On Point

Jacob Alan Powers v. Jon Noble, No. 24-2134, 3/25/25

The Seventh Circuit found that Jacob Powers was competent to stand trial in a Wisconsin court in 2006 for sexual assault of a child and child enticement.  Although Powers’ IQ was in the borderline/mild mental retardation range; his trial testimony, trial counsel’s decision not to challenge his competency, and two experts’ findings that he was competent convinced the Court that he reasonably understood the charges against him, trial procedures, and could assist his lawyer in his defense.  The Court therefore affirmed the district court’s order denying Powers’ petition for a writ of habeas corpus. 

Winnebago County v. J.S., 2024AP1333, 3/5/25, District II (1-judge decision, ineligible for publication); case activity

In yet another case testing the applicability of SCOW’s D.J.W. mandate, COA finds that the circuit court “barely” satisfied those requirements and affirms.

Monroe County v. M.C., 2024AP924, 12/12/24, District IV (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

The Court of Appeals reversed the circuit court’s commitment order under Chapter 51 where the court did not make sufficient factual findings to support its conclusion that M.C. was dangerous, as required by D.J.W.

Vernon County v. F.W.R., 2024AP203, District IV, 11/6/24 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

COA rejects F.W.R.’s challenges to his involuntary commitment order under Wis. Stat. § 51.20 for alcohol dependence, concluding that a person may be involuntarily committed for treatment for alcoholism, the circuit court followed the proper procedures and the county met its burden to prove that he was drug dependent and dangerous.

Graham L. Stowe v. Gregory Van Rybroek, No. 23-3345, 8/21/24

This habeas appeal is limited to a facial challenge to the NGI conditional release statute, Wis. Stat. § 971.17(4)(d). The Seventh Circuit rejects Stowe’s argument, concluding that he cannot show that there are no circumstances under which the law’s application would be valid.

Winnebago County v. C.H., 2023AP505, 8/30/23, District 2 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

In this Ch. 51 appeal, COA swats aside familiar 51 arguments, expresses its frustration with a “flood” of Ch. 51 appeals and, with approving citation to a dissent from SCOW, hints that we may not have heard the last of the mootness doctrine in COA with respect to 51 appeals.

Milwaukee County v. D.H., 2022AP1402, 3/7/23, District 1 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity

To obtain an involuntary medication order, a county must satisfy the multi-step test for incompetency to make medication decisions in §51.61(1)(g)4. The first step requires the county to prove that the person received a “reasonable explanation” of the advantages, disadvantages, and alternatives to medication. The examiner can’t just testify that she complied with the statute. She must tell the court what she told the person about the medication. In “Dan’s” case, the court of appeals reversed the involuntary medication order because the county failed this step.

Rock County Human. Servs. v. A.P., Appeal nos. 2022AP248-249; 7/14/22, District 4; (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity

This is one more in a long line of appellate decisions affirming a default finding of grounds for terminating a parent’s rights without a finding that the parent had behaved egregiously as required by Dane Cnty. DHS v. Mable K., 2013 WI 28, ¶71, 346 Wis. 2d 396, 828 N.W.2d 198. The difference here is that the court of appeals also openly disregards (or perhaps is unfamiliar with?) the rules of appellate procedure.

State v. Roy C. O’Neal, 2020AP1270, 6/2/21, District 3 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

A person who’s been indefinitely committed under ch. 980 is entitled to a discharge trial if he can show … well, er, nobody really knows what he has to show. In State v. Hager, our supreme court failed to reach a majority for any view on the statute (while arguably striking down the court of appeals’ attempt at a gloss). Given the absence of an ascertainable rule, it’s not too surprising that we get incoherent decisions like this one. What is a little surprising is the court of appeals’ decision to “treat [Hager‘s] lead opinion as controlling” on one aspect of the statute’s meaning. That was a three-justice lead opinion; four other justices disagreed on the point. Arguably. Is the court of appeals here treating a supreme court minority view as binding?

State v. Tavodess Matthews, 2021 WI 42, reversing a published court of appeals opinion, 2020 WI App 33, 5/14/21, case activity (including briefs)

Section 801.58(1) allows a party to a civil case to request a new judge if, among other things, he files a written substitution request before “the hearing of any preliminary contested matter.” Matthews’ case concerns a substitution request made after the circuit court granted a motion to adjourn a Chapter 980 probable cause hearing regarding sexually violent persons. But since Chapter 980 commitments are civil proceedings, this unanimous SCOW opinion, which reverses a published court of appeals’ opinion, is an important clarification of the law governing all civil cases.