On Point: A. For trial

State v. A.L., 2017 WI App 72, petition for review granted 6/11/18, affirmed, 2019 WI 20; case activity; review granted 6/11/18

The court of appeals holds that § 938.30(5) permits a juvenile court to order the re-evaluation of competency of a juvenile previously found not competent to proceed even though the juvenile was also found not likely to regain competence within the relevant statutory time frame (12 months, or the maximum criminal sentence for the offense, whichever is less).

State v. Andre L. Scott, 2016AP2017-CR, bypass granted 9/12/17, case activity (including briefs)

Issues:

1. Whether, despite State v. Debra A.E., 188 Wis. 2d 111, 523 N.W.2d 727 (1994), a circuit court may use §971.14(4)(b) to require a nondangerous defendant to be treated to competency against his will, and if so, whether §971.14(4)(b) is unconstitutional on its face because it does not comport with Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166 (2003).

2. Whether an order requiring an inmate to be involuntarily treated to competency is a nonfinal order that should be challenged by a Wis. Stat. §809.50 petition for interlocutory appeal or a final order of a special proceeding that is appealable as a matter of right via Wis. Stat. §808.03(1).

3. Whether the court of appeals exercises its discretion erroneously when it denies a motion for relief pending appeal without explaining its reasoning.

State v. Matthew Allen Lilek, 2014AP784-CR, 10/4/16, District 1 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Lilek’s trial counsel raised his competency to stand trial and the court-appointed expert found him incompetent and unlikely to become so. The state, dissatisfied with that result, requested another evaluation, and the court obliged. This new evaluation reached the opposite conclusion, and Lilek was eventually found competent. Is this OK?

State v. Jimmie Lee Smith, 2016 WI 23, 4/7/16, reversing a published court of appeals decision, majority opinion by Roggensack, concurrence by Ziegler, dissent by Abrahamson (joined by A.W. Bradley); case activity (including briefs)

You can’t accuse the majority of mere error correction in this decision. Although the State never asked SCOW to rewrite the “clearly erroneous” standard of review and nobody briefed or orally argued the issue (see Ziegler’s concurrence and Abrahamson’s dissent), the majority seized the opportunity to make a tough standard even tougher. Unless SCOTUS steps in, it’s going to be virtually impossible to  challenge circuit court competency findings as well as other circuit court decisions governed by the “clearly erroneous” standard of review.

Review of a published court of appeals decision; case activity (including briefs)

Issue (composed by On Point)

Did the evidence presented at Smith’s postconviction hearing establish reason to doubt that Smith was competent at the time of his trial and sentencing under the standard for retrospective determinations of competency established by State v. Johnson, 133 Wis. 2d 207, 395 N.W.2d 176 (1986)?

State v. Jimmie Lee Smith, 2014 WI App 98, petition for review granted 6/12/15; case activity

If you’re working on a competency issue, read this decision.  Neither the trial court nor defense counsel raised the subject of Smith’s competency at the time of trial.  And Smith had not received a pre-trial competency exam. That’s why the postconviction court rejected Smith’s claim that he was incompetent at the time of trial. There was no contemporaneous evidence to support it. The court of appeals reversed, vacated the conviction, and remanded the case for a new trial.

State v. Maurice C. Hall, 2013AP209-CR, District 1, 10/15/13; court of appeals decision (not recommended for publication); case activity

A competency evaluation found Hall competent to proceed, though his mental health history caused Deborah Collins, the examiner, to “urge court officers to remain sensitive in the event of any significant changes in his overall mental status as such a factor may signal decline in his competency and warrant his reexamination.”

seventh circuit decision (html) (90-page pdf download: here), granting habeas relief in 904 N.E.2d 1077 (Ill. App. 2009)

A significant decision in several respects – not least, attorney performance – that a summary post cannot hope to capture, save broad highlights. Executive summary: Harris was convicted of killing her 4-year-old son Jaquari, against a defense of accidental death (self-strangulation with an elastic band). The defense had potential,

State v. Marquita R., 2010AP1981, District 1, 12/14/10

court of appeals decision (1-judge, not for publication); for Marquita R.: Carl W. Chesshir

TPR – Default as Sanction

Delay of over two-and-one-half years between petition and fact-finding hearing (despite statutorily mandated schedule of 45-day limit, § 48.422(2)), caused by Marquita R.’s “egregious” and “bath faith” conduct, intended to disrupt the TPR process, supported the trial court’s decision to find her in default as a sanction.Nor did the default ruling violate due process,

7th circuit decision; on appeal after remand, Eric D. Holmes v. Buss, 506 F.3d 576 (7th Cir 2007)

Competency of Petitioner, While Pursuing Habeas Relief

Given that petitioner is clearly incompetent (“He is deeply confused, obsessed, and delusional”) court orders habeas proceeding suspended until state shows his condition sufficiently improved.

This is a death penalty case, and the decision in the prior appeal indicated that it had “found no noncapital case in which such a claim (petitioner’s incompetency,