On Point: 4. Competency of defendant

State v. A.L., 2017 WI App 72, petition for review granted 6/11/18, affirmed, 2019 WI 20; case activity; review granted 6/11/18

The court of appeals holds that § 938.30(5) permits a juvenile court to order the re-evaluation of competency of a juvenile previously found not competent to proceed even though the juvenile was also found not likely to regain competence within the relevant statutory time frame (12 months, or the maximum criminal sentence for the offense, whichever is less).

State v. Andre L. Scott, 2016AP2017-CR, bypass granted 9/12/17, case activity (including briefs)

Issues:

1. Whether, despite State v. Debra A.E., 188 Wis. 2d 111, 523 N.W.2d 727 (1994), a circuit court may use §971.14(4)(b) to require a nondangerous defendant to be treated to competency against his will, and if so, whether §971.14(4)(b) is unconstitutional on its face because it does not comport with Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166 (2003).

2. Whether an order requiring an inmate to be involuntarily treated to competency is a nonfinal order that should be challenged by a Wis. Stat. §809.50 petition for interlocutory appeal or a final order of a special proceeding that is appealable as a matter of right via Wis. Stat. §808.03(1).

3. Whether the court of appeals exercises its discretion erroneously when it denies a motion for relief pending appeal without explaining its reasoning.

State v. Desmond Anthony Mattis, 2016AP982, 3/28/17, District 3 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including state’s brief)

Desmond Mattis raises three issues in this appeal of the circuit court’s denial of his Wis. Stat. § 974.06 motion. The court of appeals rejects them seriatim.

State v. Matthew Allen Lilek, 2014AP784-CR, 10/4/16, District 1 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Lilek’s trial counsel raised his competency to stand trial and the court-appointed expert found him incompetent and unlikely to become so. The state, dissatisfied with that result, requested another evaluation, and the court obliged. This new evaluation reached the opposite conclusion, and Lilek was eventually found competent. Is this OK?

State v. Jimmie Lee Smith, 2016 WI 23, 4/7/16, reversing a published court of appeals decision, majority opinion by Roggensack, concurrence by Ziegler, dissent by Abrahamson (joined by A.W. Bradley); case activity (including briefs)

You can’t accuse the majority of mere error correction in this decision. Although the State never asked SCOW to rewrite the “clearly erroneous” standard of review and nobody briefed or orally argued the issue (see Ziegler’s concurrence and Abrahamson’s dissent), the majority seized the opportunity to make a tough standard even tougher. Unless SCOTUS steps in, it’s going to be virtually impossible to  challenge circuit court competency findings as well as other circuit court decisions governed by the “clearly erroneous” standard of review.

Review of a published court of appeals decision; case activity (including briefs)

Issue (composed by On Point)

Did the evidence presented at Smith’s postconviction hearing establish reason to doubt that Smith was competent at the time of his trial and sentencing under the standard for retrospective determinations of competency established by State v. Johnson, 133 Wis. 2d 207, 395 N.W.2d 176 (1986)?

State v. Roddee W. Daniel, 2015 WI 44, 4/29/15, affirming and modifying a published court of appeals decision; opinion by Justice Bradley; case activity (including briefs)

This opinion clarifies the procedure for determining the competency of a defendant during postconviction proceedings by holding that once the issue of a defendant’s competency has been raised, the state bears the burden of showing by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant is competent to proceed.

On review of a published court of appeals decision; case activity

Issue (adapted from Daniel’s PFR):

1. Under Wisconsin law, should the defendant bear the burden of proving incompetency? If so, is it by clear and convincing evidence or by a preponderance of the evidence?

2. When postconviction counsel questions the defendant’s competency, but the defendant insists that he is competent, what procedures should the circuit court employ?

3. What standard of review should an appellate court apply to a circuit court’s determination of a defendant’s competency to participate in postconviction proceedings?

State v. Jimmie Lee Smith, 2014 WI App 98, petition for review granted 6/12/15; case activity

If you’re working on a competency issue, read this decision.  Neither the trial court nor defense counsel raised the subject of Smith’s competency at the time of trial.  And Smith had not received a pre-trial competency exam. That’s why the postconviction court rejected Smith’s claim that he was incompetent at the time of trial. There was no contemporaneous evidence to support it. The court of appeals reversed, vacated the conviction, and remanded the case for a new trial.

State v. Roddee W. Daniel, 2014 WI App 46, petition for review granted 9/18/14, modified and affirmed, 2015 WI 44; case activity

When postconviction counsel questions a defendant’s competency to understand his or her § 809.30 appellate rights or ability to effectively communicate with counsel but the defendant asserts he or she is competent, defense counsel has the burden of proving the defendant is incompetent by the preponderance or greater weight of the evidence.