On Point: A. For trial

State v. T.A.W., 2025AP437-CR, 6/3/25, District I (not recommended for publication); case activity

Although the charges against T.A.W. — resisting an officer causing soft tissue injury and retail theft — are not “serious crimes” under Wis. Stat. § 969.08, which specifies procedures for pretrial release, the COA found that the State met its burden to show an important governmental interest in forcibly medicating T.A.W. to competency under the aggravated circumstances of the case.

Jacob Alan Powers v. Jon Noble, No. 24-2134, 3/25/25

The Seventh Circuit found that Jacob Powers was competent to stand trial in a Wisconsin court in 2006 for sexual assault of a child and child enticement.  Although Powers’ IQ was in the borderline/mild mental retardation range; his trial testimony, trial counsel’s decision not to challenge his competency, and two experts’ findings that he was competent convinced the Court that he reasonably understood the charges against him, trial procedures, and could assist his lawyer in his defense.  The Court therefore affirmed the district court’s order denying Powers’ petition for a writ of habeas corpus. 

State v. M.M.K., 2024AP591-CR, 2024AP592-CR, 2024AP593-CR, 2024AP594-CR, 10/31/24, District IV(1-judge decision, ineligible for publication); case activity

In a case which continues a new trend in appeals of involuntary medication appeals, COA holds that while the circuit court correctly found M.M.K. incompetent, it failed to correctly apply Sell in ordering involuntary medication.

State v. Wilson P. Anderson, 2023 WI 44, 6/2/23, summarily reversing an unpublished court of appeals decision; 2020AP819; case activity (including briefs)

As we’ve noted previously, the court of appeals (in the person of a single judge in District 1) decided this case shortly after the same court (by a three-judge panel of District 4) decided State v. Green, 2021 WI App 18, 396 Wis. 2d 658, 957 N.W.2d 583. Green reversed an order that a criminal defendant be involuntarily medicated to competency, relying on and fleshing out the factors established by Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166 (2003). In particular, Green required the state to file, for the court’s approval, an individualized treatment plan specifying medications and doses. (Green was then taken up by the supreme court, but its decision addressed other matters, leaving the court of appeals’ reading of Sell intact.) The D1 judge in Wilson’s case didn’t follow Green (or, as the state now concedes, Sell itself) and okayed a med order prepared by a psychologist with a generic recommendation that Wilson be medicated. The supreme court granted Wilson’s petition, and the state’s litigation position changed: it conceded in SCOW that it hadn’t met its burden under Sell. In briefing and argument, the only dispute between the parties was whether the testimony of a medical doctor is always necessary to satisfy Sell‘s requirements.

State v. Donald L. White, 2020AP275-CR, 11/3/2022, District 4 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

We hope SCOW reviews this decision. An examiner opined that White was competent to proceed under §971.14 but refused to give her opinion to a reasonable degree of professional certainty. In fact, she thought White should be observed longer. The trial court excluded the examiner’s report and found White competent without it. The court of appeals affirmed.

State v. Joseph G. Green, 2020AP298-CR, petition for review granted 6/16/21, case activity (including briefs)

Issue (from the State’s petition):

Does a circuit court have authority to order tolling of the 12-month statutory time limit for bringing an incompetent criminal defendant to trial competency?

State v. Lance L. Black, 2019AP592, 3/3/20, District 1 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Black’s first trial ended in a hung jury. When the state said it would try him again, he made a fuss–swearing and pounding on a table. At his second trial, Black again erupted (twice), was removed from the courtroom, and refused to return. His counsel requested a competency evaluation, which the court permitted, though with apparent reluctance. After the examiner found Black incompetent, the court disagreed with her, finding him competent and continuing the trial to (guilty) verdicts.

State v. Craig L. Miller, 2018AP2161-CR, 7/18/19, District 4 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Miller pled guilty to disorderly conduct as a domestic abuse incident and as a repeater. He appealed arguing that his plea was not knowing, intelligent and voluntary because of his schizophrenia diagnosis and the medication he was taking. The court of appeals ruled against him due to a lack of evidence.

State v. Fitzgerald, 2018AP1296-CR, 2019 WI 69, 6/13/19; case activity

Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166 (2003) held that a mentally ill  defendant has a constitutional right to avoid unwanted antipsychotic medication. The State can force it on him to restore his competency for trial only by proving the 4 “Sell factors.” Fitzgerald holds that §971.14 does not conform to Sell. Going forward, the State cannot obtain involuntary med orders based solely on §971.14 because it is constitutionally infirm.  The State must satisfy Sell factors. The cases where this is possible may be “rare.” Sell, 539 U.S. at 180.  Involuntary medication to restore competency to proceed should be the exception, not the rule.

State ex rel. Fitzgerald v. Milw. County Circuit Court, 2018AP1214-W, 2019 WI 69, 6/13/19, case activity

A defendant is entitled to an automatic stay of an involuntary medication pending appeal, otherwise his liberty interest in avoiding unwanted antipsychotic medications is rendered a nullity. State v. Scott, 2018 WI 74, __Wis. 2d __, 912 N.W.2d 14. But what triggers the automatic stay–the entry of the involuntary medication order itself or the filing of the notice of appeal? SCOW split 3-3 on this issue (Abrahamson did not participate), so the court of appeals decision stands.