On Point: 3. Civil Commitments

Monroe County v. M.C., 2024AP924, 12/12/24, District IV (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

The Court of Appeals reversed the circuit court’s commitment order under Chapter 51 where the court did not make sufficient factual findings to support its conclusion that M.C. was dangerous, as required by D.J.W.

Trempealeau County v. R.B., 2024AP1052, 12/10/24, District III (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

COA affirms, holding that the evidence of potential deterioration during commitment period justified extension order.

Vernon County v. F.W.R., 2024AP203, District IV, 11/6/24 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

COA rejects F.W.R.’s challenges to his involuntary commitment order under Wis. Stat. § 51.20 for alcohol dependence, concluding that a person may be involuntarily committed for treatment for alcoholism, the circuit court followed the proper procedures and the county met its burden to prove that he was drug dependent and dangerous.

Waukesha County v. M.D.S., Jr., 2024AP1315, District II, 11/6/24 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

COA rejects “Smith’s” challenges raising commonly-litigated appellate issues and affirms in this chapter 51 case, concluding that the circuit court applied the correct legal standard and the county met its burden to show that Smith was dangerous under sub. 2.b.

State v. N.K.B., 2023AP722-CR, 10/1/24, District I (recommended for publication); petition for review granted, 2/12/25 case activity

N.K.B. (referred to as Naomi) was found incompetent to proceed on her criminal charges.  The circuit court authorized involuntarily administering medication to Naomi because she was dangerous.  Naomi argued on appeal that the circuit court did not have authority to authorize involuntarily medicating her based only on dangerousness.  In a recommended-for-publication decision, the COA vacated the circuit court’s order authorizing involuntary medication: “Defendants committed under § 971.14 cannot be involuntarily medicated based on dangerousness absent the commencement of proceedings under ch. 51 or some other statute that authorizes involuntary medication based on the defendant’s dangerousness.”  (¶ 20).

Graham L. Stowe v. Gregory Van Rybroek, No. 23-3345, 8/21/24

This habeas appeal is limited to a facial challenge to the NGI conditional release statute, Wis. Stat. § 971.17(4)(d). The Seventh Circuit rejects Stowe’s argument, concluding that he cannot show that there are no circumstances under which the law’s application would be valid.

Ozaukee County v. S.S., 2024AP759, District II, 9/11/24 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

In determining whether to continue protective placement under Chapter 55, the County does not need to present an expert witness to establish an individual continues to meet the criteria for placement, and the circuit court may rely on the entire record – not just the record at the annual review hearing – to find grounds to continue placement.

State v. J.D.B., 2023AP715-CR, 9/10/24, District I (recommended for publication); petition for review granted, 2/12/25 case activity

In a recommended-for-publication decision, COA wholly endorses all of J.D.B.’s arguments requiring a high burden of proof when the State seeks an involuntary medication order in order to render a defendant competent to stand trial. Along the way, COA offers a bevy of helpful holdings that are also applicable outside of this highly-specialized practiced area.

Brown County v. L.M.R., 2023AP2314, District III, 8/6/24 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

COA rejects all of L.M.R.’s challenges raising commonly-litigated appellate issues and affirms in this Chapter 51 case given some less-than favorable facts.

Brown County v. J.D.T., 2023AP2339, 7/23/24, District 3 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

J.D.T. challenges the his commitment under ch. 51 (second and third standards). The COA concludes that the county presented sufficient evidence of dangerousness under the third standard, Wis. Stat. § 51.20(1)(a)2.c., and therefore does not address the second standard.