On Point: D. Hearsay

State v. Mark D. Jensen, 2007 WI 26, on bypass
For Jensen: Craig W. Albee

Issue/Holding:

¶27      In light of the standard set out above, we conclude that under the circumstances, a reasonable person in Julie’s position would anticipate a letter addressed to the police and accusing another of murder would be available for use at a later trial. The content and the circumstances surrounding the letter make it very clear that Julie intended the letter to be used to further investigate or aid in prosecution in the event of her death.

State v. Mark D. Jensen, 2007 WI 26, on bypassFor Jensen: Craig W. Albee

Issue/Holding:

¶31      Finally, we consider the statements Julie made to Wojt and DeFazio. Jensen argues that if the circumstances reveal that the declarant believed her statements to nongovernmental actors would be passed on to law enforcement officials, those statements are testimonial. While we reiterate that governmental involvement is not a necessary condition for testimonial statements,

State v. Roberto Vargas Rodriguez, 2006 WI App 163, PFR filed 8/28/06; subsequent history: affirmed, 2007 WI App 252 (court assumes without deciding that statements were testimonial but holds that Rodriguez forfeited right to confrontation by intimidating witness from testifying), PFR denied 2/21/08
For Rodriguez: Donna L. Hintze, SPD, Madison Appellate

Issue: Whether statements to the police,

State v. Jeffrey Lorenzo Searcy, 2006 WI App 8
For Searcy: Joseph L. Sommers

Issue/Holding: “(S)pontaneous, unsolicited statements offered to police officers immediately following the trauma of [declarant’s] cousin’s arrest at gunpoint” were not “testimonial” and therefore did not violate Crawford, ¶¶51-56:

¶53      Adams initiated the interaction with the officers; the police did not seek her out. She approached the police officers after they had arrested her cousin at gunpoint.

State v. David Barton, 2006 WI App 18
For Barton: Leonard D. Kachinsky

Issue: Whether the expert opinion of a crime lab analyst, presenting his own conclusions about tests performed by a non-testifying analyst, violated confrontation.

Holding: 

¶16 Like the unit leader’s testimony in Williams, Olson’s testimony was properly admitted because he was a qualified unit leader presenting his individual,

State v. Daniel D. King, 2005WI App 224
For King: Scott D. Obernberger

Issue/Holding: The confrontation clause requires that the hearsay declarant be unavailable to testify at trial “and, critically, that the State make a ‘good-faith effort’ to produce the declarant at trial,” ¶6. The trial court erred in determining that the declarant was truly unavailable:

¶16 First, the State conceded that its process-server had Shelia J.’s wrong address for seven of the attempts at service.

State v. Antwan B. Manuel, 2005 WI 75, affirming 2004 WI App 111
For Manuel: Steven D. Phillips, SPD, Madison Appellate

Issue/Holding1 [general principles]: Assuming that an out of court statement first satisfies a hearsay rule (¶23), it does not implicate the “core” concern of the confrontation clause unless the statement is considered “testimonial” under Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S.

State v. Daniel D. King, 2005 WI App 224
For King: Scott D. Obernberger

Issue/Holding: An interview by a detective of the victim at a hospital shortly after the charged assault, admitted into evidence as an excited utterance, is deemed “testimonial” (and, therefore, inadmissible under the confrontation clause) because it involved “response(s) to ‘structured police questioning,’” ¶18.

Result seems unassailable in light of Hammon v.

State v. Antwan B. Manuel, 2005 WI 75, affirming 2004 WI App 111
For Manuel: Steven D. Phillips, SPD, Madison Appellate

Issue/Holding1 [general principles]: The two-part analysis of Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980) survives Crawford for use in determining Confrontation Clause admissibility of nontestimonial statements, ¶¶54-61 (unavailable declarant, and adequate indicia of reliability).

State v. Glenn H. Hale, 2005 WI 7, affirming, as modified, 2003 WI App 238
For Hale: Steven D. Phillips, SPD, Madison Appellate

Issue/Holding: Under Crawford v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 1354 (2004), prior testimony at a codefendant’s separate trial is inadmissible at Hale’s trial, given that the previously testifying witness cannot be located. ¶¶53-58.

Crawford says that testimonial hearsay violates confrontation absent prior opportunity to cross-examine.