On Point: a. Police

State v. Todd W. Berggren, 2009 WI App 82, PFR filed 6/24/09
For Berggren: Robert G. LeBell

Issue/Holding:

¶29      Berggren also argues that his statements were induced by promises of probation and treatment. This amounts to an argument that his statements were not voluntarily given. He contends that the detective questioning him conveyed: “the belief that simple possession of child pornography photos would result in a probation disposition”;

State v. Heather A. Markwardt, 2007 WI App 242, PFR filed 11/29/07
For Markwardt: Richard Hahn

Issue/Holding: Markwardt’s in-custody statement was voluntary: any stress she was under was “unrelated to police conduct” (¶37); she didn’t unequivocally assert her rights (¶40); that the interrogator “was at times confrontational and raised his voice is not improper police procedure and does not, by itself, establish police coercion” (¶42,

State v. Matthew J. Knapp, 2003 WI 121, on certification
For Knapp: Robert G. LeBell

Issue: In essence, this court is presented with the question of whether a custodial inculpatory statement, obtained without proper Miranda warnings, and extracted through the use of police deception, is an “involuntary” self-incriminatory statement and inadmissible at trial for any purpose,” ¶95. (The police ruse involved inducing Knapp into talking by telling him that they were investigating constitutional violations committed by the department when they were in fact investigating Knapp’s involvement in a homicide.)

Holding: Given Knapp’s intelligence,

State v. Paul D. Hoppe, 2003 WI 43, affirming unpublished opinion
For Hoppe: William E. Schmaal, SPD, Madison Appellate

Issue/Holding:

¶46. Both Connelly and Clappes support the proposition that some coercive or improper police conduct must exist in order to sustain a finding of involuntariness. However, both of these cases also recognize that police conduct does not need to be egregious or outrageous in order to be coercive.

State v. Paul D. Hoppe, 2003 WI 43, affirming unpublished opinion
For Hoppe: William E. Schmaal, SPD, Madison Appellate

Issue/Holding: Under “somewhat unique” facts, a suspect’s statements made during interviews in a hospital over a three-day period while delusional and in the throes of acute alcohol withdrawal were involuntary despite the absence of any egregious police pressure. ¶¶47-59.

As suggested, this case is highly fact-specific,

State v. Marvin J. Moss, 2003 WI App 239, PFR filed 10/27/03
For Moss: F.M. Van Hecke

Issue/Holding:

¶2. The issue in this case is whether a defendant’s incriminating statement improperly coerced by a person who is not a state agent offends constitutional due process such that the statement is inadmissible. We conclude that there is no due process violation where, as in this case,

State v. Stanley A. Samuel, 2002 WI 34, reversing 2001 WI App 25, 240 Wis. 2d 756, 623 N.W.2d 565

For Samuel: Robert A. Henak

Issue/Holding: Ҧ30. With due process as our touchstone, we conclude that when a defendant seeks to suppress witness statements as the product of coercion, the police misconduct must be more than that set forth in Clappes.

State v. George W. Hindsley, 2000 WI App 130, 237 Wis. 2d 358, 614 N.W.2d 48
For Hindsley: James B. Connell

Issue: Whether a statement is involuntary, even in the absence of police coercion, simply because the Miranda warnings aren’t effectively communicated.

Holding: A suspect’s deafness doesn’t alter the test for voluntariness, “which was and remains focused on police coercion, and considers a person’s language and culture only insofar as they bear on whether coercion by more subtle means,