On Point blog, page 5 of 9
Defendant’s behavior counts against him for speedy trial purposes, but doesn’t show he was incompetent to represent himself
State v. Ennis Lee Brown, 2015AP522-CR, District 1, 10/9/15 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)
The 14½-month delay in trying Brown didn’t violate his right to a speedy trial, as “all of the delays are attributable to the defense, and most are attributable to Brown’s poor behavior and inability to work with his assigned counsel.” (¶56). At the same time, the trial court didn’t err in allowing Brown to proceed pro se at the start of trial, as Brown’s “poor behavior and inability to work with his assigned counsel” don’t show Brown was incompetent to represent himself.
State court’s exclusion, on hearsay grounds, of exculpatory evidence didn’t violate right to present defense
Wayne Kubsch v. Ron Neal, 7th Circuit Court of Appeals No. 14-1898, 8/12/15
After being convicted of murdering his wife, her son, and her ex-husband, Kubsch was sentenced to death. He challenged his conviction and sentence in a federal habeas proceeding on three grounds: (1) the Indiana trial court excluded evidence of a witness’s exculpatory hearsay statement to police; (2) his trial counsel was ineffective in seeking admission of the witness’s hearsay statement; and (3) his waiver of counsel and choice to represent himself at the sentencing phase of his trial were not knowing and voluntary. The court, over a dissent by one judge as to the first and second claims, rejects Kubsch’s arguments.
State court reasonably rejected claim that defendant was denied the right to represent himself
Laderian McGhee v. Michael A. Dittmann, 7th Circuit Court of Appeals No. 14-1763, 7/22/15
The Wisconsin Court of Appeals reasonably applied federal law in rejecting McGhee’s claim that he was denied the right to self-representation under Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975).
“Critical stages” of prosecution where defendant has right to counsel
Sila Luis v. United States, USSC No. 14-419, cert. granted 6/8/15
Whether the pretrial restraint of a criminal defendant’s legitimate, untainted assets (those not traceable to a criminal offense) needed to retain counsel of choice violates the Fifth and Sixth Amendments.
Wisconsin’s standards for determining competency for self-representation are constitutional
State v. Andrew L. Jackson, 2015 WI App 45; case activity (including briefs)
The standard established under State v. Klessig, 211 Wis. 2d 194, 564 N.W.2d 716 (1997), for determining a defendant’s competency to represent himself does not violate Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 164 (2008), the court of appeals holds. The court also affirms the circuit court’s conclusions that Jackson didn’t validly waive his right to counsel and wasn’t competent to represent himself.
Use of counsel in prior cases defeats defendant’s claim that he didn’t knowingly waive his right to counsel in later case
State v. Scott J. Stelzer, 2013AP1555-CR, District 2, 12/27/13 (1-judge decision; ineligible for publication), case activity
After being convicted of his 3rd OWI offense, Stelzer moved to exclude his 2nd OWI (which occurred in 1996) from the calculation of his prior convictions on the grounds that he was not represented by counsel when he pled guilty to it. Nor did he knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily waived his right to counsel at that time.
Underfunded public defender system violates Sixth Amendment right to counsel
How many misdemeanor cases is too many for one public defender to take in one year? Is it okay to advise a client to take a fantastic plea bargain without having a confidential conversation with him first? What about skipping the investigation of a client’s story? In Wilbur v. City of Mount Vernon, Case No. C11-1100RSL (12/4/13) the Western District of Washington slammed the “meet and plead” public defense systems in place in the cities of Mount Vernon and Burlington.
“Bullshit” newly-discovered evidence and self-representation on 974.06 motions
State v. Joseph Jordan, 2011AP1249, District 1, 6/25/13; case activity; (not recommended for publication).
What a challenging case. A jury convicted Jordan of first-degree reckless homicide and other crimes. He lost his direct appeal and then filed a pro se §974.06 motion requesting various forms of relief, including a new trial based on: (a) newly-discovered evidence, and (b) ineffective assistance of counsel. He also filed several requests for counsel,
Habeas corpus provides remedy where parent’s lawyer failed to file timely appeal in TPR case
Amy W. v. David G., 2013 WI App 83; case activity
David G.’s parental rights were terminated in a proceeding commenced by the child’s mother. He filed a timely notice of intent to pursue postdisposition relief, but his appointed appellate counsel failed to file a notice of appeal before the deadline. (¶3). That deadline cannot be extended because the legislature has decreed that the time for filing an appeal in a TPR case may not be enlarged when the petition was filed by someone other than “a representative of the public.”