On Point: C. Voluntariness

on review of unpublished opinion; for Lemoine: Donna L. Hintze, Katie R. York, SPD, Madison Appellate; case activity

Involuntary Statement – Coercion 

Issue (composed by On Point): 

Whether Lemoine’s in-custody statement was involuntary given the following police tactics:

• promising that in exchange for the “true story” he would not go to jail that night;
• telling him that he would not be able to contact an attorney while at the jail;

State v. Dennis D. Lemoine, 2010AP2597-CR, District 4, 9/15/11

court of appeals decision (not recommended for publication); for Lemoine: Donna L. Hintze, Katie R. York, SPD, Madison Appellate; case activity; supreme court review granted, 1/25/12

¶18      We agree with the trial court that the balance of the defendant’s personal characteristics against the tactics used by the police renders this is a “close case.”  However,

State v. Devon L. Bean, 2011 WI App 129 (recommended for publication); for Bean: Scott D. Obernberger; case activity

Sew-up Confession 

The fourth interrogation of Bean within a 60-hour period following his arrest did not, under the particular facts, amount to an impermissible “sew-up” confession.

General principles. The question, in brief, is whether the time between arrest and formal charge was “inordinate.”

State v. Darron D. Jackson, 2011 WI App 63 (recommended for publication); for Jackson: Rebecca Lawnicki; case activity

Waiver – Lesser Offense Instruction

The jury convicted Jackson of recklessly endangering safety while armed, which was submitted as a lesser offense of the charged offense, attempted first-degree intentional homicide. Although Jackson did object to the endangering instruction on the ground that it wasn’t supported by the facts,

State v. Quentin J. Louis, 2009AP2502-CR, District 3, 3/15/11

court of appeals decision (not recommended for publication); for Louis: Edward J. Hunt; amicus, Wis. Innocence Project: Keith A. Findley, Peter Shawn Moreno; case activity

Trial court grant of new trial in interest of justice upheld as proper exercise of discretion:  the issue in controversy wasn’t fully and fairly tried, given failure to adduce at trial medical testimony that the deceased baby’s injuries didn’t result from shaken baby syndrome.

on certification; for Spaeth: Shelley Fite, SPD, Madison Appellate; case activity

Issue (formulated by On Point):

Whether a statement made to law enforcement following a probationer’s honest accounting to his probation agent may derive from a “legitimate source wholly independent of compelled testimony” and therefore admissible in a criminal case, notwithstanding the promise of immunity for such statements when made to probation agents.

See prior post for further discussion.

certification; for Spaeth: Shelley Fite, SPD, Madison Appellate; case activity; Spaeth BiC; State Resp.; Reply

Review granted 2/8/11

ISSUE

In Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 453, 460 (1972), the United States Supreme Court held that the government may compel incriminating testimony so long as it comes with a grant of use and derivative use immunity—that is to say,

Voluntariness – Statements to Probation Officer

court of appeals decision (3-judge, not recommended for publication), supreme court review granted 11/14/12; for Sahs: Mark S. Rosen; BiC; Resp.

Sahs’ claim that his statements to his probation officer were given under compulsion is rejected, because the premise for the claim – a DOC form cautioning that he must reveal his activities else face probation revocation –

State v. Ronnie L. Peebles, 2010 WI App 156 (recommended for publication); for Peebles: Suzanne L. Hagopian, SPD, Madison Appellate; BiC; Resp.; Reply

Use, at Peebles’ sentencing after revocation, of his incriminating statements made during counseling ordered as a condition of probation, violated the 5th amendment and requires resentencing. The court canvasses the leading cases – State v.

7th Cir. decision; Order denying rehearing and amending opinion, 10/10/15

Habeas – Voluntary Statement – Juvenile

State court determination that juvenile’s custodial statement to police was voluntary wasn’t objectively unreasonable., notwithstanding his age (15), borderline intellectual functioning and lack of criminal background. “(I)t is the totality of the circumstances underlying a juvenile confession, rather than the presence or absence of a single circumstance, that determines whether or not the confession should be deemed voluntary.”