On Point blog, page 37 of 60
SCOW: Reversal of predicate sexually violent offense doesn’t require dismissal of pending ch. 980 petition
State v. Joseph J. Spaeth, 2014 WI 71, 7/16/14, on certification from the court of appeals, and reversing the circuit court’s dismissal order; majority opinion by Justice Gableman; case activity
A necessary predicate of a commitment under ch. 980 is a conviction for a sexually violent offense. This case raises an unusual issue regarding predicate convictions: Can the state continue to prosecute a ch. 980 proceeding if the predicate conviction that was alleged in the petition is vacated and dismissed after the petition is filed? The supreme court answers “yes,” holding that the sufficiency of a ch. 980 petition is to be assessed as of the time it is filed, and at the time the petition in this case was filed there was a valid conviction for the predicate offense.
County presented sufficient evidence to support involuntary medication order; recommitment deadline explained
Portage County v. Jeffrey J.T., 2013AP2481, District 4, 6/26/14 (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity
The report of the examining physician was sufficient to show that the advantages, disadvantages, and alternatives to medication were explained to Jeffrey, the subject of a ch. 51 recommitment proceeding, as required by § 51.61(1)(g)4. and Outagamie County v. Melanie L., 2013 WI 67, ¶¶91, 97, 349 Wis. 2d 148, 833 N.W.2d 607.
County failed to prove lack of competence to refuse medication or treatment
Waukesha County v. Kathleen H., 2014AP90, District 2, 6/25/14 (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity
The County did not show that Kathleen, the subject of a ch. 51 commitment proceeding, is incompetent to refuse medication or treatment because it did not show that the advantages, disadvantages, and alternatives to her medication were explained to her, as required by § 51.61(1)(g)4. and Outagamie County v. Melanie L., 2013 WI 67, ¶¶91, 97, 349 Wis. 2d 148, 833 N.W.2d 607.
Outagamie County v. Michael H., 2013AP1638-FT, petition for review granted 6/12/14
On review of an unpublished court of appeals decision; case activity
Issue (composed by On Point)
Was there sufficient evidence to establish Michael H. was “dangerous” under § 51.20(1)(a)2.a. or c., based either on his “threats” of suicide or a pattern of acts or omissions showing such impaired judgment that there is a substantial probability of physical impairment or injury?
Ch. 51 respondent did not have right to be physically present at final hearing, so appearance by videoconferencing was not error
Price County DHHS v. Sondra F., 2013AP2790, District 3, 5/28/14 (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity
A respondent in a ch. 51 mental commitment proceeding does not have either a statutory or a due process right to be physically present at the final hearing under § 51.20. To the extent § 885.60(2)(a) provides a right to be physically present, it does not mandate physical presence, and the right under that statute is forfeited if the respondent fails to object to the videoconferencing or fails to request to be physically present.
State v. Michael Alger, 2013AP225, & State v. Ronald Knipfer, 2013AP578, petitions for review granted 5/23/14
On review of published court of appeals decisions: Alger, 2013 WI App 148; Knipfer, 2014 WI App 9; case activity: Alger; Knipfer
Issues (composed by On Point)
Does the filing of a petition for discharge or supervised release under ch. 980 after the effective date of the adoption of 2011 Wisconsin Act 2 “commence” an action or proceeding such that the Daubert standard for expert witness testimony applies to the discharge or supervised release proceeding?
If the filing of a discharge or supervised release petition after the effective date of Act 2 does not commence a new proceeding, does it violate due process or equal protection to refuse to apply the Daubert standard to the proceedings on those petitions?
Police officers who entered and searched home and seized firearm–all without a warrant– are not civilly liable
Krysta Sutterfield v. City of Milwaukee, No. 12-2272 (7th Cir. May 9, 2014)
Nine hours after obtaining a § 51.15 emergency detention order, Milwaukee police officers forcibly entered Sutterfield’s home without a warrant, opened a locked container, and seized the handgun and concealed carry licenses that were in the container. Sutterfield filed a civil rights suit against them, but the district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The Seventh Circuit affirms in a long (76-page) decision with plenty to digest, even though it declines to resolve some of the constitutional issues raised because they were not preserved or fully argued. The court does conclude the entry was justified because the police reasonably believed Sutterfield was going to harm herself. And the court assumes the search of the closed container and seizure of the gun were unlawful, but holds the officers are immune from civil liability.
Trial court improperly weighed persuasiveness of evidence in denying Ch. 980 discharge petition
State v. Scott Maher, 2013AP1815, District 4, 4/3/14; court of appeals decision (not recommended for publication); case activity
The circuit court impermissibly weighed the relative persuasiveness of conflicting examination reports of experts when it denied Maher’s § 980.09 petition without holding a discharge hearing when it said it had “some ability apparently to assess the accuracy of the expert’s report or their qualifications” and concluded that the “wildly different conclusions”
Committed sex offender entitled to discharge hearing based on re-evaluation with updated actuarial
State v. Herbert O. Richard, 2014 WI App 28; case activity
Richard is entitled to an evidentiary hearing on his petition for discharge because the independent psychologist’s opinion that amendments to the Static-99 show Richard’s risk to reoffend is below the legal threshold constitutes a fact on which a court or jury may conclude that Richard does not meet the criteria for commitment as a sexually violent person,
Chapter 51 commitment may be extended without re-proving past dangerousness
Wood County v. Linda S.D., 2013AP1380, 2/16/14, District 4 (1-judge, ineligible for publication), case activity
Do you know what an infinite loop is? This decision is a good example of one.
Linda S.D. was subject to a Ch. 51 inpatient commitment order, and the County petitioned to extend it. The test for extending a commitment order is set forth in § 51.20(1)(am). The issue,