On Point: 6. Post-disposition

State v. David Hager, Jr., 2015AP330, and State v. Howard Carter, 2015AP1311, District 3, 2/2/2015; case activity (Hager) (Carter) (including briefs)–final SCOW decision here 4/19/18

Issues

(1) Does [the 2013 Wis. Act 84] change in [Wis. Stat. § 980.09(2)] authorize the circuit court to weigh the evidence [to determine whether to hold a discharge trial], overruling State v. Arends, 2010 WI 46, ¶¶40-43, 325 Wis. 2d 1, 784 N.W.2d 513; (2) If the court is allowed to weigh the evidence, how is such a weighing accomplished, and, specifically, what factors should the court consider when predicting whether the factfinder would likely conclude the person no longer meets the criteria for commitment; (3) If the statute allows the court to weigh the evidence and consider the credibility of the competing psychological reports at this stage where the petitioner bears the burden of establishing a change in his or her condition, is the statute unconstitutional because it misallocates the burden of proof; and (4) Does the change in the statute apply retroactively to a petition for discharge filed before the revised statute’s effective date.

State v. Kerby G. Denman, 2014AP2133, District 4, 7/9/15 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Denman is entitled to a hearing on his petition for discharge from his ch. 980 commitment because an expert changed her opinion about Denman’s risk to reoffend based on a new risk assessment scale that hadn’t been relied on by any of the experts at Denman’s previous discharge proceeding.

State v. Michael Alger & State v. Ronald Knipfer, 2015 WI 3, 1/20/15, affirming two published court of appeals decisions,: Alger, 2013 WI App 148; Knipfer, 2014 WI App 9; majority opinion by Justice Ziegler; case activity: Alger; Knipfer

The supreme court holds that the Daubert standard for expert testimony does not apply to discharge proceedings in a ch. 980 case if the original petition for commitment was filed before the effective date of the adoption of the Daubert standard. The court also holds there are no due process or equal protection problems in applying one evidentiary standard to cases in which the original petition was filed before the effective date and a different evidentiary standard to cases filed after that date.

State v. Thornon F. Talley, 2015 WI App 4; case activity

A person committed as a sexually violent person under ch. 980 does not have a due process right to have the state prove at a discharge hearing that he is still a sexually violent person, so the clear and convincing evidence standard under § 980.09(3) is not facially unconstitutional.

On review of published court of appeals decisions: Alger, 2013 WI App 148; Knipfer, 2014 WI App 9; case activity: Alger; Knipfer

Issues (composed by On Point)

Does the filing of a petition for discharge or supervised release under ch. 980 after the effective date of the adoption of 2011 Wisconsin Act 2 “commence” an action or proceeding such that the Daubert standard for expert witness testimony applies to the discharge or supervised release proceeding?

If the filing of a discharge or supervised release petition after the effective date of Act 2 does not commence a new proceeding, does it violate due process or equal protection to refuse to apply the Daubert standard to the proceedings on those petitions?

State v. Scott Maher, 2013AP1815, District 4, 4/3/14; court of appeals decision (not recommended for publication); case activity

The circuit court impermissibly weighed the relative persuasiveness of conflicting examination reports of experts when it denied Maher’s § 980.09 petition without holding a discharge hearing when it said it had “some ability apparently to assess the accuracy of the expert’s report or their qualifications” and concluded that the “wildly different conclusions”

State v. Herbert O. Richard, 2014 WI  App 28; case activity

Richard is entitled to an evidentiary hearing on his petition for discharge because the independent psychologist’s opinion that amendments to the Static-99 show Richard’s risk to reoffend is below the legal threshold constitutes a fact on which a court or jury may conclude that Richard does not meet the criteria for commitment as a sexually violent person,

State v. Edward Cotton, 2013AP452, District 1, 1/7/14; court of appeals decision (not recommended for publication); case activity

At the hearing on Cotton’s petition for discharge from his ch. 980 commitment the state’s experts testified that Cotton’s high psychopathy coupled with his sexual deviance raised his risk to reoffend. They also opined that sex offender treatment Cotton received in prison did not significantly reduce his risk because it wasn’t designed to treat offenders with high psychopathy.

State v. Ronald Knipfer, 2014 WI App 9, petition for review granted, 5/23/14, affirmed, 2015 WI 3; case activity

In this follow-up to the recent decision in State v. Alger, 2013 WI App 148, ___ Wis. 2d ___, ___ N.W.2d ___, the court of appeals rejects two constitutional challenges to the legislation that limits the newly-adopted Daubert standard for the admission of expert testimony to ch.

State v. Michael Alger, 2013 WI App 148, petition for review granted, 5/23/14, affirmed, 2015 WI 3; case activity

In this important decision addressing an issue that’s been percolating in ch. 980 cases, the court of appeals holds that the Daubert standard for expert testimony does not apply to any proceedings in a ch.