On Point: 6. Confrontation, 6th Am.

State v. Xavier J. Rockette (II), 2006 WI App 103, PFR filed 6/29/06 ( prior unrelated appeal involving same defendant, different case: 2005 WI App 205)
For Rockette: Timothy A. Provis

Issue: Whether the witness’s repeated claim of memory loss denied Rockette confrontation within the meaning of Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004).

Holding:

¶24      Fensterer and Owens teach us that the key inquiry for Confrontation Clause purposes is whether the declarant is present at trial for cross-examination,

State v. Fred V. Vogelsberg, 2006 WI App 228 (Cert. petition filed, Case No. 06-1253)
For Vogelsberg: Timothy A. Provis

Issue1: Whether the holding of State v. Thomas, 150 Wis. 2d 374, 394, 442 N.W.2d 10 (1989) (witness may testify behind screen upon showing of necessity) survives Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004).

State v. Roberto Vargas Rodriguez, 2006 WI App 163, PFR filed 8/28/06
For Rodriguez: Donna L. Hintze, SPD, Madison Appellate

Issue/Holding: Where the defendant’s brother testified that the non-testifying complainant had recanted, the prosecution could impeach the brother with the possibility that the complainant was motivated by fear due to the brother’s gang affiliation, ¶31: “A witness’s motive (whether testifying ‘live’ or by admission of his or her out-of-court assertions) is never collateral, 

State v. Justin Yang, 2006 WI App 48
For Olson: John J. Grau

Issue/Holding:

¶11      Inquiry into a witness’s bias is always material and relevant. State v. Williamson, 84 Wis. 2d 370, 383, 267 N.W.2d 337, 343 (1978) (bias and improper motive of witness are never collateral). John Henry Wigmore has characterized cross-examination as “beyond any doubt the greatest legal engine ever invented for the discovery of truth.” 5 Wigmore,

State v. Daniel D. King, 2005WI App 224
For King: Scott D. Obernberger

Issue/Holding: The confrontation clause requires that the hearsay declarant be unavailable to testify at trial “and, critically, that the State make a ‘good-faith effort’ to produce the declarant at trial,” ¶6. The trial court erred in determining that the declarant was truly unavailable:

¶16 First, the State conceded that its process-server had Shelia J.’s wrong address for seven of the attempts at service.

State v. Antwan B. Manuel, 2005 WI 75, affirming 2004 WI App 111
For Manuel: Steven D. Phillips, SPD, Madison Appellate

Issue/Holding1 [general principles]: Assuming that an out of court statement first satisfies a hearsay rule (¶23), it does not implicate the “core” concern of the confrontation clause unless the statement is considered “testimonial” under Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S.

State v. Daniel D. King, 2005 WI App 224
For King: Scott D. Obernberger

Issue/Holding: An interview by a detective of the victim at a hospital shortly after the charged assault, admitted into evidence as an excited utterance, is deemed “testimonial” (and, therefore, inadmissible under the confrontation clause) because it involved “response(s) to ‘structured police questioning,’” ¶18.

Result seems unassailable in light of Hammon v.

State v. Antwan B. Manuel, 2005 WI 75, affirming 2004 WI App 111
For Manuel: Steven D. Phillips, SPD, Madison Appellate

Issue/Holding1 [general principles]: The two-part analysis of Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980) survives Crawford for use in determining Confrontation Clause admissibility of nontestimonial statements, ¶¶54-61 (unavailable declarant, and adequate indicia of reliability).

State v. Glenn H. Hale, 2005 WI 7, affirming, as modified, 2003 WI App 238
For Hale: Steven D. Phillips, SPD, Madison Appellate

Issue/Holding: Under Crawford v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 1354 (2004), prior testimony at a codefendant’s separate trial is inadmissible at Hale’s trial, given that the previously testifying witness cannot be located. ¶¶53-58.

Crawford says that testimonial hearsay violates confrontation absent prior opportunity to cross-examine.

State v. Harry L. Seymer, 2005 WI App 93
For Seymer: Andrea T. Cornwall, SPD, Milwaukee Appellate

Issue/Holding: Where the (pro se) sexual assault defendant’s attempt to cross-examine the complainant and principal witness was abruptly terminated by the trial court, purportedly because of the defendant’s “mocking tone” and “derisive behavior”; but where the record did not in any respect support these “subjective impressions,” “the underpinnings of the trial court’s decision to terminate cross-examination [are] unavailing,