On Point blog, page 2 of 2
COA affirms 51.20 commitment for alcoholism as matter of first impression
Vernon County v. F.W.R., 2024AP203, District IV, 11/6/24 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity
COA rejects F.W.R.’s challenges to his involuntary commitment order under Wis. Stat. § 51.20 for alcohol dependence, concluding that a person may be involuntarily committed for treatment for alcoholism, the circuit court followed the proper procedures and the county met its burden to prove that he was drug dependent and dangerous.
7th Circuit rejects facial challenge to § 971.17(4)(d)
Graham L. Stowe v. Gregory Van Rybroek, No. 23-3345, 8/21/24
This habeas appeal is limited to a facial challenge to the NGI conditional release statute, Wis. Stat. § 971.17(4)(d). The Seventh Circuit rejects Stowe’s argument, concluding that he cannot show that there are no circumstances under which the law’s application would be valid.
COA affirms initial commitment order; expresses critical thoughts as to “flood” of 51 appeals and hints at a renewed willingness to find at least some appeals moot
Winnebago County v. C.H., 2023AP505, 8/30/23, District 2 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity
In this Ch. 51 appeal, COA swats aside familiar 51 arguments, expresses its frustration with a “flood” of Ch. 51 appeals and, with approving citation to a dissent from SCOW, hints that we may not have heard the last of the mootness doctrine in COA with respect to 51 appeals.
Defense win! County failed to prove examiner gave “reasonable explanation” of medication
Milwaukee County v. D.H., 2022AP1402, 3/7/23, District 1 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity
To obtain an involuntary medication order, a county must satisfy the multi-step test for incompetency to make medication decisions in §51.61(1)(g)4. The first step requires the county to prove that the person received a “reasonable explanation” of the advantages, disadvantages, and alternatives to medication. The examiner can’t just testify that she complied with the statute. She must tell the court what she told the person about the medication. In “Dan’s” case, the court of appeals reversed the involuntary medication order because the county failed this step.
COA affirms default in TPR, violates rules of appellate procedure
Rock County Human. Servs. v. A.P., Appeal nos. 2022AP248-249; 7/14/22, District 4; (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity
This is one more in a long line of appellate decisions affirming a default finding of grounds for terminating a parent’s rights without a finding that the parent had behaved egregiously as required by Dane Cnty. DHS v. Mable K., 2013 WI 28, ¶71, 346 Wis. 2d 396, 828 N.W.2d 198. The difference here is that the court of appeals also openly disregards (or perhaps is unfamiliar with?) the rules of appellate procedure.
Court of appeals: maybe 3>4
State v. Roy C. O’Neal, 2020AP1270, 6/2/21, District 3 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)
A person who’s been indefinitely committed under ch. 980 is entitled to a discharge trial if he can show … well, er, nobody really knows what he has to show. In State v. Hager, our supreme court failed to reach a majority for any view on the statute (while arguably striking down the court of appeals’ attempt at a gloss). Given the absence of an ascertainable rule, it’s not too surprising that we get incoherent decisions like this one. What is a little surprising is the court of appeals’ decision to “treat [Hager‘s] lead opinion as controlling” on one aspect of the statute’s meaning. That was a three-justice lead opinion; four other justices disagreed on the point. Arguably. Is the court of appeals here treating a supreme court minority view as binding?
SCOW clarifies law regarding substitution of judges in civil cases
State v. Tavodess Matthews, 2021 WI 42, reversing a published court of appeals opinion, 2020 WI App 33, 5/14/21, case activity (including briefs)
Section 801.58(1) allows a party to a civil case to request a new judge if, among other things, he files a written substitution request before “the hearing of any preliminary contested matter.” Matthews’ case concerns a substitution request made after the circuit court granted a motion to adjourn a Chapter 980 probable cause hearing regarding sexually violent persons. But since Chapter 980 commitments are civil proceedings, this unanimous SCOW opinion, which reverses a published court of appeals’ opinion, is an important clarification of the law governing all civil cases.
SCOW: Expert opinion on risk not needed in ch. 980 proceeding
State v. Jamie Lane Stephenson, 2020 WI 92, 12/18/20, affirming a published decision of the court of appeals; case activity (including briefs)
A five-justice majority of the supreme court holds that the state does not need to present expert opinion testimony that a person subject to commitment under Chapter 980 is dangerous to others because his mental disorder makes it more likely than not that he will engage in one or more future acts of sexual violence.
SCOW to review need for state to have an expert on risk in ch. 980 trials
State v. Jamie Lane Stephenson, 2018AP2104, petition to review a published court of appeals decision granted 3/17/20; case activity
Issues:
- To prove that a person meets the criteria for commitment under Chapter 980, must the state present expert opinion testimony that the person is “dangerous” as defined under ch. 980?
- Should the standard of review of the sufficiency of the evidence of dangerousness in a Chapter 980 case be changed to require that a reviewing court conduct a de novo review of whether the evidence satisfies the legal standard of dangerousness?
SVP: Ineffective Assistance of Counsel – Failure to Obtain Expert – Lack of Prejudice
State v. Kenneth Parrish, 2002 WI App 263, PFR filed 11/11/02 For Parrish: Charles B. Vetzner, SPD, Madison Appellate Issue/Holding: The trial court’s rejection of respondent’s post-commitment proffer of an expert, in support of a claim that trial counsel was ineffective for not securing an expert, is sustained, due in particular to the trial court’s […]