On Point: 6. Evidentiary use of silence

State v. Nestor Luis Vega, 2021AP126-CR, District 4, 12/23/21 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Vega testified at his trial on drug delivery charges and denied he had sold drugs to the informant and that the informant was not telling the truth. (¶12). On cross examination, the prosecutor, over defense counsel’s objections, asked Vega why he failed to give police his exculpatory version of events when he was arrested. (¶¶13-15). These questions violated Vega’s due process rights under State v. Brecht, 143 Wis. 2d 297, 421 N.W.2d 96 (19880, and Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976), and the trial court’s error in allowing the questions was not harmless.

State v. Joe Bonds Turney, 2015AP1651-CR & 2015AP1652-CR, District 1, 8/30/16 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Turney claims the trial court erred in permitting joinder of two cases for trial and in denying his motion for substitution of judge following his arraignment. He also argues he is entitled to an evidentiary hearing on his ineffective assistance of counsel claim, which was based on trial counsel’s failure to object to a witness’s reference to his post-arrest silence. The court of appeals rejects his claims.

State v. David D. Hartl, Jr., 2014AP2921-CR, District 3, 7/28/15 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including respondent’s brief)

In this OWI case, trial counsel moved to exclude reference to the 911 call about a possible drunk driver, which is what led to police to look for Hartl’s car and ultimately stop him. The state stipulated to excluding this evidence. But on cross-examination of the officer, trial counsel asked questions that led to the officer referring to the call. (¶¶4-5). Hartl argues his lawyer was ineffective for doing this. (¶¶12-14). While it would be “difficult to conclude” trial counsel wasn’t deficient (¶16), it is easy to conclude there was no prejudice.

State v. Russell S. Krancki, 2014 WI App 80; case activity

In the first Wisconsin case to address how Salinas v. Texas, 570 U.S. ___, 133 S. Ct. 2174 (2013), affects the admission of evidence of a defendant’s silence, the court of appeals reads Salinas to apply to a narrow factual scenario not present in this case. The court goes on to assume that trial counsel should have objected to testimony about Krancki’s silence, but finds his failure to object wasn’t prejudicial. The court also concludes trial counsel wasn’t ineffective for saying in his opening statement that Krancki would testify or for failing to exclude references to the .02 blood alcohol limit.

Randy White v. Robert Keith Woodall, USSC No. 12-794, 4/23/14, reversing and remanding Woodall v. Simpson, 685 F.3d 574 (6th Cir. 2012); case activity

It’s getting harder and harder to win a habeas case.  Woodall requested an instruction forbidding jurors from drawing adverse inferences from his decision to not testify during the penalty phase of his capital murder trial.  The majority opinion, authored by Scalia, held that SCOTUS precedent requiring a “no adverse inference” instruction was clearly established for the guilt phase of a trial, but not the penalty phase.

State v. Haven Pettigrew, 2012AP1860-CR, District 2/1, 7/2/13; court of appeals decision (not recommended for publication); case activity

Reference to right against self-incrimination

Defense counsel revealed her theory of defense for the first time in her opening statement. During direct examination of the lead detective if that was the first time he had heard that theory. Defense counsel objected before the question was even finished, and the court sustained the objection,

Questions presented:

1. Whether the Sixth Circuit violated 28 U.S.C. §2254(d)(1) by granting habeas relief on the trial court’s failure to provide a no adverse inference instruction even though this Court has not “clearly established” that such an instruction is required in a capital penalty phase when a non-testifying defendant has pled guilty to the crimes and aggravating circumstances.

2. Whether the Sixth Circuit violated the harmless error standard in Brecht v.

Genovevo Salinas v. Texas, USSC No. 12-246, 6/17/13

United States Supreme Court decision, affirming Salinas v. State, 369 S.W.2d 176 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012)

Consistent with the rule applied to a defendant’s silence after being informed of his Miranda rights, the Supreme Court holds that a suspect who is being questioned before he was arrested and read Miranda does not invoke his right against self-incrimination by merely staying quiet in response to police questioning.

State v. Thomas S. Mayo, 2007 WI 78, affirming unpublished opinion
For Mayo: Keith A. Findley, UW Law School

Issue/Holding:

¶46      We agree with Mayo’s position, and the State’s concession at oral argument, that the prosecutor’s remarks on Mayo’s pre-Miranda silence, and the testimony she elicited in that regard, during the State’s opening statement and case-in-chief, violated Mayo’s right to remain silent under the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution,

State v. Caltone K. Cockrell, 2007 WI App 217, PFR filed
For Cockrell: Paul R. Nesson, Jr.

Issue/Holding:

¶16      Building on footnote 11 in Doyle, courts have recognized situations in which it is not a violation of due process for the prosecutor to elicit on cross-examination the fact of the defendant’s post- Miranda silence for the purpose of impeaching the defendant’s testimony about his or her interactions with the police after the arrest.