On Point: 3. Civil Commitments

State v. Paschall Lee Sanders, 2011 WI App 125 (recommended for publication); for Sanders: Ellen Henak, SPD, Milwaukee Appellate; case activity

The definitions of “mental disorder” in since-amended pattern instruction Wis JI—Criminal 2502 (2009), though concededly contradictory, didn’t prevent from being tried the issue of whether Sanders qualified for commitment as a sexually violent person:

¶14      As we have seen, two sentences in what the circuit court told the jury are contradictory:

(1)   “Mental disorder means a condition affecting the emotional or volitional capacity that predisposes a person to engage in acts of sexual violence and causes serious difficulty in controlling behavior.”  (Emphasis added.)

(2)   “Not all persons with a mental disorder are predisposed to commit sexually violent offenses or have serious difficulty in controlling behavior.”

As noted earlier,

State v. Edwin Clarence West, 2011 WI 83, affirming unpublished opinion; for West: Ellen Henak, SPD, Milwaukee Appellate; case activity [Companion case: State v. Nordberg, 2011 WI 84 (same result, controlled by West).]

Someone under ch. 980 commitment as a sexually violent person bears the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence the criteria for granting supervised release under § 980.08(4)(cg),

State v. Charles M. Ermers, Jr., 2011 WI App 113 (recommended for publication); for Ermers: Steven D. Phillips, SPD, Madison Appellate; case activity

A ch. 980 discharge hearing requires that the petitioner allege “facts from which the court or jury may conclude the person’s condition has changed since the date of his or her initial commitment order so that the person does not meet the criteria for commitment as a sexually violent person,” 

Brown County v. Kevin Q., 2011AP208, District 3, 6/28/11

court of appeals decision (1-judge, not for publication); for Kevin Q.: Andrew Hinkel, SPD, Madison Appellate; case activity

¶10      We conclude the evidence sufficiently shows there is a substantial likelihood Kevin would be a proper subject for commitment if treatment were withdrawn.  Kevin acknowledged he has overdosed on medication at least three times.  Slightam testified that without the commitment he was unsure “if [Kevin] would comply with all the medications.”  He also opined Kevin’s medication administration needs to be supervised. 

State v. Alan Adin Randall, 2011 WI App 102 (recommended for publication); for Randall: Brian Kinstler, Craig S. Powell; case activity; prior history: State v. Randall, 192 Wis. 2d 800, 532 N.W.2d 94 (1995) (“Randall I”); State v. Randall, 222 Wis. 2d 53, 586 N.W.2d 318 (Ct.

State v. Albert M. Virsnieks, 2010AP1967, District 2 / 1, 6/21/11

court of appeals decision (not recommended for publication); pro se; case activity

Virsnieks’ plea-based conviction for burglary supported  ch. 980 commitment.

¶35      A Wis. Stat. ch. 980 petition must allege, among other things, that a “person has been convicted of a sexually violent offense.”[5] Wis. Stat. § 980.02(2)(a)1.  A “[s]exually violent offense” is defined,

State v. Scott Maher, 2010AP460, District 4, 5/26/11

court of appeals decision (not recommended for publication); for Maher: Donald T. Lang, SPD, Madison Appellate; case activity

Testimony from a State’s expert witness describing the ch. 980 screening process was irrelevant.

¶11      We addressed the issue of the admissibility of this same type of evidence in State v. Sugden, 2010 WI App 166,

Dane County v. Kelly M., 2011 WI App 69 (recommended for publication); for Kelly M.: Ruth N. Westmont, Ashley J. Richter; case activity

Kelly M. appeals a commitment order premised on the “fifth standard,” inability by reason of mental illness to understand the advantages and disadvantages of medication or treatment for the mental illness.

¶3        We conclude as follows:  (1) Commitment is available under the fifth standard for individuals who have dual diagnoses—that is,

State v. Herbert O. Richard, 2011 WI App 66 (recommended for publication); for Richard: Steven D. Grunder, SPD, Madison Appellate; case activity

Changes in the scoring of the actuarial test which was used to support Richard’s commitment at his original trial, cannot support his discharge petition even though his new score would reduce his predicted likelihood of reoffending.

¶13      Richard argues that the circuit court improperly dismissed his petition for discharge and that he is entitled to a discharge hearing. 

Fond du Lac County v. Helen E. F., 2011 WI App 72(recommended for publication), affirmed 2012 WI 50; for Helen E.F.: Donald T. Lang, SPD, Madison Appellate; case activity

Alzheimer’s disease is not a qualifying mental condition for purposes of ch. 51 commitment, therefore Helen E.F. is not a proper subject for treatment as a matter of law. The disease is a degenerative brain disorder,