On Point: A. Generally

State v. Nelson Holmes, 2024AP1121, District I, 6/17/25 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

The COA affirmed Nelson Holmes’ conviction at trial of operating a vehicle under the influence and with a prohibited alcohol concentration, finding that a witness’s statements to a 911 operator were not testimonial and were admissible as present sense  impressions, and that Holmes was not subjected to custodial interrogation when he made incriminating statements to police.

Christopher Roalson v. Jon Noble, No. 22-2833, 8/28/24

The Seventh Circuit affirms an order denying habeas relief, applying pre-Smith law on the confrontation clause, as the underlying WI COA decision dates back to 2014. The Court concludes that the rule the COA applied–“one expert cannot act as a mere conduit for the opinion of another” and must instead “render[] her own expert opinion”–did not contradict Melendez-Diaz or Bullcoming, the established precedent at the time.

State v. Patrick A. Keller, 2021 WI App 22; case activity (including briefs)

Keller was convicted of causing mental harm, as a party to a crime, to his stepdaughter, who has autism. During his trial, the circuit court admitted statements made by non-testifying confidential reporters to Child Protective Services access workers. In a published decision, the court of appeals holds that these statements were not made for the primary purpose of gathering evidence to prosecute Keller, so the Confrontation Clause does not apply.

State v. Thomas A. Nelson, 2021 WI App 2; 12/9/20, District 2; case activity (including briefs).

This split court of appeals opinion, which is recommended for publication, has “petition granted” written all over it.  Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68 (2004) held that a trial court violates a defendant’s right to confrontation when it receives into evidence out-of-court statements by someone who does not testify at trial, if the statements are “testimonial” and if the defendant has not had an opportunity to cross-examine the declarant of the statement.  Yet in this case, the court of appeals holds that Nelson’s confrontation rights were not violated when the circuit court admitted a “Sexual Abuse Evaluation” requested by the police for the purpose of collecting evidence even though the author of the evaluation did not testify at trial.

In a case that may bear on the potential use of videoconferencing at criminal trials as the COVID-19 pandemic grinds on, the Tennessee Court of Appeals, in State v. Dennis Lee Seale, invalidated a trial court’s order allowing the prosecution’s out-of-state witnesses to testify using teleconferencing technology.

State v. Glenn T. Zamzow, 2017 WI 29, 4/6/17, affirming a published court of appeals decision; case activity (including briefs)

“The Sixth Amendment guarantees that a defendant whose guilt or innocence is at stake at trial may employ the ‘greatest legal engine ever invented for the discovery of truth.’ …. But the Sixth Amendment does not mandate that statements considered at a suppression hearing face the crucible of cross-examination. Nor does the Due Process Clause demand this. Accordingly, we conclude that the circuit court did not deny Zamzow his rights under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution by relying on an audio recording of a deceased officer’s statement at the suppression hearing.” (¶31).

State v. Glenn T. Zamzow, 2016 WI App 7, petition for review granted, 3/7/16, affirmed, 2017 WI 29; case activity (including briefs)

Relying on precedent predating Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004), two judges of the court of appeals hold that the Confrontation Clause does not apply to suppression hearings and that the circuit court could rely on hearsay evidence in denying Zamzow’s motion to suppress. The third judge on the panel dissents, arguing the majority’s conclusion “rests upon a shaky foundation” (¶20) and “continues [the] unfortunate legacy” of pre-Crawford Confrontation Clause jurisprudence (¶23).

Questions presented:

1. Does an individual’s obligation to report suspected child abuse make that individual an agent of law enforcement for purposes of the Confrontation Clause?

2. Do a child’s out-of-court statements to a teacher in response to the teacher’s concerns about potential child abuse qualify as “testimonial” statements subject to the Confrontation Clause?

On review of published decision; case activity

Confrontation — bases of expert opinion as “testimonial” hearsay

Issue (Composed by On Point)

When a State Crime Lab technician concludes there is a DNA match between defendant and assailant based in part on a report of a DNA profile prepared by an outside lab, is the outside lab report “testimonial” for Confrontation Clause purposes, thus requiring the outside lab technician who prepared the report to testify?

State v. Richard Lavon Deadwiller, 2012 WI App 89, supreme court review granted 1/14/13; affirmed, 2013 WI 75; case activity

A report from an “outside” lab (Orchid Cellmark) relied on by a State Crime Lab technician for “investigative” purposes in developing a DNA match between defendant and assailant wasn’t “testimonial,” therefore didn’t violate confrontation:

¶1        Richard Deadwiller appeals the judgments entered on jury verdicts convicting him of two counts of second-degree sexual assault with the use of force.