On Point: A. Right to counsel

David Asa Villarreal v. Texas, USSC No. 24-557, certiorari granted 4/7/25

SCOTUS added to its 2025-26 docket this week when it granted the petitioner’s cert. petition to address the following:

Question presented:

Whether a trial court abridges the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel by prohibiting the defendant and his counsel from discussing the defendant’s testimony during an overnight recess.

State v. L.J.T., Jr., 2024AP1877-CR, 12/12/24, District IV (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

In a very unique appeal arising from pretrial competency proceedings, COA holds that the defendant was not competent to exercise the right of self-representation and reverses for a new hearing.

State v. Percy Antione Robinson, 2020AP1728-CR, 8/6/24, District I (recommended for publication); case activity

In a published decision that criminal practitioners have been waiting on for years, COA holds that a CR-215 probable cause procedure used to satisfy the requirements of Riverside triggers the attachment of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel.

Nelson Garcia, Jr., v. Randall Hepp, No. 21-3268, 4/25/23, affirming Nelson Garcia, Jr. v. Brian Foster

A long line of Supreme Court cases holds that a criminal defendant’s right to counsel attaches when he or she becomes a criminal defendant: when he or she is formally accused of a crime. Most recently, in Rothgery v. Gillespie County, 554 U.S. 191 (2008), the Court applied this rule to conclude that the defendant had the right to counsel when a police officer brought him before a judge and the judge found probable cause, committed him to jail, and set bail. In Milwaukee County, though, when a person is arrested without a warrant, judges routinely find probable cause, order detention, and set bail without seeing the person. As happened in Garcia’s case, an officer presents a judge a form–the CR-215–detailing the basis for suspecting the person; the judge can then check a box indicating that probable cause exists and can also set bond. The form is then distributed to, among others, the person being held.

State v. O.F., 2022AP1703, District 1, 01/18/2023 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

Ultimately, the issue addressed by the court of appeals is whether O.F. received ineffective assistance of counsel where trial counsel was alleged to have “violated his duty of confidentiality and loyalty” to his client. O.F.’s claims were based on multiple statements made by his trial counsel that arguably disclosed confidential information to the court and painted O.F. in a bad light. The court rejects O.F.’s claim primarily because he failed to establish “any prejudice” and also rejects O.F.’s assertions that his IAC claim was structural and thus did not require a post-disposition motion or a Machner evidentiary hearing. (Opinion, ¶¶22-25).

State v. Robert Daris Spencer, 2022 WI 56, July 6, 2022, affirming in part and reversing in part an unpublished court of appeals decision; case activity (including briefs)

A majority of the supreme court holds that Spencer had no right to be personally present or even to have counsel present when the trial judge decided to dismiss a juror for cause just before deliberations began because the judge’s interaction with the juror wasn’t a critical stage of the proceedings. 

State v. Alberto E. Rivera, 2021AP1100, 7/12/22, District 1, (not recommended for publication); case activity, (including briefs)

The court of appeals rejects Rivera’s claims for ineffective assistance of postconviction counsel for failing to raise two claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Rivera challenged trial counsel’s counsel’s failure to seek suppression of an in-court identification because (a) it was tainted by an earlier suggestive “showup” procedure, and (b) his right to counsel was violated during the line-up because his retained counsel was not present for it.

State v. Richard M. Arrington, 2022 WI 53, reversing a published court of appeals opinion, 2021 WI App 32, 7/1/22, case activity (including briefs)

In a majority opinion written by Roggensack, SCOW holds that the State did not violate Arrington’s 6th Amendment right to counsel by using a jailhouse snitch to help cinch a 1st-degree homicide conviction against him. Thus, Arrington’s lawyer did not perform deficiently by failing to file a suppression motion. Dallet wrote a concurrence joined by A.W. Bradley and Karofsky arguing that a 6th Amendment violation did occur and that Arrington’s lawyer performed deficiently by not moving to suppress the snitch evidence. The concurrence agrees, however, that Arrington was not prejudiced by counsel’s conduct.

State v. Nhia Lee, 2019AP221-CR, petition dismissed as improvidently granted, 5/24/22; case activity (including briefs)

SCOW presumably took this case in order to address one or both of these issues: (1) whether a circuit court must appoint counsel at the county’s expense when the SPD is unable to do so within 10 days of the defendant’s initial appearance; and (2) whether Lee was denied the right to counsel, due process and a speedy trial as he sat in jail for over 100 days waiting for a lawyer. After briefing and oral argument, 5 justices voted to dismiss his petition as improvidently granted.

State v. Percy Antione Robinson, 2020AP1728-CR, certification granted 5/18/22; case activity (including briefs); ; remanded  5/10/23

Question presented:

The 4th Amendment requires that a judicial officer determine probable within 48 hours of a warrantless arrest. County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 56 (1991). Milwaukee County complies with this mandate by having the judicial officer review a sworn affidavit from law enforcement and set initial bail. This procedure does not require the accused to appear in person. The judicial officer simply conducts a paper review and completes a CR-215 form. Does this procedure trigger the accused’s right to counsel?