On Point blog, page 2 of 4
Wisconsin’s standards for determining competency for self-representation are constitutional
State v. Andrew L. Jackson, 2015 WI App 45; case activity (including briefs)
The standard established under State v. Klessig, 211 Wis. 2d 194, 564 N.W.2d 716 (1997), for determining a defendant’s competency to represent himself does not violate Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 164 (2008), the court of appeals holds. The court also affirms the circuit court’s conclusions that Jackson didn’t validly waive his right to counsel and wasn’t competent to represent himself.
Defendant forfeited right to counsel of choice; failed to show deficient performance
State v. Annette Morales-Rodriguez, 2014AP1438-CR, District 1, 2/3/15 (not recommended for publication); click here for briefs
A defendant must assert that she was denied her constitutional right to the counsel of her choice before trial, not after. Also, an attorney clears the “deficient performance” prong of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim where he withdraws as counsel based on a possible conflict even if the client wants him as her lawyer and will waive the conflict.
Federal district court grants habeas relief because Wisconsin Court of Appeals’ unreasonably determined facts in appeal addressing defendant’s request to reinstate right to counsel
Joel D. Rhodes v. Michael Meisner, No. 13-C-0161 (E.D. Wis. Mar. 12, 2014)
Judge Lynn Adelman of the U.S. District Court, Eastern District of Wisconsin, has ordered a new trial for Joel Rhodes, concluding that in State v. Rhodes, 2011 WI App 145, 337 Wis. 2d 594, 807 N.W.2d 1, the Wisconsin Court of Appeals unreasonably determined that the trial court properly exercised his discretion in denying Rhodes’s request to reinstate his right to counsel on the eve of trial.
Court rejects argument that waiver of counsel was involuntary because it was not “free from financial constraint”
State v. Gregory Garro, 2013AP342-CR, District 1, 12/27/13; court of appeals decision (not recommended for publication); case activity
Garro waived the right to counsel before trial after two retained lawyers withdrew because he couldn’t pay them. (3). Garro told the court he couldn’t afford the fees quoted by the lawyers, but did have some money to hire counsel. (4). After being given time to look for a lawyer he could afford,
Use of counsel in prior cases defeats defendant’s claim that he didn’t knowingly waive his right to counsel in later case
State v. Scott J. Stelzer, 2013AP1555-CR, District 2, 12/27/13 (1-judge decision; ineligible for publication), case activity
After being convicted of his 3rd OWI offense, Stelzer moved to exclude his 2nd OWI (which occurred in 1996) from the calculation of his prior convictions on the grounds that he was not represented by counsel when he pled guilty to it. Nor did he knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily waived his right to counsel at that time.
Yet another take on how to structure bifurcated sentences for an enhanced misdemeanor
State v. Gabriel Griffin, 2012AP2631-CR, District 1, 7/30/13; court of appeals decision (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity
Agreeing with State v. Gerondale, 2009AP1237-CR and 2009AP1238-CR (Wis. Ct. App Nov. 3, 2009) (unpublished), and State v. Ash, No. 2012AP381-CR (Wis. Ct. App. Aug. 15, 2012) (unpublished), that there is a conflict in § 973.01 which affects the structure of enhanced misdemeanor sentences,
Denial of right to self-representation — competence to represent oneself; search and seizure — probable cause, automobile exception
State v. Robert L. Tatum, Case No. 2011AP2439-CR, District 1, 1/29/13; court of appeals decision (not recommended for publication); case activity
Denial of right to self-representation – competence to represent oneself
The circuit court properly denied Tatum the right to represent himself based on his limited education and understanding of legal procedures, as evidenced by his statements and behavior in court. (¶13). While the circuit court found Tatum competent to proceed under Wis.
Counsel – Waiver, Self-Representation – Presentencing Plea-Withdrawal
State v. Dennis C. Strong, Jr., 2012AP1204-CR, District 3, 11/30/12
court of appeals decision (1-judge, ineligible for publication); case activity
The trial court undertook an appropriate colloquy with Strong before allowing him to waive counsel and represent himself, leading to guilty pleas. The court thus rejects his claim that his pleas were premised on a violation of his right to counsel, ¶12.
Strong had an apparent change of heart after entering guilty pleas: he turned around and made a request for representation,
Self-Representation
State v. Anthony S. Irving, 2011AP1908-CR, District 2, 8/8/12
court of appeals decision (not recommended for publication); case activity
A defendant has a constitutional right to self-representation, State v. Imani, 2010 WI 66, ¶20, 326 Wis. 2d 179, 786 N.W.2d 40, but it must be triggered by a “clear and unequivocal” request for self-representation, State v. Darby,
Self-Representation: Klessig Waiver
State v. Dragisa Pavlovic, 2011AP2687-CR, District 2, 8/1/12
court of appeals decision (1-judge, ineligible for publication); case activity
Pavlic’s waiver of counsel so that he could represent himself at trial satisfied State v. Klessig, 211 Wis. 2d 194, 564 N.W.2d 716 (1997).
¶8 As a precautionary measure, the trial court granted Pavlovic a Klessig evidentiary hearing. We conclude the trial court’s waiver colloquy complied with Klessig.