On Point blog, page 6 of 9
Statute of limitations, § 939.74(1) — sufficiency of “John Doe” complaint’s identification of defendant for purposes of tolling statute of limitations; denial of right to self-representation or to substitution of counsel
State v. Rodney Washington, 2012AP1015-CR, District 1, 3/26/13; court of appeals decision (not recommended for publication); case activity
Statute of limitations, § 939.74(1) — sufficiency of “John Doe” complaint’s identification of defendant for purposes of tolling statute of limitations
The crimes in this case—sexual assault and robbery—were alleged to have occurred in 1994 and 1995. In 2000, eleven days before the statute of limitations was to run,
Denial of right to self-representation — competence to represent oneself; search and seizure — probable cause, automobile exception
State v. Robert L. Tatum, Case No. 2011AP2439-CR, District 1, 1/29/13; court of appeals decision (not recommended for publication); case activity
Denial of right to self-representation – competence to represent oneself
The circuit court properly denied Tatum the right to represent himself based on his limited education and understanding of legal procedures, as evidenced by his statements and behavior in court. (¶13). While the circuit court found Tatum competent to proceed under Wis.
Counsel – Waiver, Self-Representation – Presentencing Plea-Withdrawal
State v. Dennis C. Strong, Jr., 2012AP1204-CR, District 3, 11/30/12
court of appeals decision (1-judge, ineligible for publication); case activity
The trial court undertook an appropriate colloquy with Strong before allowing him to waive counsel and represent himself, leading to guilty pleas. The court thus rejects his claim that his pleas were premised on a violation of his right to counsel, ¶12.
Strong had an apparent change of heart after entering guilty pleas: he turned around and made a request for representation,
William Thompkins, Jr. v. Pfister, 7th Cir No. 10-2467, 10/23/12
seventh circuit decision, denying habeas relief in 641 N.E.2d 371 (Ill. 1994) and 521 N.E.2d 38 (1988)
Habeas Review – 6th Amendment Attachment of Counsel – State Court Findings
The Seventh Circuit rejects, on habeas review of his Illinois conviciton, Thompkins’ challenge to admissibility of his statement. Thompkins made his statement after his arrest and, according to the state court, before his initial bond hearing.
Adequate Provocation Defense, §§ 939.44(1), 940.01(2)(a): Test for Admissibility; Counsel: No Right to Participate, in camera Hearing
State v. Scott E. Schmidt, 2012 WI App 113 (recommended for publication); case activity
Adequate Provocation Defense, §§ 939.44(1), 940.01(2)(a) – Test for Admissibility
The “some evidence,” rather than Schmidt’s proposed less stringent “mere relevance,” standard controls admissibility of evidence of adequate provocation that would reduce first- to second-degree intentional homicide:
¶9 When applying the some evidence standard, “the circuit court must determine whether a reasonable construction of the evidence will support the defendant’s theory viewed in the most favorable light it will reasonably admit of from the standpoint of the accused.” [State v.
Self-Representation
State v. Anthony S. Irving, 2011AP1908-CR, District 2, 8/8/12
court of appeals decision (not recommended for publication); case activity
A defendant has a constitutional right to self-representation, State v. Imani, 2010 WI 66, ¶20, 326 Wis. 2d 179, 786 N.W.2d 40, but it must be triggered by a “clear and unequivocal” request for self-representation, State v. Darby,
Self-Representation: Klessig Waiver
State v. Dragisa Pavlovic, 2011AP2687-CR, District 2, 8/1/12
court of appeals decision (1-judge, ineligible for publication); case activity
Pavlic’s waiver of counsel so that he could represent himself at trial satisfied State v. Klessig, 211 Wis. 2d 194, 564 N.W.2d 716 (1997).
¶8 As a precautionary measure, the trial court granted Pavlovic a Klessig evidentiary hearing. We conclude the trial court’s waiver colloquy complied with Klessig.
State v. Juan G. Gracia, 2011AP813-CR, petition for review granted 5/14/12
on review of unpublished court of appeals decision; for Gracia: Tracey A. Wood; case activity
Warrantless Entry – Community Caretaker / OWI Enhancer – Collateral Attack
Issues (Composed by On Point):
Whether the community caretaker doctrine supported entry into Gracia’s bedroom after the police linked him to a serious traffic accident.
Whether Gracia’s waiver of counsel in a prior OWI conviction used as a penalty enhancer was valid,
OWI Enhancer – Collateral Attack – Prima Facie Showing
State v. Casey D. Schwandt, 2011AP2301-CR, District 2, 5/16/12
court of appeals decision (1-judge, not for publication); for Schwandt: Erik C. Johnson; case activity
Schwandt made a prima facie showing that he did not validly waive counsel in a 1997 OWI conviction used as a penalty enhancer.
General Principles.
¶5 A defendant may collaterally attack a prior conviction on the ground that his or her constitutional right to counsel was violated because he or she did not knowingly,
State v. Juan G. Gracia, 2011AP813-CR, District 2, 12/28/11, rev. granted 5/14/12
court of appeals decision (1-judge, not for publication); for Gracia: Tracey A. Wood; case activity; petition for review granted 5/14/12
Warrantless Entry – Community Caretaker
Entry into Gracia’s bedroom by police, who had linked him to a serious traffic accident, was justified by the community caretaker doctrine; State v. Ultsch, 2011 WI App 17, 331 Wis. 2d 242,