On Point blog, page 1 of 2
7th circuit affirms denial of habeas relief in pre-Smith confrontation clause analysis
Christopher Roalson v. Jon Noble, No. 22-2833, 8/28/24
The Seventh Circuit affirms an order denying habeas relief, applying pre-Smith law on the confrontation clause, as the underlying WI COA decision dates back to 2014. The Court concludes that the rule the COA applied–“one expert cannot act as a mere conduit for the opinion of another” and must instead “render[] her own expert opinion”–did not contradict Melendez-Diaz or Bullcoming, the established precedent at the time.
Use of preliminary hearing testimony when witness is unavailable at trial
There’s an interesting petition for writ of certiorari on this issue pending in SCOTUS. As this post from the Confrontation Blog explains: “The question is whether, or in what circumstances, the testimony of a prosecution witness at a preliminary hearing may be used at trial if the witness is then unavailable. This is an issue on which the Supreme Court has not given any guidance since Crawford, and the petition ably shows that the lower courts are in clear dispute.”
Six years after habeas affirmed, SCOW directs circuit court to hold new trial in Jensen case
State v. Mark D. Jensen, 2021 WI 27, 3/18/21, affirming a court of appeals summary disposition; case activity (including some briefs)
Julie Jensen died by poisoning in 1998. The state eventually charged her husband, Mark, with having killed her; the defense was that she had died by suicide. Before her death Julie had made oral and written statements to the effect that Mark would be responsible if something happened to her. She wasn’t available to testify at the trial, of course, and Mark moved to exclude these statements on Confrontation grounds. Our supreme court now holds that, when it held these statements testimonial in a prior appeal (in 2007), it established the law of the case; it further concludes that SCOTUS has not altered the law so much since then that the law-of-the-case doctrine should give way. So, it remands for a new trial, without the statements.
COA: Confrontation Clause doesn’t apply to statements by reporters of child abuse
State v. Patrick A. Keller, 2021 WI App 22; case activity (including briefs)
Keller was convicted of causing mental harm, as a party to a crime, to his stepdaughter, who has autism. During his trial, the circuit court admitted statements made by non-testifying confidential reporters to Child Protective Services access workers. In a published decision, the court of appeals holds that these statements were not made for the primary purpose of gathering evidence to prosecute Keller, so the Confrontation Clause does not apply.
SCOW to address admissibility of deceased’s hearsay statements, whether Miranda warnings are required at John Doe hearings
State v. Peter J. Hanson, 2016AP2058-CR, petition for review of per curiam opinion granted 1/15/19; case activity (including briefs)
Issues (from the petition for review):
Whether the admission of hearsay statements of a defendant’s deceased wife inculpating him in murder violates his right to confrontation?
Whether trial counsel is ineffective in failing to move to suppress inculpatory statements that the defendant made at a John Doe hearing where he was in custody and not properly Mirandized?
Challenges to admission of transcript testimony by unavailable witness, amendment of information, and sentence fail
State v. Larry L. Garner, 2016AP2201-CR, 4/17/18, District 1 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)
The State charged Garner and 3 other co-defendants with 2 counts of armed robbery use of force, PTAC, and felony murder, PTAC. The trial court ordered separate trials. A mistrial occurred due to juror misconduct, so the court held a second trial where the jury found Garner guilty on all 3 counts. On appeal the lead issue was whether the circuit court violated Garner’s confrontation rights by allowing the State to present his co-defendant’s testimony from the 1st trial at his 2nd trial. The answer, according to the court of appeals, is “no.” Garner’s challenges to the State’s amended information and to his sentence also failed.
Testimony that 90% of child sexual assault reports are true didn’t clearly vouch for victim’s credibility
State v. Esequiel Morales-Pedrosa, 2016 WI App 38; case activity (including briefs)
The case law prohibiting vouching by one witness for the credibility of another witness didn’t clearly cover a forensic interviewer’s testimony that 90% of child sexual assault reports are true. Thus, trial counsel wasn’t deficient for failing to object to the testimony.
Habeas Review – Confrontation – Admissibility of Prior Testimony, Showing of Witness Unavailability
Hardy v. Irving L. Cross, USSC No. 11-74, 12/12/11, reversing Cross v. Hardy, 7th Cir No. 09-1666
The Seventh Circuit grant of habeas relief, on the ground “the state failed to demonstrate that it employed good faith efforts to locate the complainant” before declaring her “unavailable” and allowing her prior testimony to be read to the jury, is reversed:
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of1996 (AEDPA),
Irving L. Cross v. Hardy, 7th Cir No. 09-1666, 1/13/11
7th circuit decision, reversed, Hardy v. Cross, USSC No. 11-74, 12/12/11
Habeas Review – Confrontation – Pre-Crawford (Ohio v. Roberts) Showing of Witness Unavailability
The state court (Illinois) unreasonably applied controlling Supreme Court precedent in finding good-faith efforts to secure the presence of the declarant, before determining that she was unavailable so that her first-trial testimony could be read to the jury at Cross’s re-trial.
Confrontation: Forfeiture Doctrine – Witness Unavailability; Authentication – Telephone Recording; Appellate Jurisdiction
State v. Scottie L. Baldwin, 2010 WI App 162 (recommended for publication); for Baldwin: Robert E. Haney; (principal briefs not posted on-line)
The trial judge’s findings, though made prior to Giles v. California, 128 S.Ct. 2678 (2008), satisfied the test imposed by that case, that forfeiture of the right to confrontation requires intent to prevent the witness from testifying.
¶39 Therefore,