On Point blog, page 2 of 18
More on using algorithms to predict risk in criminal cases
You’ve read a lot about the use of algorithms at the sentencing stage of criminal proceedings, but they are also used at the bail and parole stages. This new paper looks at the bias embedded in algorithms (including the STATIC-99R) and zeroes in on our own State v. Loomis.
No expert on dangerousness? No problem! (If you’re the state at a ch. 980 discharge hearing)
State v. Jamie Lane Stephenson, 2019 WI App 63, petition for review granted, 3/17/20, affirmed, 2020 WI 92; case activity (including briefs)
At a hearing on a committed person’s petition for discharge from a ch. 980 commitment, the state has the burden of proving the person is still a sexually violent person—that is, that the person: (1) has a mental disorder; and (2) is dangerous because that mental disorder makes it more likely than not the person will commit sexually violent offenses in the future. § 980.09(3). The court of appeals holds that even though the state needs an expert to prove the person has a mental disorder, it doesn’t need an expert to prove the person is dangerous because of the mental disorder.
Daubert’s teeth still missing
State v. Anthony Jones, 2018 WI 44, 5/4/2018, affirming an unpublished summary order, 2015AP2665, case activity
We noted in our post on the grant of Jones’s PFR that at the time there were “exactly zero Wisconsin appellate cases holding expert testimony inadmissible under Daubert.” That’s still true.
State v. Anthony Jones, 2015AP2665, petition for review granted 9/11/2017
Review of a summary order of the court of appeals; affirmed 5/4/18; case activity (including briefs)
Issues (from the petition for review):
Anthony Jones was committed under Wis. Stat. ch. 980 after a trial at which the state presented expert testimony relying in part on two actuarial instruments: the MnSOST-R and the RRASOR. Mr. Jones had moved pretrial to exclude these instruments as unreliable under Wisconsin’s new Daubert standard, because they are decades old and were constructed using questionable means. The circuit court permitted their introduction on the ground that they are still in use and that the state’s expert had testified that they are reliable. Did the court adequately scrutinize the instruments for reliability, as is its responsibility under Daubert?
Local governments can intervene in ch. 980 supervised release proceedings
State v. Michael McGee, 2017 WI App 39; case activity (including briefs)
This is an important decision for the few, the happy few, who represent persons committed under ch. 980 in seeking supervised release. The court of appeals holds that the municipalities in which a committed person may be placed have the right to intervene in supervised release proceeding. It also holds that if the circuit court and Department of Health Services fail to adhere strictly to the statutory requirements governing supervised release planning, the supervised release order is invalid.
SCOW to take up new ch. 980 discharge trial standard
State v. David Hager, 2015AP330, and State v. Howard Carter, 2015AP1311, petitions for review granted 5/15/17, reversed 4/19/18; review of published court of appeals decisions (Hager) (Carter); case activity (Hager) (Carter) (including briefs)
We’ve posted on these cases a few times. The first time was when the court of appeals certified them (together) to the supreme court. The supreme court refused that certification, so the court of appeals decided them (separately), as we discussed here and here.
Miscalculated release date didn’t invalidate ch. 980 petition
State v. Kenneth William Jaworski, 2016AP5, District 1, 4/18/17 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)
The state filed a ch. 980 commitment petition against Jaworski shortly before the mandatory release (MR) date the Department of Corrections had calculated for him. But DOC later realized it had miscalculated Jaworski’s MR date, which was actually about two months earlier than the date the petition was filed. DOC’s miscalculation (whether negligent or, as Jaworski argues, made in “bad faith”) doesn’t mean the petition was untimely because a ch. 980 petition may be filed anytime before the person is released or discharged from his predicate sexual offense sentences.
SCOW: no 980 discharge trial for inconsequential behavioral changes
State v. Thornon F. Talley, 2017 WI 21, 3/9/17, affirming an unpublished summary court of appeals order; case activity (including briefs)
Thornon Talley, who is committed as a sexually violent person under Wis. Stat. ch. 980, filed a petition for discharge from that commitment in 2012. The circuit court denied the petition without a hearing. The supreme court now unanimously upholds that denial, essentially because Talley did not show any meaningful change in his condition since his previous discharge trial (also in 2012).
2013 amendments to 980 discharge statute apply retroactively
State v. Carter, 2017 WI App 9, petition for review granted 5/15/17; case activity (including briefs)
This case is a companion to State v. Hager, in which the court held that the amended discharge statute does not require a committed person to prove he is not dangerous in order to get a discharge trial.
Defense win: amendment to 980 discharge standard doesn’t authorize “weighing”
State v. David Hager, Jr., 2017 WI App 8, petition for review granted 5/15/17; reversed 4/19/18; case activity (including briefs)
This is the first (likely) published case to construe the 2013 amendments to the ch. 980 discharge petition standard. The court of appeals holds that while the legislature required a committed person seeking a discharge trial to meet a higher burden of production, it did not permit courts to deny a trial based on an assessment that the evidence as a whole favors the state.