On Point blog, page 2 of 4

Habeas petitioner entitled to hearing on “textbook” improper vouching claim

Joseph J. Jordan v. Randall R. Hepp, 7th Circuit Court of Appeals No. 14-3613, 2016 WL 4119862, 8/3/16

Jordan claims the Wisconsin courts unreasonably applied clearly established federal law when they held that he was not denied the right to represent himself and that his trial lawyer was not ineffective for failing to object to the prosecutor’s improper vouching for a police witness’s credibility. The Seventh Circuit okays the state courts’ decision on self-representation but orders a hearing on Jordan’s ineffective assistance claim.

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Seventh Circuit: SCOW decision on self-representation is “flatly contrary” to Faretta

Rashaad A. Imani v. William Pollard, 7th Circuit Court of Appeals No. 14-3407, 2016 WL 3434673, 6/22/16

Imani tried to exercise his right to self-representation under Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975), but the Wisconsin trial judge prevented him from doing so. In State v. Imani, 2010 WI 66, 326 Wis. 2d 179, 786 N.W.2d 40, the Wisconsin Supreme Court held that the trial judge properly found Imani wasn’t competent to represent himself and that he hadn’t made a knowing and voluntary choice to represent himself. The Seventh Circuit now holds that even under the stringent standard for federal habeas relief, SCOW’s decision was wrong, and Imani is entitled to a new trial.

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Defendant’s behavior counts against him for speedy trial purposes, but doesn’t show he was incompetent to represent himself

State v. Ennis Lee Brown, 2015AP522-CR, District 1, 10/9/15 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

The 14½-month delay in trying Brown didn’t violate his right to a speedy trial, as “all of the delays are attributable to the defense, and most are attributable to Brown’s poor behavior and inability to work with his assigned counsel.” (¶56). At the same time, the trial court didn’t err in allowing Brown to proceed pro se at the start of trial, as Brown’s “poor behavior and inability to work with his assigned counsel” don’t show Brown was incompetent to represent himself.

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State court’s exclusion, on hearsay grounds, of exculpatory evidence didn’t violate right to present defense

Wayne Kubsch v. Ron Neal, 7th Circuit Court of Appeals No. 14-1898, 8/12/15

After being convicted of murdering his wife, her son, and her ex-husband, Kubsch was sentenced to death. He challenged his conviction and sentence in a federal habeas proceeding on three grounds: (1) the Indiana trial court excluded evidence of a witness’s exculpatory hearsay statement to police; (2) his trial counsel was ineffective in seeking admission of the witness’s hearsay statement; and (3) his waiver of counsel and choice to represent himself at the sentencing phase of his trial were not knowing and voluntary. The court, over a dissent by one judge as to the first and second claims, rejects Kubsch’s arguments.

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State court reasonably rejected claim that defendant was denied the right to represent himself

Laderian McGhee v. Michael A. Dittmann, 7th Circuit Court of Appeals No. 14-1763, 7/22/15

The Wisconsin Court of Appeals reasonably applied federal law in rejecting McGhee’s claim that he was denied the right to self-representation under Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975).

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Wisconsin’s standards for determining competency for self-representation are constitutional

State v. Andrew L. Jackson, 2015 WI App 45; case activity (including briefs)

The standard established under State v. Klessig, 211 Wis. 2d 194, 564 N.W.2d 716 (1997), for determining a defendant’s competency to represent himself does not violate Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 164 (2008), the court of appeals holds. The court also affirms the circuit court’s conclusions that Jackson didn’t validly waive his right to counsel and wasn’t competent to represent himself.

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“Bullshit” newly-discovered evidence and self-representation on 974.06 motions

State v. Joseph Jordan, 2011AP1249, District 1, 6/25/13; case activity; (not recommended for publication).

What a challenging case.  A jury convicted Jordan of first-degree reckless homicide and other crimes.  He lost his direct appeal and then filed a pro se §974.06 motion requesting various forms of relief, including a new trial based on: (a) newly-discovered evidence, and (b) ineffective assistance of counsel. He also filed several requests for counsel,

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Statute of limitations, § 939.74(1) — sufficiency of “John Doe” complaint’s identification of defendant for purposes of tolling statute of limitations; denial of right to self-representation or to substitution of counsel

State v. Rodney Washington, 2012AP1015-CR, District 1, 3/26/13; court of appeals decision (not recommended for publication); case activity

Statute of limitations, § 939.74(1) — sufficiency of “John Doe” complaint’s identification of defendant for purposes of tolling statute of limitations

The crimes in this case—sexual assault and robbery—were alleged to have occurred in 1994 and 1995. In 2000, eleven days before the statute of limitations was to run,

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Denial of right to self-representation — competence to represent oneself; search and seizure — probable cause, automobile exception

State v. Robert L. Tatum, Case No. 2011AP2439-CR, District 1, 1/29/13; court of appeals decision (not recommended for publication); case activity

Denial of right to self-representation – competence to represent oneself

The circuit court properly denied Tatum the right to represent himself based on his limited education and understanding of legal procedures, as evidenced by his statements and behavior in court. (¶13). While the circuit court found Tatum competent to proceed under Wis.

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Counsel – Waiver, Self-Representation – Presentencing Plea-Withdrawal

State v. Dennis C. Strong, Jr., 2012AP1204-CR, District 3, 11/30/12

court of appeals decision (1-judge, ineligible for publication); case activity

The trial court undertook an appropriate colloquy with Strong before allowing him to waive counsel and represent himself, leading to guilty pleas. The court thus rejects his claim that his pleas were premised on a violation of his right to counsel, ¶12.

Strong had an apparent change of heart after entering guilty pleas: he turned around and made a request for representation,

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