On Point blog, page 36 of 60
SCOW: “threat of suicide” ground for involuntary commitment does not require articulation of plan
Outagamie v. Michael H., 2014 WI 127, 12/16/14, affirming an unpublished court of appeals decision, majority opinion by Justice Crooks; case activity
Section 51.20(1)(a)2.a authorizes the involuntary commitment of a person who is “dangerous,” a test that may be met by showing recent threats of, or attempts at, suicide. This unanimous decision holds that in the right circumstances just thinking about suicide–without articulating a plan for committing it–constitutes a sufficient “threat” to satisfy the involuntary commitment statute.
Lower burden of proof at ch. 980 discharge trial doesn’t violate due process
State v. Thornon F. Talley, 2015 WI App 4; case activity
A person committed as a sexually violent person under ch. 980 does not have a due process right to have the state prove at a discharge hearing that he is still a sexually violent person, so the clear and convincing evidence standard under § 980.09(3) is not facially unconstitutional.
Jury instruction defining “drug” using dictionary was proper in ch. 51 commitment based on drug dependency
Marathon County v. Zachary W., 2014AP955, District 3, 12/2/14 (1-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity
Even if the circuit court erred it provided multiple definitions of the term “drug” when instructing the jury hearing a ch. 51 commitment case.
Failure to hold hearing within statutory time limit means circuit court lost competency to decide ch. 54 guardianship petition
Tina B. v. Richard H., 2014 WI App 123; case activity
The circuit court lost competency to decide a guardianship proceeding under § 54.34 because it failed to decide the case within the statutory time limit, but the circuit court’s decisions in a related guardianship proceeding under § 48.977 are affirmed.
Threats to harm others, when made to third parties, show dangerousness under Sec. 51.20(1)(a)2.b.
Kenosha County v. Steven H., 2014AP1435-FT, District 2, 10/15/14 (1-judge opinion ineligible for publication); case activity
The court of appeals here affirmed an order finding Steven H. “dangerous” under §51.20(1)(a)2.b, which requires, among other things, evidence that people were placed in reasonable fear of Steven’s violent behavior. Under this standard, a court may consider threats voiced to third parties rather than to the potential victims. R.J. v. Winnebago County, 146 Wis. 2d 516, 521-22, 431 N.W.2d 708 (Ct. App. 1988).
Evidence in ch. 51 case sufficient to show dangerousness
Winnebago County v. William A.M., 2014AP977-FT, District 2, 9/10/14 (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity
The evidence at trial was sufficient to prove William was dangerous under § 51.20(1)(a)2.c., which requires a showing of “such impaired judgment, manifested by evidence of a pattern of recent acts or omissions, that there is a substantial probability of physical impairment or injury to himself or herself.”
Court lost competency in ch. 51 case because probable cause hearing occurred beyond 72-hour time limit
Waukesha County v. Steven R.C., 2014AP1032-FT, District 2, 9/10/14 (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity
The failure to hold a probable cause hearing within 72 hours of Steven’s initial detention deprived the circuit court of competency to proceed, despite the County’s filing of a new petition within the 72-hour time period with new allegations.
Ch. 51 appeal is moot
Milwaukee County v. Rebecca G., 2014AP359, District 1, 9/3/14 (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity
Rebecca’s appeal of her ch. 51 commitment is dismissed as moot because the six-month commitment order expired while the appeal was pending and the County didn’t seek an extension.
Time for holding probable cause hearing under § 51.20(7)(a) runs from time of arrival at hosptial, not mental health unit within hospital
Ozaukee County v. Mark T.J., 2014AP479, District 2, 8/27/14 (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity
The failure to hold an initial hearing within 72 hours of Mark’s arrival at the hospital where he was detained deprived the circuit court of competency to order an initial commitment order under ch. 51. But his appeal from that initial commitment order is moot because he stipulated to recommitment and vacating the initial commitment would have no practical effect.
Evidence sufficient to extend ch. 51 commitment and order involuntary medication and treatment
Ozaukee County v. Laura B., 2014AP1011-FT, District 2, 8/13/14 (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity
The evidence was sufficient to justify an extension of Laura B.’s commitment and an order for involuntary medication and treatment.