On Point: A. Ch. 51, Mental health

Kenosha County v. Steven H., 2014AP1435-FT, District 2, 10/15/14 (1-judge opinion ineligible for publication); case activity

The court of appeals here affirmed an order finding Steven H. “dangerous” under §51.20(1)(a)2.b, which requires, among other things, evidence that people were placed in reasonable fear of Steven’s violent behavior. Under this standard, a court may consider threats voiced to third parties rather than to the potential victims.  R.J. v. Winnebago County, 146 Wis. 2d 516, 521-22, 431 N.W.2d 708 (Ct. App. 1988).

Winnebago County v. William A.M., 2014AP977-FT, District 2, 9/10/14 (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity

The evidence at trial was sufficient to prove William was dangerous under § 51.20(1)(a)2.c., which requires a showing of “such impaired judgment, manifested by evidence of a pattern of recent acts or omissions, that there is a substantial probability of physical impairment or injury to himself or herself.”

Waukesha County v. Steven R.C., 2014AP1032-FT, District 2, 9/10/14 (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity

The failure to hold a probable cause hearing within 72 hours of Steven’s initial detention deprived the circuit court of competency to proceed, despite the County’s filing of a new petition within the 72-hour time period with new allegations.

Milwaukee County v. Rebecca G., 2014AP359, District 1, 9/3/14 (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity

Rebecca’s appeal of her ch. 51 commitment is dismissed as moot because the six-month commitment order expired while the appeal was pending and the County didn’t seek an extension.

Ozaukee County v. Mark T.J., 2014AP479, District 2, 8/27/14 (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity

The failure to hold an initial hearing within 72 hours of Mark’s arrival at the hospital where he was detained deprived the circuit court of competency to order an initial commitment order under ch. 51. But his appeal from that initial commitment order is moot because he stipulated to recommitment and vacating the initial commitment would have no practical effect.

Ozaukee County v. Laura B., 2014AP1011-FT, District 2, 8/13/14 (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity

The evidence was sufficient to justify an extension of Laura B.’s commitment and an order for involuntary medication and treatment.

Kenosha County v. Vermetrias W., 2014AP861-FT, District 2, 7/16/14 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

Vermetrias had been the subject of a Chapter 51 commitment order, which Kenosha County sought to extend. Section 51.20(1)(a)2 provides than an individual is the proper subject for commitment if he or she poses a danger to himself or herself or to others.  Vermetrias presented evidence that there was not a “substantial likelihood” she would become dangerous if her commitment ended.  The trial court ruled against her.  The court of appeals affirmed, but complimented those involved in this matter:

Portage County v. Jeffrey J.T., 2013AP2481, District 4, 6/26/14 (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity

The report of the examining physician was sufficient to show that the advantages, disadvantages, and alternatives to medication were explained to Jeffrey, the subject of a ch. 51 recommitment proceeding, as required by § 51.61(1)(g)4. and Outagamie County v. Melanie L., 2013 WI 67, ¶¶91, 97, 349 Wis. 2d 148, 833 N.W.2d 607.

Waukesha County v. Kathleen H., 2014AP90, District 2, 6/25/14 (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity

The County did not show that Kathleen, the subject of a ch. 51 commitment proceeding, is incompetent to refuse medication or treatment because it did not show that the advantages, disadvantages, and alternatives to her medication were explained to her, as required by § 51.61(1)(g)4. and Outagamie County v. Melanie L., 2013 WI 67, ¶¶91, 97, 349 Wis. 2d 148, 833 N.W.2d 607.

On review of an unpublished court of appeals decision; case activity

Issue (composed by On Point)

Was there sufficient evidence to establish Michael H. was “dangerous” under § 51.20(1)(a)2.a. or c., based either on his “threats” of suicide or a pattern of acts or omissions showing such impaired judgment that there is a substantial probability of physical impairment or injury?