On Point: 3. Civil Commitments

Price County DHHS v. Sondra F., 2013AP2790, District 3, 5/28/14 (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity

A respondent in a ch. 51 mental commitment proceeding does not have either a statutory or a due process right to be physically present at the final hearing under § 51.20. To the extent § 885.60(2)(a) provides a right to be physically present, it does not mandate physical presence, and the right under that statute is forfeited if the respondent fails to object to the videoconferencing or fails to request to be physically present.

On review of published court of appeals decisions: Alger, 2013 WI App 148; Knipfer, 2014 WI App 9; case activity: Alger; Knipfer

Issues (composed by On Point)

Does the filing of a petition for discharge or supervised release under ch. 980 after the effective date of the adoption of 2011 Wisconsin Act 2 “commence” an action or proceeding such that the Daubert standard for expert witness testimony applies to the discharge or supervised release proceeding?

If the filing of a discharge or supervised release petition after the effective date of Act 2 does not commence a new proceeding, does it violate due process or equal protection to refuse to apply the Daubert standard to the proceedings on those petitions?

Krysta Sutterfield v. City of Milwaukee, No. 12-2272 (7th Cir. May 9, 2014)

Nine hours after obtaining a § 51.15 emergency detention order, Milwaukee police officers forcibly entered Sutterfield’s home without a warrant, opened a locked container, and seized the handgun and concealed carry licenses that were in the container. Sutterfield filed a civil rights suit against them, but the district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The Seventh Circuit affirms in a long (76-page) decision with plenty to digest, even though it declines to resolve some of the constitutional issues raised because they were not preserved or fully argued. The court does conclude the entry was justified because the police reasonably believed Sutterfield was going to harm herself. And the court assumes the search of the closed container and  seizure of the gun were unlawful, but holds the officers are immune from civil liability.

State v. Scott Maher, 2013AP1815, District 4, 4/3/14; court of appeals decision (not recommended for publication); case activity

The circuit court impermissibly weighed the relative persuasiveness of conflicting examination reports of experts when it denied Maher’s § 980.09 petition without holding a discharge hearing when it said it had “some ability apparently to assess the accuracy of the expert’s report or their qualifications” and concluded that the “wildly different conclusions”

State v. Herbert O. Richard, 2014 WI  App 28; case activity

Richard is entitled to an evidentiary hearing on his petition for discharge because the independent psychologist’s opinion that amendments to the Static-99 show Richard’s risk to reoffend is below the legal threshold constitutes a fact on which a court or jury may conclude that Richard does not meet the criteria for commitment as a sexually violent person,

Wood County v. Linda S.D., 2013AP1380, 2/16/14, District 4 (1-judge, ineligible for publication), case activity

Do you know what an infinite loop is?  This decision is a good example of one.

Linda S.D. was subject to a Ch. 51 inpatient commitment order, and the County petitioned to extend it.  The test for extending a commitment order is set forth in § 51.20(1)(am).  The issue,

Waukesha County v. Michael J.S., 2013AP1983-FT, District 2, 1/29/14; court of appeals decision (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity

Michael has been on a court-ordered commitment for thirty-five years, except for a two-year period that ended in 1996, when Michael was committed under § 51.20 after an incident in which he rode his bicycle erratically on a highway and had a confrontation with police. Since 1996, Michael’s commitment order has been extended numerous times,

Eau Claire County v. Mary S., 2013AP2098, District 3, 1/28/14 (1-judge opinion ineligible for publication); case activity

Mary S. was placed under a Chapter 51 mental health commitment and involuntary medication order in 2011, and those orders were extended once. But when the County sought to extend the orders again, Mary objected and argued that the County, which bore the burden of proof, failed to establish that Mary was incompetent to refuse medication,

Polk County  Human Services Dep’t v. Boe H., 2013AP1719, District 3, 1/14/13 (not recommended for publication); case activity

This appeal turns on the court of appeals’ application of the law of the case doctrine,  so it’s necessary to recap some procedural history.

After a jury found Boe mentally ill, a proper subject for treatment, and dangerous under the “fifth standard”, Wis. Stat. § 51.20(1)(a)2.e, the circuit court committed him to the DHS for 6 months.  

State v. Edward Cotton, 2013AP452, District 1, 1/7/14; court of appeals decision (not recommended for publication); case activity

At the hearing on Cotton’s petition for discharge from his ch. 980 commitment the state’s experts testified that Cotton’s high psychopathy coupled with his sexual deviance raised his risk to reoffend. They also opined that sex offender treatment Cotton received in prison did not significantly reduce his risk because it wasn’t designed to treat offenders with high psychopathy.