On Point: 3. Civil Commitments

Trempealeau County v. C.B.O., 2021AP1955 & 2022AP102, 8/30/22, District 3, (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity

This is a double defense win! You might even call it a quadruple defense win! The court of appeals consolidated “Chris’s” appeals from his initial commitment order and his recommitment order. It reversed his initial commitment order because (1) the circuit court violated Langlade County v. D.J.W. and (2) the county’s evidence was insufficient. It reversed the recommitment order because (3) the circuit court’s fact findings were clearly erroneous, and (4) all the county proved was that if treatment were withdrawn Chris would engage in the same conduct that was insufficient to support the initial commitment.

Walworth County v. M.R.M., 2022AP140-FT, certification granted 9/14/22,  reversed, 2023 WI 59; case activity

Issues (from the COA certification):

1. Does the Wisconsin Supreme Court’s decision in Waukesha County v. E.J.W., 2021 WI 85, ¶38, 399 Wis. 2d 471, 966 N.W.2d 590, apply retroactively or only prospectively?

2. In a ch. 51 case involving a petition to extend a commitment order, is circuit court competency determined from the expiration of the earlier commitment order or from the expiration of the extension order, even where the extension order is determined on appeal to be invalid?

Winnebago County v. D.E.S., 2022AP251, 8/31/22, District 2, (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity

Langlade County v. D.J.W. requires a circuit to make specific factual findings with reference to the dangerousness standard that its recommitment order is based upon.  The circuit court failed to follow D.J.W. but the court of appeals affirmed because the circuit court’s words and the county’s closing argument supposedly made it clear that they were relying on the second and fifth standards of dangerousness.

Wood County v. J.L.S., 2022AP299, 8/25/22, District 4 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity

The circuit court entered orders for initial commitment order and involuntary medication order. Later (not sure how much later), the County persuaded the circuit court to dismiss these orders. On appeal, J.L.S. argued, among other things, that the appeal of orders was not moot due to their collateral consequences. The County filed a letter saying that it wouldn’t file a response brief because J.L.S.

Barron County v. K.L., 2021AP133, District 3, 8/9/22 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

Langlade County v. D.J.W., 2020 WI 41, ¶3, 391 Wis. 2d 231, 942 N.W.2d 277, held that “going forward circuit courts in recommitment proceedings are to make specific factual findings with reference to the subdivision paragraph of Wis. Stat. § 51.20(1)(a)2. on which the recommitment is based.” Deciding an issue addressed in the dissenting opinion in Sheboygan County v. M.W., 2022 WI 40, the court of appeals holds the failure to comply with D.J.W.‘s findings requirement can be a harmless error and was harmless in this case.

Manitowoc County v. J.M.K., 2022AP122, 7/27/22, District 2, (1-judge opinion; ineligible for publication); case activity

J.M.K.  is currently diagnosed with schizoaffective disorder. He has been committed several times since 2015. Right now he is doing well. He lives in a supervised apartment but holds a job, participates in community activities, and works out at the YMCA. The county monitors his medication compliance because in the past when he has stopped taking them he deteriorated rapidly.

Rock County Human. Servs. v. A.P., Appeal nos. 2022AP248-249; 7/14/22, District 4; (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity

This is one more in a long line of appellate decisions affirming a default finding of grounds for terminating a parent’s rights without a finding that the parent had behaved egregiously as required by Dane Cnty. DHS v. Mable K., 2013 WI 28, ¶71, 346 Wis. 2d 396, 828 N.W.2d 198. The difference here is that the court of appeals also openly disregards (or perhaps is unfamiliar with?) the rules of appellate procedure.

Walworth County v. M.R.M., 2022AP140-FT, certification filed 7/14/22, certification granted, 9/14/22, reversed, 2023 WI 59; District 2; case activity

1. Does the Wisconsin Supreme Court’s decision in Waukesha County v. E.J.W., 2021 WI 85, ¶38, 399 Wis. 2d 471, 966 N.W.2d 590, have retroactive application or only prospective application?

2. In a ch. 51 case involving a petition to extend a commitment order, is circuit court competency determined from the expiration of the earlier commitment order or from the expiration of the extension order, even where the extension order is determined on appeal to be invalid?

Sauk County v. S.A.M., 2022 WI 46, reversing an unpublished court of appeals opinion, 2019AP1033; case activity

Unlike other states, Wisconsin appellate courts have for decades dismissed most appeals from expired ch. 51 orders as moot. As a result, there was been little appellate review of circuit court decisions declaring people mentally ill, committing them to government custody, and medicating them against their will. Not any more. In a 4-3 decision, SCOW holds that appeals from expired recommitment orders are not moot due to their collateral consequences. While S.A.M. won the war on mootness, he lost his due process and sufficiency of evidence claims. His recommitment was affirmed.

Sheboygan County v. M.W., 2022 WI 40, reversing an unpublished court of appeals opinion; case activity

The crisp majority opinion of this 50-page split decision confirms a narrow but important point of law for ch. 51 cases. When an appellate court reverses a commitment order that has expired, the circuit court lacks competency to conduct remand proceedings in the case. The majority opinion does not address whether, in all cases, an appellate court must reverse a “D.J.W. error” outright or whether it may instead conduct a harmless error analysis. The dissent does not fully grasp this point and thus presents a long, confusing attack on an imaginary majority opinion.