On Point: 3. Civil Commitments

State v. Harris D. Byers, 2003 WI 86, reversing unpublished opinion of court of appeals
For Byers: Jack E. Schairer & Jefren E. Olsen, SPD, Madison Appellate

Issue/Holding:

¶26. A review of the placement of the provisions, together with the legislative history, reflects an intent to create a step-by-step process that must be followed before a district attorney has authority to file a petition.

State v. Steven J. Burgess, 2003 WI 71, affirming 2002 WI App 264, 258 Wis. 2d 548, 654 N.W.2d 81
For Burgess: Steven P. Weiss, SPD, Madison Appellate

Issue/Holding:

¶25. Burgess challenges his commitment based on the use of actuarial instruments in his chapter 980 commitment proceeding because they did not take into account his mental health. Consequently, Burgess contends that the instruments are irrelevant for chapter 980 proceedings because there must be a nexus between an offender’s mental disorder and the probability of committing sexually violent acts in the future.

State v. Steven J. Burgess, 2003 WI 71, affirming 2002 WI App 264, 258 Wis. 2d 548, 654 N.W.2d 81
For Burgess: Steven P. Weiss, SPD, Madison Appellate

Issue: Whether the evidence was sufficient, where the state’s expert conceded that respondent could conform his conduct to requirements of the law.

Holding:

¶29. Nevertheless, Burgess claims that the expert testimony presented at trial,

State ex rel. William E. Marberry v. Macht, 2003 WI 79, reversing 2002 WI App 133, 254 Wis. 2d 690, 648 N.W.2d 522; prior history omitted
For Marberry: Donald T. Lang, SPD, Madison Appellate

Issue/Holding:

¶19. As we have noted, Chapter 980 is a civil commitment statute with dual objectives: protection of the public and treatment of persons with dangerous mental disorders.

Fond du Lac County v. Elizabeth M.P., 2003 WI App 232
For Elizabeth M.P.: Thomas K. Voss

Issue: Whether the circuit court had jurisdiction to transfer Elizabeth, who was on outpatient status under ch. 51, to inpatient status given that judicial review of the county’s transfer decision wasn’t held within 10 days, contrary to § 51.35(1)(e)3.

Holding:

¶28. Wisconsin Stat.

Walworth County v. Therese B., 2003 WI App 223

Issue/Holding: Procedural due process in guardianship and protective placement proceedings is governed by the analysis used in mental commitments, W.J.C. v. Vilas County, 124 Wis. 2d 238, 240, 369 N.W.2d 162 (Ct. App. 1985), which in turn adopts Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976):

¶11 … The Mathews test “involves balancing three factors: 1) The private interest affected by the official action,

State v. Shawn Virlee, 2003 WI App 4, PFR filed 1/3/03
For Virlee: Jack E. Schairer

Issue/Holding: Barring introduction of the post-petition grant of sentence credit was proper: this evidence “would have been irrelevant to whether the State filed its petition within ninety days of Virlee’s release and would have confused the jury on this issue.” ¶19.

State v. Shawn Virlee, 2003 WI App 4, PFR filed 1/3/03
For Virlee: Jack E. Schairer

Issue: Whether post-petition grant of jail credit deprived the court of competency to proceed, where the petition was filed within 90 days of the pre-grant release date, but would be untimely when calculated against the post-grant date.

Holding:

¶17. Virlee claims the court lost its competency to proceed with his commitment proceeding when it retroactively granted him sentence credit that placed his mandatory release date prior to the petition’s filing date.

State v. Henry Pocan, 2003 WI App 233
For Pocan: Margaret A. Maroney, SPD, Madison Appellate

Issue/Holding: Pocan established probable cause for a discharge hearing where the psychologist conducting the reevaluation and using actuarial tables unavailable at the time of original commitment found no substantial probability of reoffending:

¶11. The State argues that Wis. Stat. ch. 980 thus requires the court to focus on progress or improvement in Pocan’s condition.

State v. Shawn Virlee, 2003 WI App 4, PFR filed 1/3/03
For Virlee: Jack E. Schairer

Issue: Whether ch. 980 violates due process and/or equal protection because it doesn’t allow for pretrial release.

Holding:

¶14. We decline to address Virlee’s due process and equal protection arguments because he fails to establish, and we do not see, how the statute’s lack of a provision for pretrial release affects the trial court’s judgment.