On Point: 5. Coercion or misconduct

State v. Miguel Muniz-Munoz, 2014AP702-CR, 3/1/16, District 1 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

By the time Muniz-Munoz went to trial for first degree intentional homicide, the medical examiner who conducted the autopsy of the victim was dead. The trial court allowed another medical examiner who reviewed the case record to give his independent opinion about the cause of the victim’s death. This did not violate Muniz-Munoz’s right to confrontation.

State v. Jeanette M. Janusiak, 2015AP160-CR, 1/28/16, District 4 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Pregnancy does not by itself make a suspect particularly vulnerable to police pressure and tactics during custodial interrogation, the court of appeals holds, so the fact that Janusiak was in an advanced state of pregnancy didn’t render her statement to police involuntary. The court also rejects Janusiak’s claims that her statement was coerced because she was threatened with the loss of her children and was promised she could go home if she made a statement.

Review of a published court of appeals decision; case activity (including briefs)

Issues (composed by On Point from the PFR)

1. Does the inevitable discovery doctrine require the State to show that information gained through police misconduct did not prompt or influence the purportedly lawful investigation?
2. Does the inevitable discovery doctrine require the State to show that it was actively pursuing an alternative line of investigation prior to the illegal conduct?
3. Does the Wisconsin Constitution bar use of the inevitable discovery doctrine to allow admission of evidence obtained through an intentional violation of constitutional rights?

State v. Marie A. Ezell, 2014 WI App 101; case actvity

Prison guards overheard Ezell tell her incarcerated boyfriend that she would smuggle in drugs for him on her next visit. When she tried to follow through, the guards detained her in a conference room, questioned her, and obtained damning evidence.  Due to the lack of Miranda warnings, this custodial interrogation violated the 5th Amendment, but the court nevertheless declined to suppress the physical evidence derived from the Miranda violations.

State v. Stanley K. Bullock, 2014 WI App 29, case activity

How “voluntary” does this sound to you?

The defendant was convicted of 1st-degree reckless homicide for the stabbing death of his girlfriend.  He said that masked attackers broke into their apartment and stabbed him and his girlfriend.  He called 911.  The responding paramedics found the defendant conscious with stab wounds and his girlfriend dead.  During his ambulance ride to the hospital (and while experiencing pain and disorientation),

State v. Todd W. Berggren, 2009 WI App 82, PFR filed 6/24/09
For Berggren: Robert G. LeBell

Issue/Holding:

¶29      Berggren also argues that his statements were induced by promises of probation and treatment. This amounts to an argument that his statements were not voluntarily given. He contends that the detective questioning him conveyed: “the belief that simple possession of child pornography photos would result in a probation disposition”;

State v. Heather A. Markwardt, 2007 WI App 242, PFR filed 11/29/07
For Markwardt: Richard Hahn

Issue/Holding: Markwardt’s in-custody statement was voluntary: any stress she was under was “unrelated to police conduct” (¶37); she didn’t unequivocally assert her rights (¶40); that the interrogator “was at times confrontational and raised his voice is not improper police procedure and does not, by itself, establish police coercion” (¶42,

State v. Matthew J. Knapp, 2003 WI 121, on certification
For Knapp: Robert G. LeBell

Issue: In essence, this court is presented with the question of whether a custodial inculpatory statement, obtained without proper Miranda warnings, and extracted through the use of police deception, is an “involuntary” self-incriminatory statement and inadmissible at trial for any purpose,” ¶95. (The police ruse involved inducing Knapp into talking by telling him that they were investigating constitutional violations committed by the department when they were in fact investigating Knapp’s involvement in a homicide.)

Holding: Given Knapp’s intelligence,

State v. Paul D. Hoppe, 2003 WI 43, affirming unpublished opinion
For Hoppe: William E. Schmaal, SPD, Madison Appellate

Issue/Holding:

¶46. Both Connelly and Clappes support the proposition that some coercive or improper police conduct must exist in order to sustain a finding of involuntariness. However, both of these cases also recognize that police conduct does not need to be egregious or outrageous in order to be coercive.

State v. Paul D. Hoppe, 2003 WI 43, affirming unpublished opinion
For Hoppe: William E. Schmaal, SPD, Madison Appellate

Issue/Holding: Under “somewhat unique” facts, a suspect’s statements made during interviews in a hospital over a three-day period while delusional and in the throes of acute alcohol withdrawal were involuntary despite the absence of any egregious police pressure. ¶¶47-59.

As suggested, this case is highly fact-specific,