On Point: A. In-Custody, 5th Amendment

State v. Zachary Ryan Wiegand, 2011AP939-CR, District 3, 2/7/12

court of appeals decision (not recommended for publication); for Wiegand: Brian C. Findley; case activity

Despite initially waiving his Miranda rights, Wiegand later unequivocally asserted his right to silence (“I don’t want to say anything more”); nonetheless, the interrogating officer did not scrupulously honor this invocation, and the ensuing statement along with all derivative evidence is therefore suppressed.

on review of unpublished decision; for Martin: Byron C. Lichstein; case activity; prior post

Miranda – “Interrogation” 

Issue (composed by On Point):

Whether an exchange between Martin and an officer was the functional equivalent of “interrogation” so as to require interrogation.

The facts, very briefly, as taken from the court of appeals’ decision: Martin was under arrest for DC when an officer fished a gun out of his car.

Bobby v. Archie Dixon, USSC No. 10-1540, 11/7/11 (per curiam), reversing Dixon v. Houk, 627 F.3d 553 (6th Cir 2010)

Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, a state prisoner seeking a writ of habeas corpus from a federal court “must show that the state court’s ruling on the claim being presented in federal court was so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement.” Harrington v.

State v. Devon L. Bean, 2011 WI App 129 (recommended for publication); for Bean: Scott D. Obernberger; case activity

Sew-up Confession 

The fourth interrogation of Bean within a 60-hour period following his arrest did not, under the particular facts, amount to an impermissible “sew-up” confession.

General principles. The question, in brief, is whether the time between arrest and formal charge was “inordinate.”

J.D.B. v. North Carolina, USSC No. 09-11101, 6/16/11, reversing 363 N. C. 664, 686 S. E. 2d 135

This case presents the question whether the age of a child subjected to police questioning is relevant to the custody analysis of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 (1966) . It is beyond dispute that children will often feel bound to submit to police questioning when an adult in the same circumstances would feel free to leave.

on petition for review of unpublished decision; for Stevens: Paul G. LaZotte, SPD, Madison Appellate; case activity

Issues (provided by court):

If a suspect in custody initiates communication with the police after previously invoking his Miranda right to consult with an attorney but has yet to again waive his Miranda rights, do the police violate the demands of Miranda by denying an attorney access to the suspect prior to the second waiver of his Miranda rights?

State v. Randy L. Martin, 2010AP505-CR, District 1, 5/3/11

court of appeals decision (3-judge, not recommended for publication), reversed, 2012 WI 96; for Martin: Byron C. Lichstein; case activity

Although Martin was in custody and had not received Miranda warnings, his statement wasn’t the result of “interrogation” and therefore wasn’t suppressible. When it appeared that Martin’s uncle was going to be arrested for possessing a gun found in their car,

State v. Brad E. Forbush, 2011 WI 25, reversing 2010 WI App  11; for Forbush: Craig A. Mastantuono, Rebecca M. Coffee; amicus: Colleen D. Ball, SPD, Milwaukee Appellate; case activity

Forbush’s 6th amendment right to counsel had already attached – because a criminal complaint had been filed – and he had retained counsel before officers began interrogating him on that charge in the absence of his attorney.

Docket

Decision below (617 F.3d 813 (6th Cir 2010))

Question Presented (by Scotusblog):

Whether this Court’s clearly established precedent under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 holds that a prisoner is always “in custody” for purposes of Miranda any time that prisoner is isolated from the general prison population and questioned about conduct occurring outside the prison regardless of the surrounding circumstances.

Cert petition

Brief in opposition

Petitioner’s reply

Scotusblog page

The grant appears to raise the recurrent problem of whether Miranda warnings are always and necessarily required when someone already incarcerated is interrogated by the police on a different offense.

State v. Marlon M. Anderson, 2010AP742-CR, District 1/4, 12/9/10

court of appeals decision (3-judge, not recommended for publication); for Anderson: Angela Conrad Kachelski; Anderson BiC; State Resp.

A defendant’s statement made voluntarily but in violation of Miranda isn’t admissible in the State’s case-in-chief, but is admissible if the defendant testifies and the statement is inconsistent with his testimony. The question raised here relates to how such inconsistency is measured: whether outright contradictions are necessary,