On Point: A. Right to counsel

State v. Marcus Demond Anderson, Sr., 2018AP2016-CR, District 1, 10/8/19 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

At the start of his sentencing hearing Anderson lodged a complaint against his lawyer, which the judge blithely ignored. (¶¶2-4). Do over, says the court of appeals.

State v. Nelson Garcia, Jr., 2019 WI 40, 4/19/19; case activity (including briefs)

ASPD Pam Moorshead briefed this appeal and argued it to SCOW less than two weeks ago. The lead issue was whether the Sixth Amendment right to counsel attaches upon the finding of probable cause and setting of bail by a court commissioner. Justice Abrahamson withdrew from participation leaving only 6 justices to decide the case.

State v. Maries D. Addison, 2018AP55-57-CR, 3/26/19, District 1 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

The court of appeals agreed that the 17-month delay in bringing Addison to trial was presumptively prejudicial, but based on the unique facts of this case, it held that his speedy trial rights weren’t violated. Addison did a fine job representing himself (he got “not guilty” verdicts on 5 of 22 counts) so his “incompetency to proceed pro se” claim went nowhere. Plus his freedom of religion claim (right to have a Bible with him during trial) failed because his argument was insufficiently developed. 

Scott Schmidt v. Brian Foster, 7th Circuit Court of Appeals No. 17-1727, 12/20/18, reversing panel decision of 5/29/18

Schmidt, as we discussed in our post on the Seventh Circuit’s (now reversed) habeas grant, was summoned into chambers and questioned by the judge about the testimony he wanted to give in his defense. His lawyer was allowed to be there but was forbidden, outside of a brief limited consultation, to participate. A majority of the en banc court, over sharp dissent, now says that even though that was pretty clearly unconstitutional, Schmidt’s conviction stands because of the AEDPA standard.

State v. Nelson Garcia, Jr., 2016AP1276-CR, petition for review of an unpublished court of appeals decision granted 12/12/18; case activity (including briefs)

Issues (from the petition for review)

1. Does the Sixth Amendment right to counsel attach upon the finding of probable cause and setting of bail by a court commissioner?
2. Was the line-up impermissibly suggestive because it violated the Department of Justice’s Model Policy and Procedure for Eyewitness Identification and the viewing witnesses failed to follow the standard instructions given to them?
3. Can a trial court at a pre-trial hearing decide that a defendant has waived the right to self-representation because the court believes the defendant will engage in disruptive behavior in front of the jury? If so, does the defendant have a right to redeem himself?

Fond du Lac County v. S.R.H., 2018AP1088-FT, 10/17/18, District 2 (1-judge opinion, eligible for publication); case activity

At the beginning of a Chapter 51 extension hearing, S.R.H. told the court that he wanted to fire his attorney, and he asked for a new one. When that failed, he asked the court “Your honor, could I go pro se?” The court ignored his request. The hearing proceeded, S.R.H. was recommitted, and the court of appeals here affirms in a decision worthy of SCOW’s review.

State v. Sandra D. Solomon, 2018AP298-CR, 9/25/18, District 1 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Solomon sought plea withdrawal arguing that the circuit court had denied her request to represent herself and insisted on proceeding with the scheduled trial date, so her newly-retained lawyer was not prepared to defend her. The court of appeals held that her invocation of this right was not clear and unequivocal. It also held that the domestic abuse assessment clearly applied to this case.

State v. Terrance Lavone Egerson, 2018 WI App 49; case activity (including briefs)

Egerson told the trial court that his lawyer was “totally deficient” and declared a “total breakdown in communication.” The trial court agreed to let Egerson have a new lawyer, but as the parties and the court discussed logistics, he said: “let me represent myself and have co-counsel.” When that was ignored, Egerson said: “let me represent myself and have no counsel.” The court of appeals holds that this was not clear and unequivocal request to go pro se. Thus, the trial court had no duty to conduct the colloquy required by State v. Klessig, 211 Wis. 2d 194, 564 N.W.2d 716 (1997). If Egerson’s words don’t satisfy the test, what words would? Perhaps SCOW will tell us.

Scott Schmidt v. Brian Foster, 7th Circuit Court of Appeals No. 17-1727, 5/29/18, reversing Schmidt v. Pollard, No. 13-CV-1150 (E.D. Wis. Mar. 20, 2017); reversed en banc 12/20/18

A criminal defendant is entitled to counsel at all “critical stages” of the case. You probably think that a hearing, before a murder trial, that determines whether the accused will get to present his only defense counts as such a “critical stage.” The Wisconsin Court of Appeals, however, “easily reject[ed]” that notion in this (published) case. The Seventh Circuit now disagrees, saying the Wisconsin decision “unreasonably applied Supreme Court precedent and, frankly, ignored reality.”

The latest edition of the Volokh Conspiracy analyzes a recent 12-4 en banc decision by the 6th Circuit decision in which the majority answers the question above “no” based on current precedent. However, a “concurrence dubitante” argues that this conflicts with The Founders’ intent when they drafted the 6th Amendment. Another concurring opinion calls on SCOTUS to change its precedent. A dissent argues that based on the facts of this case,