On Point blog, page 37 of 61
Threats to harm others, when made to third parties, show dangerousness under Sec. 51.20(1)(a)2.b.
Kenosha County v. Steven H., 2014AP1435-FT, District 2, 10/15/14 (1-judge opinion ineligible for publication); case activity
The court of appeals here affirmed an order finding Steven H. “dangerous” under §51.20(1)(a)2.b, which requires, among other things, evidence that people were placed in reasonable fear of Steven’s violent behavior. Under this standard, a court may consider threats voiced to third parties rather than to the potential victims. R.J. v. Winnebago County, 146 Wis. 2d 516, 521-22, 431 N.W.2d 708 (Ct. App. 1988).
Evidence in ch. 51 case sufficient to show dangerousness
Winnebago County v. William A.M., 2014AP977-FT, District 2, 9/10/14 (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity
The evidence at trial was sufficient to prove William was dangerous under § 51.20(1)(a)2.c., which requires a showing of “such impaired judgment, manifested by evidence of a pattern of recent acts or omissions, that there is a substantial probability of physical impairment or injury to himself or herself.”
Court lost competency in ch. 51 case because probable cause hearing occurred beyond 72-hour time limit
Waukesha County v. Steven R.C., 2014AP1032-FT, District 2, 9/10/14 (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity
The failure to hold a probable cause hearing within 72 hours of Steven’s initial detention deprived the circuit court of competency to proceed, despite the County’s filing of a new petition within the 72-hour time period with new allegations.
Ch. 51 appeal is moot
Milwaukee County v. Rebecca G., 2014AP359, District 1, 9/3/14 (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity
Rebecca’s appeal of her ch. 51 commitment is dismissed as moot because the six-month commitment order expired while the appeal was pending and the County didn’t seek an extension.
Time for holding probable cause hearing under § 51.20(7)(a) runs from time of arrival at hosptial, not mental health unit within hospital
Ozaukee County v. Mark T.J., 2014AP479, District 2, 8/27/14 (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity
The failure to hold an initial hearing within 72 hours of Mark’s arrival at the hospital where he was detained deprived the circuit court of competency to order an initial commitment order under ch. 51. But his appeal from that initial commitment order is moot because he stipulated to recommitment and vacating the initial commitment would have no practical effect.
Evidence sufficient to extend ch. 51 commitment and order involuntary medication and treatment
Ozaukee County v. Laura B., 2014AP1011-FT, District 2, 8/13/14 (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity
The evidence was sufficient to justify an extension of Laura B.’s commitment and an order for involuntary medication and treatment.
Ch. 980 petition is timely as long as it’s filed before the person’s release or discharge from sentence
State v. Hershel R. Stanley, 2014 WI App 89; case activity
Even if DOC was required to release Stanley from prison on his presumptive mandatory release date instead of holding him to his maximum discharge date, the ch. 980 petition filed against him before his discharge date was timely because § 980.02(1m) permits filing a ch. 980 petition before a person is released or discharged from his sentence.
Trial court properly extended Chapter 51 commitment; subject will pose danger to herself and others if commitment ends
Kenosha County v. Vermetrias W., 2014AP861-FT, District 2, 7/16/14 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity
Vermetrias had been the subject of a Chapter 51 commitment order, which Kenosha County sought to extend. Section 51.20(1)(a)2 provides than an individual is the proper subject for commitment if he or she poses a danger to himself or herself or to others. Vermetrias presented evidence that there was not a “substantial likelihood” she would become dangerous if her commitment ended. The trial court ruled against her. The court of appeals affirmed, but complimented those involved in this matter:
SCOW: Reversal of predicate sexually violent offense doesn’t require dismissal of pending ch. 980 petition
State v. Joseph J. Spaeth, 2014 WI 71, 7/16/14, on certification from the court of appeals, and reversing the circuit court’s dismissal order; majority opinion by Justice Gableman; case activity
A necessary predicate of a commitment under ch. 980 is a conviction for a sexually violent offense. This case raises an unusual issue regarding predicate convictions: Can the state continue to prosecute a ch. 980 proceeding if the predicate conviction that was alleged in the petition is vacated and dismissed after the petition is filed? The supreme court answers “yes,” holding that the sufficiency of a ch. 980 petition is to be assessed as of the time it is filed, and at the time the petition in this case was filed there was a valid conviction for the predicate offense.
County presented sufficient evidence to support involuntary medication order; recommitment deadline explained
Portage County v. Jeffrey J.T., 2013AP2481, District 4, 6/26/14 (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity
The report of the examining physician was sufficient to show that the advantages, disadvantages, and alternatives to medication were explained to Jeffrey, the subject of a ch. 51 recommitment proceeding, as required by § 51.61(1)(g)4. and Outagamie County v. Melanie L., 2013 WI 67, ¶¶91, 97, 349 Wis. 2d 148, 833 N.W.2d 607.