On Point

Pierce County v. P.C.A., 2024AP1367, 7/1/25, District III (ineligible for publication); case activity

While affirming the circuit court continuing a protective placement order under Chapter 55 after a due process hearing (known as a Watts hearing), the COA clarified that, following previous due process hearings, documentary evidence that was admitted, and testimony that was accepted by the circuit court and incorporated into its findings, may be considered at subsequent due process hearings. 

Jacob Alan Powers v. Jon Noble, No. 24-2134, 3/25/25

The Seventh Circuit found that Jacob Powers was competent to stand trial in a Wisconsin court in 2006 for sexual assault of a child and child enticement.  Although Powers’ IQ was in the borderline/mild mental retardation range; his trial testimony, trial counsel’s decision not to challenge his competency, and two experts’ findings that he was competent convinced the Court that he reasonably understood the charges against him, trial procedures, and could assist his lawyer in his defense.  The Court therefore affirmed the district court’s order denying Powers’ petition for a writ of habeas corpus. 

Rock County Human. Servs. v. A.P., Appeal nos. 2022AP248-249; 7/14/22, District 4; (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity

This is one more in a long line of appellate decisions affirming a default finding of grounds for terminating a parent’s rights without a finding that the parent had behaved egregiously as required by Dane Cnty. DHS v. Mable K., 2013 WI 28, ¶71, 346 Wis. 2d 396, 828 N.W.2d 198. The difference here is that the court of appeals also openly disregards (or perhaps is unfamiliar with?) the rules of appellate procedure.

State v. Roy C. O’Neal, 2020AP1270, 6/2/21, District 3 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

A person who’s been indefinitely committed under ch. 980 is entitled to a discharge trial if he can show … well, er, nobody really knows what he has to show. In State v. Hager, our supreme court failed to reach a majority for any view on the statute (while arguably striking down the court of appeals’ attempt at a gloss). Given the absence of an ascertainable rule, it’s not too surprising that we get incoherent decisions like this one. What is a little surprising is the court of appeals’ decision to “treat [Hager‘s] lead opinion as controlling” on one aspect of the statute’s meaning. That was a three-justice lead opinion; four other justices disagreed on the point. Arguably. Is the court of appeals here treating a supreme court minority view as binding?

State v. Tavodess Matthews, 2021 WI 42, reversing a published court of appeals opinion, 2020 WI App 33, 5/14/21, case activity (including briefs)

Section 801.58(1) allows a party to a civil case to request a new judge if, among other things, he files a written substitution request before “the hearing of any preliminary contested matter.” Matthews’ case concerns a substitution request made after the circuit court granted a motion to adjourn a Chapter 980 probable cause hearing regarding sexually violent persons. But since Chapter 980 commitments are civil proceedings, this unanimous SCOW opinion, which reverses a published court of appeals’ opinion, is an important clarification of the law governing all civil cases.

State v. Jamie Lane Stephenson, 2020 WI 92, 12/18/20, affirming a published decision of the court of appeals; case activity (including briefs)

A five-justice majority of the supreme court holds that the state does not need to present expert opinion testimony that a person subject to commitment under Chapter 980 is dangerous to others because his mental disorder makes it more likely than not that he will engage in one or more future acts of sexual violence.

State v. Jamie Lane Stephenson, 2018AP2104, petition to review a published court of appeals decision granted 3/17/20; case activity

Issues:

1. To prove that a person meets the criteria for commitment under Chapter 980, must the state present expert opinion testimony that the person is “dangerous” as defined under ch. 980?
2. Should the standard of review of the sufficiency of the evidence of dangerousness in a Chapter 980 case be changed to require that a reviewing court conduct a de novo review of whether the evidence satisfies the legal standard of dangerousness?

State v. Kenneth Parrish, 2002 WI App 263, PFR filed 11/11/02 For Parrish: Charles B. Vetzner, SPD, Madison Appellate Issue/Holding: The trial court’s rejection of respondent’s post-commitment proffer of an expert, in support of a claim that trial counsel was ineffective for not securing an expert, is sustained, due in particular to the trial court’s […]