On Point blog, page 5 of 17
SCOW to address admissibility of deceased’s hearsay statements, whether Miranda warnings are required at John Doe hearings
State v. Peter J. Hanson, 2016AP2058-CR, petition for review of per curiam opinion granted 1/15/19; case activity (including briefs)
Issues (from the petition for review):
Whether the admission of hearsay statements of a defendant’s deceased wife inculpating him in murder violates his right to confrontation?
Whether trial counsel is ineffective in failing to move to suppress inculpatory statements that the defendant made at a John Doe hearing where he was in custody and not properly Mirandized?
Another garage hot pursuit case
State v. Jonalle L. Ferraro, 2018AP498, 11/8/18, District 4 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity
As in Palmersheim just last week, here we have another successor to Weber from the 2016 term – an officer follows a driver (or recent driver) into his or her garage to arrest.
Non-custodial interrogation became custodial, so Miranda warnings were required
State v. Brian D. Frazier, 2017AP1249-CR, District 4, 8/2/18 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)
Frazier agreed to drive himself to the police station to answer some questions and was assured when the questioning began that he was not under arrest and did not have to answer questions. But the initial non-custodial encounter was transformed into custody for purposes of Miranda by the officer’s subsequent words and actions, triggering the need for the Miranda warning. The officer never read Frazier the warning, so the confession he gave must be suppressed.
SCOTUS denied Brendan Dassey’s cert. petition
On Point is sorry to report that on Monday SCOTUS denied Brendan Dassey’s petition for writ of certiorari. Click here. This means that the 7th Circuit’s decision en banc stands and Dassey remains in custody. Dassey’s cert petition and the many amicus briefs supporting it make great arguments. With different facts, they might prevail. So take full advantage of the effort.
Police lies during interrogation
It happens all the time, and it’s been dubbed an art. This new article, Extending Miranda: Prohibition on Police Lies Regarding the Incriminating Evidence (54 San Diego Law Review 611 (2017), argues that police lies increase the risk of false confessions and infringe upon the defendant’s right to remain silent, the presumption of innocence, and the prosecution’s obligation to prove its accusations.
SCOW: Confession to violent felony doesn’t transform interrogation room interview into custodial interrogation
State v. Daniel J.H. Bartelt, 2018 WI 16, 2/20/18, affirming a published court of appeals opinion, case activity (including briefs)
Suppose you confessed to attempted homicide while sitting in a police station interrogation room with 2 officers who are positioned between you and the exit. Would you feel free to leave? The majority says a reasonable person would. The dissent by A.W. Bradley (joined by Abrahamson) says a reasonable person would not.
SCOW to decide whether a person is in custody for Miranda purposes after he confesses to a crime
State v. Daniel H. Bartelt, 2015AP2506-CR, 6/15/17, granting review of a published court of appeals opinion; case activity (including briefs)
Issues:
1. After confessing to an attempted homicide or other serious crimes, would a reasonable person feel free to terminate a police interview and leave an interrogation room, such that the person in not “in custody” for Miranda purposes?
2. After confessing, did Bartelt make a clear and unequivocal request for counsel when he asked one of the detectives, “Should I or can I speak to a lawyer or anything?” the detective replied, Sure, yes, that is your option.” And Bartelt replied, “Okay, I think I’d prefer that.”
Defense win on Miranda and consent to search
State v. Omar Quinton Triggs, 2015AP2533, 6/13/17, District 1 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)
A patrolling officer saw Triggs “close a garage door and quickly run to the driver’s door” and get into his car, which was parked nearby in an alley. Five officers in three vehicles converged, forcibly removed Triggs from his car, and handcuffed him.
SCOW boasts of “generous buffer zone” around 5th Amendment right against self-incrimination
State v. Brian Harris, 2017 WI 31, 4/7/17, affirming a published court of appeals opinion, 2016 WI App 2; case activity (including briefs)
“This freedom from compelled self-incrimination is one of the nation’s ‘most cherished principles.’ Miranda, 384 U.S. at 458. We are sufficiently solicitous of this protection that we guard it by patrolling a generous buffer zone around the central prohibition.” Majority Op. ¶12. That’s the principle in theory. Here’s how it applies in practice.
Court of appeals again blurs harmless error test
State v. Julius Alfonso Coleman, 2013AP2100-CR, 3/21/2017, District 1 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)
Julius Coleman was set up by a confidential informant to participate in an armed robbery of a nonexistent drug dealer named “Poncho.” He challenges the admission of various statements at trial on the ground that they were taken in violation of Miranda. The court of appeals concludes that any error in their admission was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, but along the way (and not for the first time) seems to confuse the test for harmless error with that for sufficiency of the evidence.