On Point: D. Hearsay

State v. Olu A. Rhodes, 2011 WI 73, reversing unpublished COA decision; for Rhodes: John J. Grau; case activity

Although the State’s theory of motive was that Rhodes intentionally shot and killed the victim in retaliation for beating Rhodes’ sister the day before, the trial court reasonably precluded cross-examination of the sister on a prior instance where the victim severely beat her without response from Rhodes.

On Point is very pleased to present this Guest Post discussion of Bullcoming v. New Mexico by Daniel D. Blinka, Professor of Law, Marquette University of Virginia. (Cross-posted at Marquette.)  Professor Brandon L. Garrett, Virginia, also has a Guest Post on Bullcoming. Feel free to submit comments in the box at the end of the Post.

Note that issues discussed in these posts will be further refined by the recent grant of certiorari in Williams v.

On Point is very pleased to present this Guest Post discussion of Bullcoming v. New Mexico by Brandon L. Garrett, Professor of Law, University of Virginia. (Cross-posted at ACS. On Point has made a minor editing change in the first sentence, to add the date of decision.) Professor Garret has previously guest-posted on DNA and habeas procedure.  Professor Daniel D. Blinka, Marquette,

Docket

Decision below: People v. Williams, 238 Ill. 2d 125 (Ill. S. Ct. No. 107550)

Question Presented (by the Court):

Whether a state rule of evidence allowing an expert witness to testify about the results of DNA testing performed by non-testifying analysts, where the defendant has no opportunity to confront the actual analysts, violates the Confrontation Clause.

Hmm. Didn’t the Court just get done resolving this issue?

Donald Bullcoming v. New Mexico, USSC No. 09-10876, 6/23/11

The question presented is whether the Confrontation Clause permits the prosecution to introduce a forensic laboratory report containing a testimonial certification—made for the purpose of proving a particular fact—through the in-court testimony of a scientist who did not sign the certification or perform or observe the test reported in the certification. We hold that surrogate testimony of that order does not meet the constitutional requirement.

State v. Marvin L. Beauchamp, 2011 WI 27, affirming 2010 WI App 42; for Beauchamp: Craig S. Powell; case activity

Confrontation – Dying Declaration, § 908.045(3)

¶34  We therefore, like every state court that has considered the dying declaration exception since Crawford, take a position consistent with the language of Crawford and Giles and decline to hold that the constitutional right to confront witnesses is violated by the admission of statements under the dying declaration hearsay exception. 

7th circuit court of appeals decision

Habeas – Certificate of Appealability

We pause briefly to note the district court’s error in denying a certificate of appealability in this case. The statute provides that a certificate of appealability may issue “only if the applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). The Supreme Court has interpreted this language to require a showing that “reasonable jurists could debate whether (or,

Gordon Sussman v. Jenkins, 7th Cir No. 09-3940, 4/1/11

7th circuit decision, granting habeas relief in State v. Sussman, 2007AP687-CR; in chambers opinion on stay

Habeas – Confrontation – Rape Shield and Prior False Allegation

The state court unreasonably restricted Sussman’s cross-examination of his chief accuser, and thus violated his right to confrontation, by precluding him from inquiring into the complainant’s prior false allegations of sexual misconduct.

State v. Anthony M. Smith, 2009AP2867-CR, District 1/4, 3/3/11

court of appeals decision (not recommended for publication); for Smith: Rodney Cubbie, Syovata K. Edari; case activity

Trial court’s limitations on cross-examination with respect to State witness’s “prior mental condition” or use of medications (prescribed for his Bipolar Disorder and Attention Deficit Disorder) upheld as proper exercise of discretion. The witness was taking his medication at the time of the alleged offense,

Michigan v. Bryant, USSC No. 09-150

At respondent Richard Bryant’s trial, the court admitted statements that the victim, Anthony Covington, made to police officers who discovered him mortally wounded in a gas station parking lot. … We hold that the circumstances of the interaction between Covington and the police objectively indicate that the “primary purpose of the interrogation” was “to enable police assistance to meet an ongoing emergency.” Davis,