On Point: 2. Definitions

State v. Jamie Lane Stephenson, 2020 WI 92, 12/18/20, affirming a published decision of the court of appeals; case activity (including briefs)

A five-justice majority of the supreme court holds that the state does not need to present expert opinion testimony that a person subject to commitment under Chapter 980 is dangerous to others because his mental disorder makes it more likely than not that he will engage in one or more future acts of sexual violence.

State v. Jamie Lane Stephenson, 2018AP2104, petition to review a published court of appeals decision granted 3/17/20; case activity

Issues:

1. To prove that a person meets the criteria for commitment under Chapter 980, must the state present expert opinion testimony that the person is “dangerous” as defined under ch. 980?
2. Should the standard of review of the sufficiency of the evidence of dangerousness in a Chapter 980 case be changed to require that a reviewing court conduct a de novo review of whether the evidence satisfies the legal standard of dangerousness?

You’ve read a lot about the use of algorithms at the sentencing stage of criminal proceedings, but they are also used at the bail and parole stages. This new paper looks at the bias embedded in algorithms (including the STATIC-99R) and zeroes in on our own State v. Loomis.

They may seem more measured and bias free, but according to this new article, they aren’t very good. Compas has significant flaws, and the accuracy of the Static 99-R “is not much better than a coin toss.” This article links to a number of studies that might support a challenge to the use of these tools.

State v. Scott R. Nelson, 2007 WI App 2, PFR filed 1/22/07
For Nelson: Joseph L. Sommers

Issue/Holding:

¶15      … Even under the “more likely than not” standard, there must be a strong nexus between the person’s mental disorder and that person’s level of dangerousness. Under this standard, the likelihood that the person will engage in an act of sexual violence is more than 50%. 

State v. Terry L. Olson, 2006 WI App 32, PFR filed 3/16
For Olson: Melinda A. Swartz, SPD, Milwaukee Appellate

Issue: Whether ch. 980 is unconstitutional because the SVP definition of “dangerousness” is not linked to imminent risk.

Holding:

¶5       We deem Olson’s reliance on Lessard misplaced. In 2002, our own supreme court considered a challenge to Wis.

State v. Shermell G. Tabor, / State v. Ronald Irvin Ryan, 2005 WI App 107
For Tabor / Ryan: Ellen Henak, SPD, Milwaukee Appellate

Issue/Holding: Legislative modification of the definition of SVP “dangerousness” (2003 Wis Act 187, §§ 2, 2m, amending §§ 980.01(7) and 980.02(2)(c); reducing the necessary showing from “substantial probability” to mere likelihood of sexual violence) has an effective date of April 22,

State v. Ray A. Schiller, 2003 WI App 195
For Schiller: Jack E. Schairer, SPD, Madison Appellate

Issue/Holding:

¶11. However, a “serious difficulty in controlling behavior” is not about whether a person has the ability to make choices….¶12. The Crane Court further indicated that we must not only consider whether the person has the ability to make choices, but the degree to which those choices are driven by a mental disorder: [S]erious difficulty in controlling behavior …

State v. John Lee Laxton, 2002 WI 82, affirming unpublished court of appeals decision
(Affirmed on habeas review, John L. Laxton v. Bartow, 421 F.3d 565 (7th Cir 2005))
For Laxton: Margaret A. Maroney, SPD, Madison Appellate

Issue: Whether ch. 980 is unconstitutional by failing to adequately narrow the class of commitment subjects to those with serious difficulty controlling dangerous behavior.

State v. John Lee Laxton, 2002 WI 82, affirming unpublished court of appeals decision
(Affirmed on other grounds, habeas review, John L. Laxton v. Bartow, 421 F.3d 565 (7th Cir 2005))
For Laxton: Margaret A. Maroney, SPD, Madison Appellate

Issue: Whether the jury instructions adequately conveyed the requirement of mental disorder causing serious difficulty in controlling behavior.