On Point blog, page 1 of 1
COA holds that protective placement may be continued based on evidence from previous hearings provided the evidence was “adjudicated.”
Pierce County v. P.C.A., 2024AP1367, 7/1/25, District III (ineligible for publication); case activity
While affirming the circuit court continuing a protective placement order under Chapter 55 after a due process hearing (known as a Watts hearing), the COA clarified that, following previous due process hearings, documentary evidence that was admitted, and testimony that was accepted by the circuit court and incorporated into its findings, may be considered at subsequent due process hearings.
Seventh Circuit retrospectively evaluates habeas petitioner’s competence at his 2006 trial; despite low IQ and mental illness, court denies due process and IAC claims.
Jacob Alan Powers v. Jon Noble, No. 24-2134, 3/25/25
The Seventh Circuit found that Jacob Powers was competent to stand trial in a Wisconsin court in 2006 for sexual assault of a child and child enticement. Although Powers’ IQ was in the borderline/mild mental retardation range; his trial testimony, trial counsel’s decision not to challenge his competency, and two experts’ findings that he was competent convinced the Court that he reasonably understood the charges against him, trial procedures, and could assist his lawyer in his defense. The Court therefore affirmed the district court’s order denying Powers’ petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
Court of appeals: maybe 3>4
State v. Roy C. O’Neal, 2020AP1270, 6/2/21, District 3 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)
A person who’s been indefinitely committed under ch. 980 is entitled to a discharge trial if he can show … well, er, nobody really knows what he has to show. In State v. Hager, our supreme court failed to reach a majority for any view on the statute (while arguably striking down the court of appeals’ attempt at a gloss). Given the absence of an ascertainable rule, it’s not too surprising that we get incoherent decisions like this one. What is a little surprising is the court of appeals’ decision to “treat [Hager‘s] lead opinion as controlling” on one aspect of the statute’s meaning. That was a three-justice lead opinion; four other justices disagreed on the point. Arguably. Is the court of appeals here treating a supreme court minority view as binding?