On Point blog, page 27 of 60
Due process challenge fails; counties and courts needn’t specify dangerousness standard justifying Chapter 51 commitment
Milwaukee County v. T.L.R., 2018AP1131, 12/4/18, District 1 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication), case activity
Here’s an issue of first impression for SCOW. Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078, 1092 (E.D. Wis. 1972) established procedural and substantive due process rights for persons undergoing mental commitments. One of those rights is the right to particularized notice of the basis for detention, including, the legal standard upon which the person is detained. Id. at 1092. T.L.R didn’t receive that notice.
Failure to raise issue in circuit court forfeits it on appeal
Monroe County v. B.L., 2018AP694, 11/8/18, District 4 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity
B.L. argues on appeal that the doctor who initiated his emergency detention could not also be one of the examiners appointed under Wis. Stat. § 51.20(9)(a)1.. The court does not address the argument, because B.L. raises it for the first time on appeal.
Good issues for SCOW: Requests for substitute counsel and self-representation in Chapter 51 cases
Fond du Lac County v. S.R.H., 2018AP1088-FT, 10/17/18, District 2 (1-judge opinion, eligible for publication); case activity
At the beginning of a Chapter 51 extension hearing, S.R.H. told the court that he wanted to fire his attorney, and he asked for a new one. When that failed, he asked the court “Your honor, could I go pro se?” The court ignored his request. The hearing proceeded, S.R.H. was recommitted, and the court of appeals here affirms in a decision worthy of SCOW’s review.
Ch. 51 commitment extension and medication order upheld
Winnebago County v. B.C., 2018AP846-FT, District 2, 9/5/18 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity
B.C. challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to extend his commitment and involuntarily medicate him. His challenge fails.
COA: evidence sufficient for continued guardianship and protective placement
Winnebago County v. M.R.R., 2018AP273, 10/3/18, District 2 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
M.R.R. suffered a traumatic brain injury 35 years ago; he’s diagnosed with a personality change due to the injury and unspecified personality disorder. He was found incompetent and placed in a guardianship in 2015 and a protective placement in 2016; this is an appeal of the recent continuation of that guardianship and protective placement.
SCOW to review personal jurisdiction and default judgments in Chapter 51 cases
Waukesha County v. S.L.L., 2017AP1468, petition for review of memorandum opinion granted 8/15/18; case activity
Issues (from court of appeals opinion):
Whether the circuit court has personal jurisdiction to recommit a person under Chapter 51 when the County concedes that it has been unable to serve her with the petition for recommitment?
Whether a circuit court has authority to enter a default judgment against the subject of a Chapter 51 petition for recommitment?
Whether “examining” physician reports recommending involuntary commitment and medication prepared physicians who never actually examined the subject are sufficient to support a Chapter 51 commitment?
Sufficient evidence supported finding that “Donald” was dangerous under Chapter 51
Marathon County v. D.K., 2017AP2217, 8/7/18, District 3 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); petition for review granted 7/10/19, affirmed, 2020 WI 18; case activity
“Donald” is the pseudonym the court of appeals opinion assigned to D.K., who was committed under §51.20(a)2.b. Although Dr. Dave, the examining physician, waffled on the odds of whether Donald might do serious physical harm without commitment and treatment, the court of appeals found that his conclusion–that Donald posed a “substantial risk of danger to others”–got the job done. It also acknowledged a potential antidote to mootness arguments in Chapter 51 appeals.
Once committed, always committed . . . at least under Chapter 51
Waukesha County v. M.J.S., 2017AP1843, 8/1/18, District 2, (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication), case activity
In May On Point reported a defense win in this case. One week later, Waukesha County moved for reconsideration. The court of appeals just granted the motion and issued this new opinion. The difference between the two is that the May opinion only addressed (and reversed) the circuit court’s involuntary medication order. The August opinion addresses (and affirms) the circuit court’s order to extend M.J.S.’s commitment, while maintaining the reversal of his involuntary medication order. The court of appeals’ reasons for affirming the extension of commitment are unsettling.
Court of appeals affirms orders for commitment and involuntary medication under the 5th standard
Rock County v. B.A.G., 2018AP782, 7/26/18, District 4, (1-judge opinion, eligible for publication); case activity
B.A.G. challenged a court order to commit and medicate him under §51.20(1)(a)2e (the 5th standard). His main objection appears to be that being undressed outside in cold weather was insufficient evidence to commit him. The court of appeals does not articulate the challenge he lodged against the medication order. Regardless, he lost on both issues. However, the court of appeals opinion on the medication order suggests a possible defect in the statute.
Court of appeals erases line between civil commitments and protective placements
Marathon County v. P.X., 2017AP1497, 6/26/18, District 3, (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity
P.X. is autistic, non-verbal, intellectually and developmentally disabled and has obsessive compulsive disorder and pica. The question is whether he is capable of “rehabilitation,” which would make him a proper subject for treatment on Chapter 51. If not, then he should be placed under Chapter 55. The court of appeals held that even though P.X.’s disabilities cannot be cured and he can never function in society, his OCD and pica could be controlled with medication, so Chapter 51 applies. Under Chapter 51, a person can be committed to a mental institution for years, but Chapter 55 bars protective placement in a unit for the acutely mentally ill. See §55.12(2). This decision seems to let the county accomplish through Chapter 51 what it cannot do through Chapter 55. Let’s hope P.X. petitions SCOW for review.