On Point: 3. Civil Commitments

Marathon County v. T.R.H., 2022AP1394, 3/14/23, District 3 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity

Counties often seek recommitment under §51.20(1)(a)2.c, the third standard of dangerousness. It is the easiest standard to satisfy–especially at the recommitment stage. But not this time. The court of appeals held that the county can’t just offer testimony that, at some point in the past, the person failed to care for himself, experienced delusions, and struggled with social interactions when not on medication.  The county’s evidence must be more specific.

Milwaukee County v. D.H., 2022AP1402, 3/7/23, District 1 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity

To obtain an involuntary medication order, a county must satisfy the multi-step test for incompetency to make medication decisions in §51.61(1)(g)4. The first step requires the county to prove that the person received a “reasonable explanation” of the advantages, disadvantages, and alternatives to medication. The examiner can’t just testify that she complied with the statute. She must tell the court what she told the person about the medication. In “Dan’s” case, the court of appeals reversed the involuntary medication order because the county failed this step.

Outagamie County v. L.X.D.-O., 2023 WI App 17; case activity

Unfortunately, the court of appeals just turned Chapter 51 upside down in a published opinion. It holds that counties must move examiners’ reports into evidence at recommitment hearings, but not at initial commitment hearings. This appeal concerns the sufficiency of the evidence to support an involuntary medication order entered following an initial commitment. The court of appeals held that the doctor’s testimony was insufficient to support the order, but the doctor’s report, which was not moved into evidence, filled the gaps. It thus affirmed the med order.

Mandatory Circuit Court Form CR-206 suggests that in a criminal case the circuit court may order involuntary medication for an incompetent defendant because he is dangerous. Is the form correct? No, under the current state of federal and Wisconsin law, a criminal court may not order the involuntary administration of antipsychotic for an incompetent defendant based on dangerousness.

Winnebago County v. J.D.J., 2022AP1138, 2/22/23, District 2, (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity

Such a maddening case. J.D.J., a prisoner diagnosed with schizoaffective disorder, was going to have a hard enough time winning a jury trial regarding his ch. 51 initial commitment. But the circuit court made his uphill battle impossible through a series of highly questionable pre-trial and trial rulings. Then the court of appeals, relying on nothing beyond its gut (i.e. not case law) affirmed.

State v. Graham L. Stowe, 2021AP431-CR, District 3, 02/17/23 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Graham Stowe was found NGI in 2005 and committed to the Department of Health and Family Services for 39 years and 6 months. Between 2007 and 2019, Stowe filed 10 petitions for conditional release. The same circuit court judge who committed Stowe in 2005 has presided over every subsequent proceeding. After five prior appeals, the court of appeals now agrees with Stowe that the circuit court was objectively biased at his 2019 conditional release hearing based on a totality of comments that demonstrate a “serious risk of actual bias.” As a result, the court reverses the circuit court and remands the case for a new conditional release hearing before a different judge. (Opinion, ¶2).

J.C. v. R.S., 2022AP1215 , 2/16/23, District 4, (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity

In a rare Chapter 55 reversal, the court of appeals held that the petitioner failed to prove that the individual under review had a degenerative brain disorder that was likely to be permanent.

Outagamie County v. C.J.A., 2022AP230, 2/17/23, District 3 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

“Catherine” appeals the extension of her ch. 51 commitment. The recommitment hearing was originally set for a few days before her previous extension would expire. But three days before that scheduled hearing, Catherine requested an independent examination. She, the court, and the county agreed to a “stipulation for temporary extension to commitment” for 60 days. The final hearing was held near the end of this 60 days, 57 days after her commitment had been set to expire before the stipulation.

Barron County v. K.L., 2022AP502, District 3, 02/07/2023 (one-judge decision, ineligible for publication), case activity

K.L. (Katie) challenged the 2021 extension of her original 2013 Chapter 51  commitment on two grounds: (1) insufficient evidence of dangerousness and (2) the circuit court’s failure to “make specific factual findings with reference to the subdivision paragraph of Wis. Stat. § 51.20(1)(a)2. on which the recommitment is based.” See Langlade County v. D.J.W., 2020 WI App 41, ¶3, 391 Wis. 2d 231, 942 N.W.2d 277. The court affirms Katie’s recommitment after concluding the county presented “clear and convincing evidence” that Katie was dangerous under the fourth standard (see Wis. Stat. § 51.20(1)(a)2.d.), and  that the circuit court complied with D.J.W. when it “checked two boxes on its written order,” which indicated that Katie was dangerous under the third and fourth standards. (Opinion, ¶¶2, 12).

Winnebago County v. D.J.S., 2022AP1281, District 2 (one-judge decision ineligible for publication), case activity

Accompanied by a familiar sounding caveat that “it certainly would have been better if the County had presented more evidence and the circuit court had been more detailed and specific in its oral determination,” the court of appeals rejects D.J.S.’s sufficiency of the evidence challenge to the extension of his Chapter 51 involuntary civil commitment. (Opinion, ¶8).