On Point: 3. Civil Commitments

State v. Graham L. Stowe, 2021AP431-CR, District 3, 02/17/23 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Graham Stowe was found NGI in 2005 and committed to the Department of Health and Family Services for 39 years and 6 months. Between 2007 and 2019, Stowe filed 10 petitions for conditional release. The same circuit court judge who committed Stowe in 2005 has presided over every subsequent proceeding. After five prior appeals, the court of appeals now agrees with Stowe that the circuit court was objectively biased at his 2019 conditional release hearing based on a totality of comments that demonstrate a “serious risk of actual bias.” As a result, the court reverses the circuit court and remands the case for a new conditional release hearing before a different judge. (Opinion, ¶2).

J.C. v. R.S., 2022AP1215 , 2/16/23, District 4, (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity

In a rare Chapter 55 reversal, the court of appeals held that the petitioner failed to prove that the individual under review had a degenerative brain disorder that was likely to be permanent.

Outagamie County v. C.J.A., 2022AP230, 2/17/23, District 3 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

“Catherine” appeals the extension of her ch. 51 commitment. The recommitment hearing was originally set for a few days before her previous extension would expire. But three days before that scheduled hearing, Catherine requested an independent examination. She, the court, and the county agreed to a “stipulation for temporary extension to commitment” for 60 days. The final hearing was held near the end of this 60 days, 57 days after her commitment had been set to expire before the stipulation.

Barron County v. K.L., 2022AP502, District 3, 02/07/2023 (one-judge decision, ineligible for publication), case activity

K.L. (Katie) challenged the 2021 extension of her original 2013 Chapter 51  commitment on two grounds: (1) insufficient evidence of dangerousness and (2) the circuit court’s failure to “make specific factual findings with reference to the subdivision paragraph of Wis. Stat. § 51.20(1)(a)2. on which the recommitment is based.” See Langlade County v. D.J.W., 2020 WI App 41, ¶3, 391 Wis. 2d 231, 942 N.W.2d 277. The court affirms Katie’s recommitment after concluding the county presented “clear and convincing evidence” that Katie was dangerous under the fourth standard (see Wis. Stat. § 51.20(1)(a)2.d.), and  that the circuit court complied with D.J.W. when it “checked two boxes on its written order,” which indicated that Katie was dangerous under the third and fourth standards. (Opinion, ¶¶2, 12).

Winnebago County v. D.J.S., 2022AP1281, District 2 (one-judge decision ineligible for publication), case activity

Accompanied by a familiar sounding caveat that “it certainly would have been better if the County had presented more evidence and the circuit court had been more detailed and specific in its oral determination,” the court of appeals rejects D.J.S.’s sufficiency of the evidence challenge to the extension of his Chapter 51 involuntary civil commitment. (Opinion, ¶8).

Rock Count v. H.V., 2022AP1585-FT, 1/20/23, District 4; (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity

This is an appeal from a ch. 51 recommitment under the 2nd standard– dangerousness to others. H.V.’s main argument was that the circuit court erroneously relied on hearsay to find that he is dangerous when not committed. The court of appeals disagreed and further found the county’s evidence sufficient to support the commitment.

Waukesha County v. G.M.M., 2022AP1207, 1/18/23, District 2, (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity

This appeal involves a recommitment under the 3rd standard of dangerousness. G.M.M. argued that the county presented insufficient evidence of both mental illness and dangerousness. She also argued that the circuit court failed to make the findings required under Langlade County v. D.J.W., 2020 WI 41, ¶59, 391 Wis. 2d 231, 942 N.W.2d 277.  The court of appeals rejected all 3 claims.

Kenosha County v. L.A.T., 2022AP603, 1/11/22, District 2; (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity

This appeal involves an important, recurring issue. Must the circuit court conduct a colloquy to determine whether the subject of a ch. 51 commitment proceeding knowingly and voluntarily stipulates to a commitment and medication? The court of appeals holds that there is no colloquy requirement, and there shouldn’t be one. The subject of ch. 51 commitment is presumed competent. If she says she’s stipulating to a commitment and medication, then the circuit court can (1) presume she’s making a knowing, intelligent and voluntary decision, and (2) find her dangerous without specifying a standard of dangerousness.

Calumet County DH&HS v. T.M.S., 2022AP1563-FT, 1/11/23; District 2, (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity

The circuit court recommitted T.M.S. based on the 3rd and 4th standards of dangerousness. On appeal, he challenged the sufficiency of the county’s evidence and underscored Dr. Bales’ admission that he couldn’t point to any specific information in T.M.S.’s treatment records showing that T.M.S. was currently dangerous. The court of appeals, applying only the 4th standard, affirmed.

Marathon County v. L.A.R., 2022AP1226-FT, 12/29/22, District 3 (one-judge opinion; ineligible for publication); case activity

“Laura” has suffered from bipolar disorder for over 30 years. At her initial commitment hearing, one examiner testified that she met the 2nd standard of dangerousness. Another testified that she also met the 4th standard. The circuit court held that Laura satisfied only the latter standard. The court of appeals affirmed.