On Point blog, page 1 of 5
Seventh Circuit retrospectively evaluates habeas petitioner’s competence at his 2006 trial; despite low IQ and mental illness, court denies due process and IAC claims.
Jacob Alan Powers v. Jon Noble, No. 24-2134, 3/25/25
The Seventh Circuit found that Jacob Powers was competent to stand trial in a Wisconsin court in 2006 for sexual assault of a child and child enticement. Although Powers’ IQ was in the borderline/mild mental retardation range; his trial testimony, trial counsel’s decision not to challenge his competency, and two experts’ findings that he was competent convinced the Court that he reasonably understood the charges against him, trial procedures, and could assist his lawyer in his defense. The Court therefore affirmed the district court’s order denying Powers’ petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
SCOW: Expert opinion on risk not needed in ch. 980 proceeding
State v. Jamie Lane Stephenson, 2020 WI 92, 12/18/20, affirming a published decision of the court of appeals; case activity (including briefs)
A five-justice majority of the supreme court holds that the state does not need to present expert opinion testimony that a person subject to commitment under Chapter 980 is dangerous to others because his mental disorder makes it more likely than not that he will engage in one or more future acts of sexual violence.
SCOW to review need for state to have an expert on risk in ch. 980 trials
State v. Jamie Lane Stephenson, 2018AP2104, petition to review a published court of appeals decision granted 3/17/20; case activity
Issues:
- To prove that a person meets the criteria for commitment under Chapter 980, must the state present expert opinion testimony that the person is “dangerous” as defined under ch. 980?
- Should the standard of review of the sufficiency of the evidence of dangerousness in a Chapter 980 case be changed to require that a reviewing court conduct a de novo review of whether the evidence satisfies the legal standard of dangerousness?
SCOW: Precedent? What precedent? ¯_(ヅ)_/¯
State v. Anthony James Jendusa, 2018AP2357-CRLV, review of a decision of the court of appeals denying the state’s petition for leave to appeal; case activity
Before turning to the issues presented, we’ll start with an observation about how this case might seem to affect appellate litigation in all kinds of cases, civil and criminal.
No expert on dangerousness? No problem! (If you’re the state at a ch. 980 discharge hearing)
State v. Jamie Lane Stephenson, 2019 WI App 63, petition for review granted, 3/17/20, affirmed, 2020 WI 92; case activity (including briefs)
At a hearing on a committed person’s petition for discharge from a ch. 980 commitment, the state has the burden of proving the person is still a sexually violent person—that is, that the person: (1) has a mental disorder; and (2) is dangerous because that mental disorder makes it more likely than not the person will commit sexually violent offenses in the future. § 980.09(3). The court of appeals holds that even though the state needs an expert to prove the person has a mental disorder, it doesn’t need an expert to prove the person is dangerous because of the mental disorder.
SVP Commitment – Jury Instructions: “Mental Disorder”
State v. Jonathan Phillips, 2010AP1490, District 4, 4/26/12
court of appeals decision (not recommended for publication); for Phillips: Steven D. Grunder, SPD, Madison Appellate; case activity; originally recommended for publication, changed per order 5/1/12
Although admittedly “inconsistent” in the way it defines “mental disorder,” when read “as a whole,” the pattern jury instruction for ch. 980 commitments (Wis JI—Criminal 2502) adequately conveys the required nexus between mental disorder and serious difficulty controlling behavior.
SVP Jury Instructions: “Mental Disorder” – Interest of Justice Review
State v. Paschall Lee Sanders, 2011 WI App 125 (recommended for publication); for Sanders: Ellen Henak, SPD, Milwaukee Appellate; case activity
The definitions of “mental disorder” in since-amended pattern instruction Wis JI—Criminal 2502 (2009), though concededly contradictory, didn’t prevent from being tried the issue of whether Sanders qualified for commitment as a sexually violent person:
¶14 As we have seen, two sentences in what the circuit court told the jury are contradictory:
(1) “Mental disorder means a condition affecting the emotional or volitional capacity that predisposes a person to engage in acts of sexual violence and causes serious difficulty in controlling behavior.” (Emphasis added.)
(2) “Not all persons with a mental disorder are predisposed to commit sexually violent offenses or have serious difficulty in controlling behavior.”
As noted earlier,
SVP – Evidence re: Screening Process and Postcommitment Treatment
State v. Scott Maher, 2010AP460, District 4, 5/26/11
court of appeals decision (not recommended for publication); for Maher: Donald T. Lang, SPD, Madison Appellate; case activity
Testimony from a State’s expert witness describing the ch. 980 screening process was irrelevant.
¶11 We addressed the issue of the admissibility of this same type of evidence in State v. Sugden, 2010 WI App 166,
State v. Peter A. Oliver, No. 2008AP3050, District IV, 3/18/10
court of appeals decision (3-judge, not recommended for publication); for Oliver: Steven D. Phillips, SPD, Madison Appellate; BiC; Resp. Br.; Reply Br.
SVP – Evidence
1. Unobjected-to testimony by a state evaluator that DHS psychologists are more “conservative” in their conclusions than other SVP experts did not “cloud” the issue and therefore did not support new trial in the interest of justice,
State v. Carl Kaminski, 2009 WI App 175
court of appeals decision; for Kaminski:Donald T. Lang, SPD, Madison Appellate
SVP: Misconduct Evidence, § 904.04(2), Reliance on by Expert
SVP expert may rely on the respondent’s unproven prior misconduct in deriving his or her opinion. The § 904.04(2) “preliminary relevance” requirement, State v. James E. Gray, 225 Wis.2d 39, 59-61, 590 N.W.2d 918 (1999); State v. Landrum, 191 Wis. 2d 107,