On Point: 2. Interrogation

7th Cir. decision; Order denying rehearing and amending opinion, 10/10/15

Habeas – Voluntary Statement – Juvenile

State court determination that juvenile’s custodial statement to police was voluntary wasn’t objectively unreasonable., notwithstanding his age (15), borderline intellectual functioning and lack of criminal background. “(I)t is the totality of the circumstances underlying a juvenile confession, rather than the presence or absence of a single circumstance, that determines whether or not the confession should be deemed voluntary.”

State v. Dionicia M., 2010 WI App 134; for Dionicia M.: Andrew Hinkel, SPD Madison Appellate

Recorded Confessions

The juvenile was in custody when she was directed to the locked back seat of a patrol car so that she could be transported back to school after being reported truant; and, because it was feasible under the circumstances to record her ensuing statement, failure to do so rendered it inadmissible.

7th circuit court of appeals decision

Habeas – Miranda Waiver

Viewed through the deferential lens of 2254 habeas review, a state court finding that the severely mentally impaired Collins knowingly and intelligently waived his Miranda rights an incriminatory statement was not unreasonable.

Collins had a Wechsler-scale IQ in the low- to mid-60s, exacerbated by a brain aneurysm that damaged his frontal lobes and left him with a language disorder.

State v. Esteban M. Gonzalez, 2010 WI App 104, reversed, 2011 WI 63, see: this post; for Gonzalez: Kristin Anne Hodorowski; BiC; Resp.; Reply

Jury Instructions – Exposing Child to Harmful Materials

The pattern instruction on exposing a child to harmful material, § 948.11(2)(a), accurately recites the elements, including scienter.

¶11 We agree with the trial court’s assessment that the pattern instruction accurately states the law.

State v. Armando J. Castanada, No. 2009AP1438-CR, District I, 6/15/10

court of appeals decision (3-judge, not recommended for publication); for Castanada: Jeremy C. Perri; BiC; Resp.; Reply

Appellate Review – Implicit Findings

¶30     The postconviction circuit court did not make any express findings as to the credibility of any of the witnesses’ testimony. However, as the State observes, when the circuit court does not make express findings,

Berghuis v. Thompkins, USSC No. 08-1470, 6/1/10

Thompkins’ acknowledgment that he prayed for God’s forgiveness for the shooting was admissible as valid waiver of Miranda rights, despite being preceded by nearly 3 hours of silence during custodial interrogation. Rights must be invoked unequivocally, or not at all:

The Court has not yet stated whether an invocation of the right to remain silent can be ambiguous or equivocal, but there is no principled reason to adopt different standards for determining when an accused has invoked the Miranda right to remain silent and the Miranda right to counsel at issue in Davis.

decision below: 2010 WI App 11; for Forbush: Craig Mastantuono; Rebecca M. Coffee

Issues:

Whether the right to counsel under the Wisconsin Constitution prohibits the state from interrogating a represented individual once the state is aware of the representation

Whether a suspect made an equivocal request for counsel during police questioning, thereby invoking his right to counsel under the Wisconsin Constitution and requiring suppression of his confession at trial

Whether the circuit court’s suppression order should be affirmed without reaching the viability of State v.

court of appeals decision (1-judge; not for publication); BiC; Resp. Br.; Reply Br.

Miranda – Suppressed Statement and Probable Cause

¶7        First, we will address the State’s argument that Kohel’s statement “[w]e just smoked an hour ago” was voluntary and should not be suppressed. The trial court found, and we agree, that Kohel’s statement was the result of a custodial interrogation and should be suppressed.

court of appeals decision (3-judge; not recommended for publication); BiC; Resp. Br.

“Booking Exception” to Miranda
Questioning to determine Pugh’s “true identity” fell within “booking exception.”

Sentencing Discretion
Sentence upheld where “well within maximum” and addressed “the three primary factors.”

ussc decision

“Edwards” Rule – 14-Day Expiry
A “break in custody” ends the presumptive involuntariness of a statement following invocation of right to counsel; reinterrogation permitted after 14-day lapse.

… The protections offered by Miranda, which we have deemed sufficient to ensure that the police respect the suspect’s desire to have an attorney present the first time police interrogate him, adequately ensure that result when a suspect who initially requested counsel is reinterrogated after a break in custody that is of sufficient duration to dissipate its coercive effects.