On Point: 3. Civil Commitments

court of appeals decision (3-judge, not recommended for publication); for Oliver: Steven D. Phillips, SPD, Madison Appellate; BiC; Resp. Br.; Reply Br.

SVP – Evidence
1. Unobjected-to testimony by a state evaluator that DHS psychologists are more “conservative” in their conclusions than other SVP experts did not “cloud” the issue and therefore did not support new trial in the interest of justice,

court of appeals decision (1-judge, not for publication); for Asley: Donald T. Lang, SPD, Madison Appellate

Mental Commitment
Trial court order of inpatient treatment supported by evidence:

¶18      Dr. Berney testified that as of the date of his examination, Ashley required inpatient treatment, but there was a substantial probability she would be ready for outpatient treatment by the time of the final hearing, which was five days later.  

court of appeals decision; for Kaminski:Donald T. Lang, SPD, Madison Appellate

SVP: Misconduct Evidence, § 904.04(2), Reliance on by Expert 
SVP expert may rely on the respondent’s unproven prior misconduct in deriving his or her opinion. The § 904.04(2) “preliminary relevance” requirement, State v. James E. Gray, 225 Wis.2d 39, 59-61, 590 N.W.2d 918 (1999); State v. Landrum, 191 Wis. 2d 107,

Waukesha County v. Genevieve M., 2009 WI App 173
For Genevieve M.: Lora B. Cerone, SPD, Madison Appellate

Issue/Holding: Although a ch. 54 guardianship appeal is decided by a 3-judge and ch. 55 protective placement by a 1-judge panel, when the 2 were commenced and decided under a single trial court case number, the appeal will be decided by a 3-judge panel:

¶5        The plain language of Wis.

Dane County v. Stevenson L.J., 2009 WI App 84
For Stevenson L.J.: Ruth N. Westmont

Issue/Holding: Where Stevenson L.J. was detained on an “emergency statement” in one county (Brown), then transferred to another (Dane) before a probable cause hearing, a new emergency statement in Dane County did not establish a new 72-hour time limit for a probable cause hearing; competency over the proceeding was therefore lost:

¶12      Under the County’s argument,

State v. Carl Kaminski, 2009 WI App 175
For Kaminski: Donald T. Lang, SPD, Madison Appellate

Issue/Holding: “Infrequent references to annual re-evaluation” were not “sufficiently egregious to diminish the jury’s sense of responsibility for its verdict,” ¶¶20-24.

State v. Carl Kaminski, 2009 WI App 175
For Kaminski: Donald T. Lang, SPD, Madison Appellate

Issue/Holding: Testimony by a state’s expert to the effect that the only treatment program for psychopaths is at Sand Ridge did not require a new trial under the theory that it implicitly suggested commitment would be in the community’s and respondent’s best interest, ¶¶25-27 (court rejecting analogy to TPR procedure):

¶27      Wisconsin Stat.

State v. Paul A. Wilinski, 2008 WI App 170
For Wilinski: Jefren E. Olsen, SPD, Madison Appellate

Issue/Holding:

¶11      Wisconsin courts have not yet articulated the standard for reviewing a circuit court’s order for commitment under Wis. Stat. § 971.17(3)(a). The State proposes that courts should review such orders under a sufficiency of the evidence standard. Wilinski seems to concede this is the appropriate standard of review.

State v. Paul A. Wilinski, 2008 WI App 170
For Wilinski: Jefren E. Olsen, SPD, Madison Appellate

Issue/Holding: NGI commitment to institutional care supported by the evidence, in that

• The nature of the offense itself (violent assault coupled with threat to kill) supported a finding of significant risk of harm if Wilinski were released (¶13);
• Wilinski failed to comply with conditional release under prior NGI commitment,

State v. Daniel Arends, 2008 WI App 184, PFR granted 2/10/09
For Arends: Leonard D. Kachinsky

Issue: Whether § 980.09 (2005-06) grants the circuit court a greater “gatekeeper role” than the prior statute in ordering an evidentiary hearing on a discharge petition.

Holding: 

¶22      The State’s premise that the new statute grants the circuit court a greater role than it played in a probable cause determination runs contrary to the development of the law.