On Point: 1. Miranda custody

Bobby v. Archie Dixon, USSC No. 10-1540, 11/7/11 (per curiam), reversing Dixon v. Houk, 627 F.3d 553 (6th Cir 2010)

Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, a state prisoner seeking a writ of habeas corpus from a federal court “must show that the state court’s ruling on the claim being presented in federal court was so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement.” Harrington v.

Docket

Decision below (617 F.3d 813 (6th Cir 2010))

Question Presented (by Scotusblog):

Whether this Court’s clearly established precedent under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 holds that a prisoner is always “in custody” for purposes of Miranda any time that prisoner is isolated from the general prison population and questioned about conduct occurring outside the prison regardless of the surrounding circumstances.

Cert petition

Brief in opposition

Petitioner’s reply

Scotusblog page

The grant appears to raise the recurrent problem of whether Miranda warnings are always and necessarily required when someone already incarcerated is interrogated by the police on a different offense.

State v. Colin G. Schloegel, 2009 WI App 85
For Schloegel: Sarvan Singh

Issue/Holding: High school student Schloegel was not in custody for Miranda purposes, notwithstanding that he was frisked by police officer, compelled under school policy to consent to search of his car and asked, prior to formal arrest, incriminatory questions; analogy to State v. Dale Gruen, 218 Wis.

State v. Jeffrey L. Torkelson, 2007 WI App 272, PFR filed 11/30/07
For Torkelson: Timothy A. Provis

Issue/Holding: Custody, for purposes of Miranda, requires that the suspect’s freedom be restricted to a degree associated with formal arrest, and is as gauged by a multi-factor test articulated in State v. Zan Morgan, 2002 WI App 124, ¶¶13-14. None of those factors are present in this instance,

 A.M. v. Butler, 360 F.3d 787 (7th Cir. 2004)

Issue/Holding1:

In determining whether a person is “in custody,” the question is whether, examining the totality of the circumstances, a reasonable person in the petitioner’s position would have felt “at liberty to terminate the interrogation and leave.” Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 112 (1995). In making this determination, “the only relevant inquiry is how a reasonable man in the suspect’s position would have understood his situation.”Berkemer v.

State v. Zan Morgan, 2002 WI App 124
For Morgan: Timothy A. Provis

Issue: Whether Morgan was in custody, for Miranda purposes, after being handcuffed and placed in the back of a squad car.

Holding: Custody is determined under “the totality of the circumstances, including such factors as: the defendant’s freedom to leave; the purpose, place, and length of the interrogation; and the degree of restraint.”

State v. Susan M. Goetz, 2001 WI App 294
For Goetz: Nila J. Robinson

Issue: Whether a person, detained during execution of a search warrant but not handcuffed until after questioning, was in custody for Miranda purposes.

Holding: A suspect detained during execution of a search warrant isn’t in custody under Miranda. ¶12. In this case, Goetz was told she was neither under arrest nor would be arrested unless she interfered with the search.

State v. Dale Gruen, 218 Wis. 2d 581, 582 N.W.2d 728 (Ct. App. 1998)
For Gruen: Scott F. Anderson

Issue/Holding:

… (W)hether or not Gruen was being detained pursuant to a Terry stop, or had been arrested for Fourth Amendment purposes, is not the determinative consideration. The only important inquiry is whether, for Fifth amendment purposes, he was “in custody.” To determine whether a person is in custody for Fifth amendment purposes:…