On Point: C. Voluntariness

State v. Jeremy T. Greer, 2003 WI App 112, on remand following equally-divided result,2003 WI 30; PFR filed 6/12/03
For Greer: Donna L. Hintze, SPD, Madison Appellate

Issue/Holding:

¶14. In this case it is not disputed that before he confessed to Detective Williams, Greer was told, both orally and in writing, that the polygraph test was over.

State v. Marvin J. Moss, 2003 WI App 239, PFR filed 10/27/03
For Moss: F.M. Van Hecke

Issue/Holding:

¶2. The issue in this case is whether a defendant’s incriminating statement improperly coerced by a person who is not a state agent offends constitutional due process such that the statement is inadmissible. We conclude that there is no due process violation where, as in this case,

State v. Stanley A. Samuel, 2002 WI 34, reversing 2001 WI App 25, 240 Wis. 2d 756, 623 N.W.2d 565; habeas denied, Samuel v. Frank, 525 F. 3d 566 (7th Cir 2008)
For Samuel: Robert A. Henak

Issue/Holding:

¶30. With due process as our touchstone, we conclude that when a defendant seeks to suppress witness statements as the product of coercion,

State v. Stanley A. Samuel, 2002 WI 34, reversing 2001 WI App 25, 240 Wis. 2d 756, 623 N.W.2d 565

For Samuel: Robert A. Henak

Issue/Holding: Ҧ30. With due process as our touchstone, we conclude that when a defendant seeks to suppress witness statements as the product of coercion, the police misconduct must be more than that set forth in Clappes.

State ex rel. Gary Tate v. Schwarz, 2002 WI 127, reversing 2001 WI App 131
For Tate: Jerome F. Buting, Pamela S. Moorshead, Buting & Williams

Issue/Holding: The Evans-Thompson rule — “the state may compel a probationer to answer self-incriminating questions from his probation or parole agent, or suffer the consequence of revocation for refusing to do so, only ‘if he is protected by a grant of immunity that renders the compelled testimony inadmissible against the [probationer] in a criminal prosecution’”

State v. James H. Oswald, 2000 WI App 3, 232 Wis.2d 103, 606 N.W.2d 238
For Oswald: James L. Fullin, Jr., SPD, Madison Appellate

Issue: Whether a statement made while hospitalized should have been suppressed, as the product of a lengthy detention for the purpose of interrogation.

Holding:

¶46         When a confession is the product of “unreasonable police detention for purposes of interrogation,” it must be suppressed whether voluntary or not. 

State v. George W. Hindsley, 2000 WI App 130, 237 Wis. 2d 358, 614 N.W.2d 48
For Hindsley: James B. Connell

Issue: Whether a statement is involuntary, even in the absence of police coercion, simply because the Miranda warnings aren’t effectively communicated.

Holding: A suspect’s deafness doesn’t alter the test for voluntariness, “which was and remains focused on police coercion, and considers a person’s language and culture only insofar as they bear on whether coercion by more subtle means,

State v. Lucian Agnello II, 2004 WI App 2, (AG’s) PFR filed 1/8/04, on appeal after remand, 2003 WI 44; prior history: State v. Agnello I, 226 Wis.2d 164, 593 N.W.2d 427 (1999)
For Agnello: Jerome F. Buting, Pamela Moorshead

Issue/Holding:

¶10. Police coercion and a defendant’s personal characteristics are interdependent concepts: the more vulnerable a person is because of his or her unique characteristics,

State v. Jonathan L. Franklin, 228 Wis.2d 408, 596 N.W.2d 855 (Ct. App. 1999)
For Franklin: Archie E. Simonson

Holding: Statement taken in violation of right to counsel rule, Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981) is not, for that reason alone, involuntary and is therefore admissible for impeachment purposes.

The court doesn’t mention it, but this decision resolves a question held open in State v.

State v. Wilfred E. Tobias, 196 Wis. 2d 537, 538 N.W.2d 843 (Ct. App. 1995)
For Tobias: Barbara A. Cadwell

Issue/Holding: That suspect had learning disability, required medication to deal with visual hallucinations but was off his meds during the interrogation not enough to establish voluntariness.