On Point: 3. Civil Commitments

Winnebago County v. M.R.R., 2018AP273, 10/3/18, District 2 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

M.R.R. suffered a traumatic brain injury 35 years ago; he’s diagnosed with a personality change due to the injury and unspecified personality disorder. He was found incompetent and placed in a guardianship in 2015 and a protective placement in 2016; this is an appeal of the recent continuation of that guardianship and protective placement.

Waukesha County v. S.L.L., 2017AP1468, petition for review of memorandum opinion granted 8/15/18; case activity

Issues (from court of appeals opinion):

Whether the circuit court has personal jurisdiction to recommit a person under Chapter 51 when the County concedes that it has been unable to serve her with the petition for recommitment?

Whether a circuit court has authority to enter a default judgment against the subject of a Chapter 51 petition for recommitment?

Whether “examining” physician reports recommending involuntary commitment and medication prepared physicians who never actually examined the subject are sufficient to support a Chapter 51 commitment?

Marathon County v. D.K., 2017AP2217, 8/7/18, District 3 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); petition for review granted 7/10/19, affirmed, 2020 WI 18; case activity

“Donald” is the pseudonym the court of appeals opinion assigned to D.K., who was committed under §51.20(a)2.b. Although Dr. Dave, the examining physician, waffled on the odds of whether Donald might do serious physical harm without commitment and treatment, the court of appeals found that his conclusion–that Donald posed a “substantial risk of danger to others”–got the job done.  It also acknowledged a potential antidote to mootness arguments in Chapter 51 appeals.

Waukesha County v. M.J.S., 2017AP1843, 8/1/18, District 2, (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication), case activity

In May On Point reported a defense win in this case.  One week later, Waukesha County moved for reconsideration. The court of appeals just granted the motion and issued this new opinion. The difference between the two is that the May opinion only addressed (and reversed) the circuit court’s involuntary medication order. The August opinion addresses (and affirms) the circuit court’s order to extend M.J.S.’s commitment, while maintaining the reversal of his involuntary medication order. The court of appeals’ reasons for affirming the extension of commitment are unsettling.

Rock County v. B.A.G., 2018AP782, 7/26/18, District 4, (1-judge opinion, eligible for publication); case activity

B.A.G. challenged a court order to commit and medicate him under §51.20(1)(a)2e (the 5th standard). His main objection appears to be that being undressed outside in cold weather was insufficient evidence to commit him. The court of appeals does not articulate the challenge he lodged against the medication order. Regardless, he lost on both issues. However, the court of appeals opinion on the medication order suggests a possible defect in the statute.

Marathon County v. P.X., 2017AP1497, 6/26/18, District 3, (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity

P.X. is autistic, non-verbal, intellectually and developmentally disabled and has obsessive compulsive disorder and pica. The question is whether he is capable of “rehabilitation,” which would make him a proper subject for treatment on Chapter 51. If not, then he should be placed under Chapter 55. The court of appeals held that even though P.X.’s disabilities cannot be cured and he can never function in society, his OCD and pica could be controlled with medication, so Chapter 51 applies. Under Chapter 51, a person can be committed to a mental institution for years, but Chapter 55 bars protective placement in a unit for the acutely mentally ill. See §55.12(2). This decision seems to let the county accomplish through Chapter 51 what it cannot do through Chapter 55. Let’s hope P.X. petitions SCOW for review.

Portage County v. J.W.K., 2017AP1574, petition for review of a memorandum opinion granted, 6/11/18; affirmed, 5/21/19; case activity

Whether an appeal of the extension of a Chapter 51 commitment based on insufficient evidence becomes moot when the circuit court enters a new extension order?

Whether an examining physician’s testimony is sufficient to support the extension of a commitment where the physician merely recites the statutory language?

Waukesha County v. M.J.S., 2017AP1843, 5/30/18, District 2, (1-judge opinion ineligible for publication); case activity

Section 51.61(1)(g)4 and Outagamie County v. Melanie L., 2013 WI 67, 349 Wis. 2d 148, 833 N.W.2d 607 establish that a person subject to a possible involuntary medication order is entitled to receive a reasonable explanation of the proposed medication, why it is being prescribed, its advantages and disadvantages (include side effects), and alternatives to it. If the person is incapable of expressing an understanding of these matters or incapable of applying the information to his situation in order to make an informed decision, then he is incompetent to refuse them. In this case, M.J.S. failed to show for the examination where a doctor would have attempted the statutorily-required explanation. The circuit court ordered involuntary meds; the court of appeals reversed.

State v. Justice G. Armstead, 2017AP1586-CR, 5/30/18, District 1 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Armstead pled NGI to 2 misdemeanors, pursuant to §971.16. The court ordered his conditional release into the community for 6 months, along with involuntary medications. Five months into the order, Armstead filed a motion for postdisposition relief  arguing that both the examining physician and the circuit court applied the wrong legal standard for ordering involuntary medications. The circuit court denied the motion. The conditional release order expired a week later but Armstead appealed anyway. The court of appeals dismissed his appeal as moot. In doing so, it made a significant error of law.

Milwaukee County v. I.K., 2017AP1425, District 1, 5/8/18 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

The County proved I.K. was dangerous under both § 51.20(1)(a)2.d., by showing there was a substantial probability I.K. would suffer physical harm resulting from his inability to satisfy basic needs due to mental illness, and § 51.20(1)(a)2.e., by showing that, after being advised of the advantages and disadvantages of accepting treatment, I.K. was unable to understand and make an informed choice regarding treatment and that a lack of treatment will result in further disability or deterioration.