Steven H. “dangerous” under §51.20(1)(a)2.b, which requires, among other things, evidence that people were placed in reasonable fear of Steven’s violent behavior. Under this standard, a court may consider threats voiced to third parties rather than to the potential victims. R.J. v. Winnebago County, 146 Wis. 2d 516, 521-22, 431 N.W.2d 708 (Ct. App. 1988).
Evidence in ch. 51 case sufficient to show dangerousness
Winnebago County v. William A.M., 2014AP977-FT, District 2, 9/10/14 (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity
The evidence at trial was sufficient to prove William was dangerous under § 51.20(1)(a)2.c., which requires a showing of “such impaired judgment, manifested by evidence of a pattern of recent acts or omissions, that there is a substantial probability of physical impairment or injury to himself or herself.”
Court lost competency in ch. 51 case because probable cause hearing occurred beyond 72-hour time limit
Waukesha County v. Steven R.C., 2014AP1032-FT, District 2, 9/10/14 (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity
The failure to hold a probable cause hearing within 72 hours of Steven’s initial detention deprived the circuit court of competency to proceed, despite the County’s filing of a new petition within the 72-hour time period with new allegations.
Ch. 51 appeal is moot
Milwaukee County v. Rebecca G., 2014AP359, District 1, 9/3/14 (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity
Rebecca’s appeal of her ch. 51 commitment is dismissed as moot because the six-month commitment order expired while the appeal was pending and the County didn’t seek an extension.
Time for holding probable cause hearing under § 51.20(7)(a) runs from time of arrival at hosptial, not mental health unit within hospital
Ozaukee County v. Mark T.J., 2014AP479, District 2, 8/27/14 (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity
The failure to hold an initial hearing within 72 hours of Mark’s arrival at the hospital where he was detained deprived the circuit court of competency to order an initial commitment order under ch. 51. But his appeal from that initial commitment order is moot because he stipulated to recommitment and vacating the initial commitment would have no practical effect.
Evidence sufficient to extend ch. 51 commitment and order involuntary medication and treatment
Ozaukee County v. Laura B., 2014AP1011-FT, District 2, 8/13/14 (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity
The evidence was sufficient to justify an extension of Laura B.’s commitment and an order for involuntary medication and treatment.