On Point: 6. Confrontation, 6th Am.

court of  appeals decision (3-judge; not recommended for publication); for Jackson: Mark S. Rosen; BiC: Resp.; Reply

Double Jeopardy – Retrial Following Mistrial
Mistrial on defendant’s motion, occasioned by prosecutorial failure to disclose that witness was cooperating with police in separate investigation of Jackson, didn’t bar retrial: there was no showing that the prosecutor was aware of the undisclosed information, or that failure to disclose was intended to provoke mistrial,

7th Circuit court of appeals decision

Habeas – Procedural Bar
Smith defaulted one claim by failing to raise it “in a full round of appellate review” in state court (i.e., he failed to include the issue in his request for Illinois supreme court review). He is unable to overcome the resultant bar on habeas review, on a cause-and-prejudice analysis. Among other things, the claim (trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to a witness ID instruction) would likely fail on the merits because counsel didn’t act in an objectively unreasonable manner by failing to object to a pattern instruction.

court of appeals decision; for Carter: Melinda A. Swartz, SPD, Milwaukee Appellate; Resp. Br.; Reply Br.

Ex Parte Judicial Questioning, Pretrial Proceeding
Pretrial judicial questioning of a witness at return of a bench warrant worked deprivation of the defendant’s rights to counsel and presence at trial when the witness was subsequently impeached with statements she made during that exchange, ¶¶17-21. The error, though occurring but once and limited to impeachment,

7th Circuit decision; granting habeas relief in: Wis App Nos. 2002AP791 and 2006AP2708 (earlier decision, 1/21/10, now amended); appeal following remand, 11-3228

Habeas – Confrontation
“Because it was error for the state court to admit the co-actors’ statements through the police detective’s testimony at trial, violating Ray’s right of confrontation, we reverse and remand.”

Confrontation – Lab Report
USSC decision. An order, really, not an opinion, tantamount to a “GVR” (Grant, Vacate, Remand):

PER CURIAM. We vacate the judgment of the Supreme Court of Virginia and remand the case for further proceedings not inconsistent with the opinion in Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U. S. ___ (2009).

Significance, as explained by Briscoe’s attorney and leading Confrontation Clause expert Richard Friedman: “the critical point confirmed by Melendez-Diaz remains the law: A prosecution witness must testify live,

court of appeals decision, affirmed, 2011 WI 27; for Beauchamp: Martin E. Kohler, Craig S. Powell; case activity

Dying Declaration, § 908.045(3)

¶8        …  dying declaration, codified in Wisconsin Stat. Rule 908.045(3): “A statement made by a declarant while believing that the declarant’s death was imminent, concerning the cause or circumstances of what the declarant believed to be the declarant’s impending death.” Under established law,

State v. Carmen L. Doss, 2008 WI 93, reversing 2007 WI App 208
For Doss: Robert R. Henak

Issue: Whether the authenticating affidavit of a bank record was “testimonial” within the Confrontation Clause.

Holding:

¶45      The parties do not dispute that the circuit court correctly described Crawford and Manuel as identifying business records as nontestimonial,

State v. Donald W. Jorgensen, 2008 WI 60, reversing unpublished decision
For Jorgensen: Martha K. Askins, SPD, Madison Appellate

Issue: The present convictions stemmed from Jorgensen showing up for an otherwise unrelated hearing intoxicated; without objection, the prosecutor obtained admission of that hearing’s transcript, which the trial court read to the jury: is Jorgensen entitled to relief on the ground of violation of right to confrontation,

State v. Donald W. Jorgensen, 2008 WI 60, reversing unpublished decision
For Jorgensen: Martha K. Askins, SPD, Madison Appellate

Issue/Holding:

¶39      Jorgensen’s right to confrontation was also violated during the prosecutor’s closing argument. The prosecutor took what the jury had improperly heard during the trial a step further. She “testified” that Jorgensen was a “chronic alcoholic” who did not acknowledge his problem,

Go: here.

Giles v. California, 554 U.S. 353 (2008) fundamentally altered the confrontation-forfeiture doctrine: There, the Court held in effect that the forfeiture doctrine “applie(s) only when the defendant engaged in conduct designed to prevent the witness from testifying,” although the Court also allowed that “(e)arlier abuse, or threats of abuse, intended to dissuade the victim from resorting to outside help would be highly relevant to this inquiry,